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FOREWORD—FAA AND NASA COLLABORATION
In the six months since the workshop took place, NASA and FAA have made great progress towards establishing
effective collaboration in Air Transportation Management (ATM) R&D:
The two Agency Administrators met, agreed that the agencies will cooperate and discussed the roles of each.
FAA and NASA have drafted a Memorandum of Understanding, for cooperating on Airspace System User
Operational Flexibility and Productivity R&D, which is expected to be signed by both Administrators shortly.
The FAA Associate Administrator of Research & Acquisitions and the NASA Associate Administrator of
Aeronautics have met several times and have agreed that (heir organizations will cooperate in ATM R&D to
include joint presence on Capitol Hill.
The FAA Research, Engineering and Development Advisory Committee and the NASA Aeronautics Advisory
Committee held a joint meeting to review the progress by the FAA, NASA and the DOD in developing a
national aeronautics alliance under the auspices of the National Science and Technology Council sponsored by
the White House. They have agreed to hold a joint meeting annually.
NASA is participating in the RTCA Free Flight Implementation Task Force with active participation in each
working group and the Steering Committee.
FAA and NASA have established an Interagency R&D Planning Team for ATM Automation under the co-
leadership of John Scardina, Manager of the Traffic Flow Management Integrated Product Team for the FAA,
and the undersigned for NASA.
This cooperation has come about in part by the strong, effective counsel provided by the speakers and panelists at this
workshop who eloquently spoke for an effective collaboration between the agencies. We hope you will continue to
participate with NASA and the FAA as partners in meeting the challenges of the ATM system research and
development.
Gregory W. Condon
Chief, Flight Management and Human Factors Division
NASA Ames Research Center
July 31, 1995
WELCOME
Len Tobias
Workshop Chairperson
NASA Ames Research Center
Moffett Field, CA
I'd like to welcome you to the inaugural meeting at the NASA Training and Conference Center. NASA is in the early
stages of planning a national program in Advanced Air Transportation Technologies (AATT) whose objective is to
substantially increase the efficiency and flexibility of the global air transportation system while enhancing the safety of
operations. Ames is leading this activity, but it is a team effort involving Headquarters and the following NASA
Centers: Dryden, Langley and Lewis. We also want to involve the user community and the FAA early in the plan
development, and therefore have organized this Air Transportation Management (ATM) Workshop. An objective of the
workshop is to develop an initial understanding of users' concerns and requirements for future ATM systems. Also, we
want early exposure to previous large automation system programs in air traffic and allied fields so that these
experiences can be factored into the plan.
We thank you for participating on such short notice and hope that you will find the workshop worthwhile.
VI
INTRODUCTION
Dr. Robert Whitehead is the Associate Administrator for Aeronautics at NASA. Bob received his B.S. (1967),
M.S. (1969) and Ph.D. (1971) degrees in engineering mechanics from the Virginia Polytechnic Institute and
State University. He began his career here at NASA Ames in 1970 as a postdoctoral research associate. He
worked for the Navy in the David Taylor Research Center and the Office of Naval Research before joining
NASA in 1989.
Robert Whitehead: I want to address the Headquarter's perspective on this workshop. I'm very happy that our FAA
colleagues are here. While it's true that Ames is leading an effort for the agency to try to put technology investments in
place for air traffic research and technology, what needs to be in place is a national investment in this area. It will take
all the players: the airlines, the manufacturing industry, the FAA, and NASA.
What does this mean? There is good news for a national effort in this area in terms of support by some important
customers, including the Administration. There's been a lot of support for aeronautics in the senior advisory activities
that are prioritizing requirements for federal investment. This National Research Council Aeronautics and Space
Engineering Board report in 1992 encouraged NASA to work with manufacturers, airlines and FAA to bring about major
improvements in Air Traffic Management technologies. The other recommendation was that we do research on
advanced subsonic and high speed transport aircraft.
The next year the Aerospace Industries Association came out with a report that recommended coordinating the work of
NASA and FAA to produce the best possible ATM system for the next century. Shortly, the Office of Science and
Technology Policy, through the National Science and Technology Council, will issue a report titled "Goals for National
Partnership in Aeronautics Research and Technology". The President means to prioritize R&D in the nation. The FAA,
NASA, and DOD will soon be asked to put together a national framework for aeronautical research and development.
So there's very strong support for aviation, but there's also a requirement that we have a national plan to be compared
with all other R&D activities, whether for clean cars, other modes of transportation, or health research, so that the
Administration can prioritize its investments.
A few years ago, with a lot of input from our research partners, we came to the conclusion that the traditional method of
supporting research investments in NASA (in which we might do research in aircraft technology for performance, some
environmental research, some safety, and some work with FAA and others on the airspace system) wasn't working
because we couldn't determine where the relative payoffs were in that type of work. With help from industry advisors,
we decided that we had to view aviation as a system in which we could trade off environmental impact and delays in the
system, with performance improvements on airplanes to determine where the best investments needed to be made. I
think this idea has worked very well.
Our current view, that also reflects the basic support of the Administration for a national framework for aeronautics, is
that there needs to be a national partnership of FAA, industry, manufacturers and operators, and NASA. We need to first
decide what the requirements are, what areas are realistic to make investments in; where those investments can come
from; and who needs to do the work. If NASA's going to invest in air traffic technologies, it's got to be in coordination
with FAA and the industry.
The NASA budget has growth in it through '98 primarily based on two large systems technology initiatives in advanced
subsonic technology and high speed research. This budget can be contrasted with an agency budget that is flat now and
anticipated to decline to help pay for the Administration's tax cut bill. Aeronautics in the agency has to compete its
program against space station, which is clearly the Administration's highest priority, new launch systems, etc. The
bottom line is there's not a lot of big new money out there. There's a significant investment that NASA can make in this
technology area if the community feels that that's a high priority investment to make. But I don't want anybody to
proceed down the road assuming that this program is a big addition to the budget. We've asked you to come here to help
us get your requirements on the table so that we understand and we can make adjustments within our budgetary
constraints.
ffice of Aeronautics
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
National Needs in Air Transportation
Technology
January 31, 1995
Bob Whitehead
Deputy Associate Administrator for Aeronautics
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VIEWPOINTS OF FUTURE ATM CAPABILITIES
Chair: Greg Condon
Chief, Flight Management and Human Factors Division
NASA Ames Research Center
Moffett Field, CA
Summary
The first two talks focus on free flight. Ed Thomas provides an overview. Lane Speck discusses the requirements that
RTCA generated as well as the first steps that FAA is taking towards free flight. Heinz Erzberger discusses lessons
learned from the development of CTAS and applies them to an evolutionary process towards free flight. In a different
vein, Bob Schwab discusses how a methodology for analyzing different technologies, both on the aircraft and ground-
based, could pay off in the traffic management system. FAA representatives, Neil Planzer and Clyde Miller, discuss free
flight and NASA's role in the evolution towards free flight. The last two speakers focus upon global issues. Jimmy
Boone provides a discussion of air traffic control operations in China, while Bob Ratner focuses on global safety issues.
The Future ATM System
Ed Thomas spent 23 years in the Air Force in various operational, flight test, development and acquisition
positions. He's currently Flight Systems Program Manager at United Airlines and has responsibility for
strategic planning for flight systems development and acquisition. Ed has focused the last year on future air
traffic management concepts, specifically free flight.
Ed Thomas: A future system is going to be beneficial not only for the users of the airspace but for the service providers
and for the public at large, because there are some major economic implications. From the airline point of view, the
present system has absolutely run out of capacity and flexibility. It's costing the airlines dearly from two causes:
increased flight time, which directly translates into fuel and crew and maintenance costs, and lost productivity.
United Airlines studies have shown about 18 minutes per flight segment is non-productive. Of those 18 minutes maybe
10 to 12 minutes is recoverable if we had a perfect system. Nobody thinks we'll ever have a perfect system, but I ask
you to multiply that lost 10 or 12 minutes per flight segment times the 2,000 flight segments we operate a day times 365
days a year. The total impact of this lost productivity is almost twice as big as the direct losses that we suffer due to fuel
and crew costs. The $10 billion a year figure (Figure 1) comes from work I've done with the International Air Transport
Association and is in line with the calculation of the losses that United Airlines is suffering.
Simply, the free flight concept is intended to address the requirement not only for capacity, but for additional flexibility.
It is not unusual for an airline operator to have route of flight, altitude, and in many cases, even speed dictated by
limitations in the air traffic system. The free flight concept's objective is that each aircraft has the ability to fly its own
dynamically optimized trajectory, making full use of onboard flight systems. The aircraft will provide position and
intent to the air traffic manager leading to intervention by exception or to near term conflict resolution; but in most cases
we would advocate that the large majority of aircraft be able to maneuver without restriction, unconstrained by a
clearance.
We also foresee that future onboard systems could assure (or guarantee) separation. This came out of work done under
the auspices of RTCA. Because of GPS, the aircraft knows position with a nominal accuracy of about 100 meters.
Compare that with the current lateral separation standard over the domestic U.S. of five nautical miles. We conclude
that due to the accuracy of GPS, the protected airspace that surrounds that airplane could safely be much smaller than it
is today.
Through automatic dependent surveillance and automation, we can identify situations in which two aircraft may be
approaching a conflict situation. Automation will identify the predicted conflict and suggest a resolution or restrictions
to controllers, and transmit the directive to the two airplanes with the controller's approval. Recall that this is near-term
conflict resolution, not the longer term procedural intervention we're used to now. It takes time to complete this process,
the system reaction time, and we must know how far could the airplane move within that reaction time. So an alert zone
is really an airspace volume containing all of an aircraft's future positions, a function of speed and maneuverability, as
well as other factors such as the capabilities of the communications, navigation, and surveillance systems on which the
future air traffic management system is based. Basically if the alert zone is clear, there is no reason an airplane should
be under any maneuver restriction whatsoever, because the system has enough reaction time to intervene for any aircraft
outside of that zone.
So, how does a free flight system contrast with the current system? Knowledge of intent can now be provided by the
velocity vector of each aircraft directly available from GPS; it is not available directly from radar now. That can provide
the controller with knowledge of future intent he needs to separate airplanes. In some cases we would like to delay
intervention even when a conflict is identified. For example, we might not want to resolve a conflict predicted 20
minutes in the future, because each airplane is free to optimize its flight path and might make a change that would
automatically resolve the conflict. As the airplanes get closer (within minutes), we can predict conflict with high
probability; those are the conflicts that should be resolved.
From the operator standpoint, flexibility is certainly going to allow us to find more efficient uses of the airspace. Until
now we've been developing communications, navigation, and surveillance without a clear concept of where we'd like to
go with air traffic management. All of our expectations about this future system are based on expectations of conflict
rate, is a function of dynamic density. But what will influence conflict rate? One factor certainly is the number of
airplanes in the airspace. The second is a catch-all called the complexity of the flow. Airplanes with different
performance, crossing tracks, and closely spaced airports, all have the potential to create more conflicts.
The last factor is under appreciated. It is the effect of the separation standard, a very powerful effect. As the required
separation distance shrinks, the number of conflicts declines, and this is a much more powerful effect than adding
airplanes to the system. Dynamic density can be used to forecast conflict rate, and will be a pretty good indicator of the
workload of the human operators in the system. When it approaches the limits of what the automation can handle, you
would expect that pilot and controller workload will go up. If it reaches a level the system can't handle, there will have
to be additional structure added to the system to limit the number of conflicts or to drive those to a lower level.
This sets the stage for what I see as the function of traffic flow management. We're not going to accept anything less
than 100% separation assurance. On the other hand, airspace users desire maximum flexibility. In instances where the
dynamic density is low or well within the capability of the system we create, we can then operate near the right-hand
side of this continuum in totally unrestrained operations. In cases of a busy terminal area at a busy airport at a busy time
of day, there may have to be some structure added to the system to suppress the number of conflicts that would occur
otherwise. There has been much debate about whether the two ends of this spectrum are opposites. In my view they're
extremes of the same system; the traffic flow management function is computing dynamic density for each sector, each
airport, each route, and what is the appropriate place to operate on the spectrum.
We all would like to see better real-time management of special use airspace. I think the capabilities of future systems
will make free flight possible in the majority of the airspace much of the time. Another important function that's well
developed is automated sequencing and spacing at the busiest airports. The CTAS system has been under development
and undergone some recent field trials that are very promising. Eventually we'll have complete airport surface
surveillance as well as automated ground guidance control systems. The technology will eventually allow high capacity
airport operations (approaching visual rates) even during low visibility.
Users, providers and the public stand to benefit from improved safety, service, and efficiency. The potential is really
here to revitalize the air transport industry and make benefits widely available to many people for whom it's not
affordable today. From the airline standpoint we're certainly going to insist that the benefits help us offset the
investments that will be required. This is a program of national scope; it's going to require the cooperation of all of the
interested parties to make it work.
Question (Bill Kramer, NASA Ames): Is your $10 billion figure only within the United States or is that a global figure?
Ed Thomas: That's for the 200+ airlines represented by the International Air Transport Association.
Question (Vern Battiste, NASA Ames): Have you given any consideration to what size these protected and alert zones
would be and what kind of impact that would have on the system?
Ed Thomas: The zones need to be as small as possible; the smaller the zones, the more you will be able to conduct
unrestricted operations. But there's a basic question of feasibility. Many people who have worked in busy control
centers think that what's great for the middle of the night over the western U.S. at FL 370 will never work at O'Hare.
And they may be right. But what will make the concept feasible is the communications, navigation and surveillance
systems and the automation that we're able to bring to bear on this problem.
We have already started to run some simulations. The FAA's Office of Operations Research has taken a quick look at
what happens to conflict rate on free tracks as well as the current airway system when you change the separation
standard. Without this recent flurry of activity on free flight, my concern was that we may have found ourselves, ten
years from now, having made the investment in satellite navigation, ADS, and data link communications only to find
that they're just not good enough to do free flight. And, of course, we would be in that position because we developed
those systems from the bottom up, instead of top down, starting with the operations concept.
Question (Judith Orasanu, NASA Ames): I can understand the potential economic benefit, but how do you see free
flight contributing to increased flight safety? I can imagine that if all the operators are trying to optimize in terms of
their own economics that you could end up with more congestion in certain key places.
Ed Thomas: One of the guiding principles is that we're not going to accept a lower level of separation assurance or a
lower level of safety. There are dramatic safety benefits right from the communications, navigation and surveillance
technologies themselves. All international airlines today operate over vast parts of the globe that don't have surveillance
or reliable communications, so there's an immediate safety enhancement just from having satellite or data link
communications available worldwide and from having better information in the cockpit and better exchange of
information between the ground and the cockpit.
We're starting to see the leading edge of systems that take advantage of this technology. One that I'm aware of recently
is an advanced ground proximity warning system that carries an onboard terrain data base, uses GPS derived position,
and provides in the cockpit a graphical representation of the location of high terrain in the aircraft's vicinity. Before, a
crew who got a ground proximity warning had no choice but to add maximum power and climb rapidly. Now they will
be aware that there may be a lateral escape route. There's a tremendous benefit in terms of situation awareness and
safety of operation.
Question (Herman Rediess, HER Associates): In the free flight concept do you a foresee a contribution that NASA can
make in the research and technology area, and if so what are the priorities?
Ed Thomas: The basic technologies are not only available, they're fairly mature. The problem is agreement on
standards, ones that can be consistent worldwide. Moreover, the missing pieces are the applications, (software), to tie it
all together into an integrated, functioning system. The technology's here, the applications are not. That's not surprising,
though, since we have just recently come to a consensus on what the operational concept should be.
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Free Flight
Lane Speck is the Director of the FAA's Air Traffic Rules and Procedures Service. .He has over 30 years of
service with the FAA, from line controller through management up to his current position. Lane headed up the
recent RTCA Select Committee on Free Flight.
Lane Speck: When it became abundantly clear that we at the FAA had better start thinking seriously about Free Flight
and all that it entailed, there were a number of approaches we could have used to begin to bring this into life. The option
we finally settled on was to use RTCA to sponsor a Select Committee. One good reason was that RTCA enjoys quite a
reputation for activism in the world of emerging technologies. The committee had between 15 and 19 members at any
given time who represented the spectrum of aviation users and interests.
Despite some widely divergent viewpoints on what Free Flight was all about, we reached consensus and produced a
product that is now in the hands of the FAA Administrator. It is a concept paper on Free Flight. I can't share the report
with anyone until the Administrator decides what action he'll take on it. Our fervent wish is that it will become a living
document that will take us through the next 20 years.
Our terms of reference were first to define Free Flight, obviously. Second, we developed an operational concept and
then assessed the effect this will have on users in terms of procedural and equipment ramifications. Third, we identified
studies and modeling for safe implementation. We also prepared a suggested transition strategy plan.
The definition that we synthesized for Free Flight is a safe and efficient flight operating capability under IFR in which
the operators have the freedom to select their path and speed in real time. Air traffic restrictions are imposed only to
ensure separation, to prevent exceeding airport capacity, and to prevent unauthorized flight through special use airspace.
Even those restrictions are to be limited in extent and duration and only to address an immediate ATC concern.
There are three components to air traffic management: procedures, automation tools, and infrastructure. In the
development cycle, there needs to be a continuing technology assessment coupled with operational performance
evaluation. From that assessment, you identify needs and shortfalls, which in turn can be used to produce a concept
requirement in any one of the three components: procedures, automation, infrastructure. I would argue that is the
process of improving safety and efficiency from an air traffic control standpoint.
The road map to free flight is shown in Figure 5. An interesting thing about the road map is that there is life after free
flight. Free flight is not an ultimate destination, it merely is a stop along the way. Where are we on the map? There is a
program today called the National Route Program. This is a program comprised of 104 city pairs with stage lengths over
1500 nautical miles in which airplanes operating at or above FL 310 can, in effect, free fly. We've been doing it for four
or five years. But there are some constraints: only 104 pairs with stage length minimums. There are about 700 eligible
flights a day currently in phase 1 of the program.
Phases 2 and 3 bring the altitudes down to FL 350. Phase 4 starts to get a little interesting because there are a lot of
airplanes at FL 330, the 727s, the DC-9s. So we're implementing in two stages: west, then east of the Mississippi 30
days apart, trying each for 60 days. Phase 5 goes down to FL 310 and the finale is phase 6 going to FL 290 and above.
Free flight is a reality. The work that the committee has done is setting out the road map that's going to get us there. As
I said before, the report is in the hands of the Administrator. My view of the world is there is such momentum behind
the concept of free flight that he'll endorse it and move on with it. If that happens, one of the recommendations in the
reports cover letter indicates that we'll use a task force to add the detail to the concepts contained in the report.
By the way, it was pointed out to me that this is really not a new concept. And as luck would have it I went back in our
archives and I pulled out a document dated 1979 with a title "Operation Free Flight, The Early Stages of Area
Navigation". The idea was with area navigation you could fly anywhere. The powerful concepts in free flight are the
reduction of separation. We're going to have to change the way we think about separation standards; instead of using
radar mileage between airplanes it's obvious that we're going use time between airplanes.
Question (Ken Booker, NASA): You had a staged implementation with 30 day cycles. I was wondering if you could
tell me what data you're going to look at during those 30 days and what the criteria is for success or failure?
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Lane Speck: The set of metrics we're developing is based on data that will come back from the users dealing with
savings in minutes of flight, pounds of fuel. The other metric involves safety; that is, do the system-wide operational
errors decrease? We'll be watching for the telltale signs of efficiency increases in terms of the users' performances and
also the safety aspect of it in terms of operational error measurements.
Question (Bob Simpson, MIT): In the last few years I've been looking at traffic flow management. If I'm a traffic flow
manager at Chicago, I'm going to have some problems with this. In conceptual air traffic management work, there's a
conflict between user-preferred routes and ATC-preferred routes. We have preferred routes in Chicago; every day we
have miles in trail, which can only be implemented by putting everybody into Chicago on those preferred routes. If you
start doing it at these flight levels, that technique of metering the flow into Chicago is impossible.
Lane Speck: Initially under this concept, we start 200 miles from the departure airport and we finish 200 miles before
the destination airport. But as we gain experience those points move closer to the airports depending on what traffic
flow management can handle. I don't think everybody's going to free fly up to within three miles of the runway at five
o'clock in the afternoon at O'Hare. One of the powerful ideas of the free flight concept, however, is you can organize a
system of routings around an impacted area in a more orderly way than we do now.
16
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dare to think about "unthinkable" things.
Because when things become "unthinkable",
thinking stops and actions become mindless.
Figure 2.
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Free Flight - A term used to describe a safe and efficient flight
operating capability under instrument flight ruies in which the
operators have the freedom to select their path and speed in real
time. Air traffic restrictions are only imposed to ensure
separation, to preclude exceeding airport capacity, and to
prevent unauthorized flight through special use airspace.
Restrictions are limited in extent and duration to correct the
identified problem. Any activity which removes restrictions
represents a move toward Free Flight.
Figure 3.
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AIR TRAFFIC SYSTEM MANAGEMENT
CURRENT NATIONAL ROUTE PROGRAM
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AIR IR VI I U S Y S I K M \1 V N A C I Ml M
Phase 1 J
O Current NRP & Non-Pref application
January 9.1995
O Systemwide flights FL390 & above
(Route limiting restrictions contained in current NRP are eliminated).
O Duration 30 days
February 1.1995Phase 2 E
O Current NRP & Non-Pref application
O Systemwide flights FL370 & above
(Route limiting restrictions contained in current NRP are eliminated).
O Duration 30 days
SOURCE: ATM-IOO
Figure 7.
AIR TRAM l(
Phase 3 ^
O Current NRP & Non-Pref application
March 1, 1995
O Systemwide flights FL350 & above
(Route limiting restrictions contained in current NRP are eliminated).
O Duration 30 days
Figure 8.
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• Current NRP & Non-Pref application
> Systemwide flights FL330 & above
(Route limiting restrictions contained in current NRP are eliminated).
) Structured Implementations
West of the Mississippi April 1,1995
East of the Mississippi May 1,1995
) Duration 60 days
Figure 9.
S Y S I K M \ i A N A C C
June
» Current NRP & Non-Pref application
o
> Systemwide flights FL310 & above
(Route limiting restrictions contained in current NRP are eliminated).
) Structured Implementations
West of the Mississippi June 1,1995
East of the Mississippi July 1,1995
> Duration 60 days
Figure 10.
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August
Current NRP & Non-Pref application
> Systemwide flights FL290 & above
(Route limiting restrictions contained in current NRP are eliminateri}
> Structured Implementations
West of the Mississippi August 1, 1995
East of the Mississippi September 1, 1995
> Duration 60 days
Figure 11.
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The Role of Automation in the Future ATM System
Heinz Erzberger is the Senior Scientist for Air Traffic Management Technology at Ames Research Center. He
has a rich research and technology background from theoretical work in guidance and control to technology
development activities. He's best known for his work in flight management systems and the current work in the
development of the Center TRACON Automation System, which is undergoing field evaluation under the FAA
TATCA program.
Heinz Erzberger: I'm going to report from the trenches: what we have learned from trying to develop a technology and
field it within the FAA infrastructure. I will summarize some of the philosophical and design principles that have gone
into the development in the Center TRACON Automation System (CTAS). I will conclude with a proposal to field-test
an essential automation tool needed to support user-preferred routing and free flight. Several years ago we formulated
some principles that we thought should guide us in the development of automation and the role that it could play in
improving efficiency. Primary among them is that automation provides a service to a person — whether it's a controller,
a pilot, or the future operator of a new service. That is, automation should serve the human and not vice versa. And it's
easy to lose track of that constraint and objective in developing automation technologies.
If we're designing for the controller, we should try to complement the controllers' skills by enhancing perception of
traffic situations. Also, we should have well-defined objectives. It has been emphasized many times during the last
seven or eight years when talking to controllers or other service providers, that if they can't specify the objectives very
well and if there isn't a consensus about these objectives, we should leave it alone for now, at least insofar as automation
tools are concerned. Automation should be defined and validated in field tests. You cannot simply develop automation
in a laboratory and then throw it over the fence and into the field, because functionality evolves through use, which has
to be done in the field.
What specifically is automation for ATM? The engine that powers automation in the sense of our terminology is
prediction, performed accurately and on time. Prediction accuracy depends on the quality of modeling, which is where
the technology and science come in. Modeling includes aircraft performance and trajectories; the atmosphere;
operational procedures that include controllers and pilots, operational constraints (airport capacity and separation
minimums among others); surveillance, navigation, and communication systems. Accuracy of prediction is the real
prerequisite for an efficient planning and control system. A famous philosopher, Yogi Berra, addressing himself to the
question of prediction, has said, "prediction is very hard, especially when it's about future."
When looking at the air traffic management process through the glasses of human-centered automation, it shouldn't come
as a surprise that I see the future lies in a series of evolutionary tools that are centered around the operators of the system.
As we follow a flight from start to end, and as we move through the airspace, there are different people concerned with
the management of that flight. You can think of automation tools as assisting in that process by helping to remove all
unnecessary constraints. In a way, all the automation tools we are designing attempt to minimize the impact of
inevitable constraints, whether they are minimum separation, capacity at the airport, or a constraint on the ground
movement of the aircraft at the airport.
I would like to stress that one of the most complex parts of the work to be done in the future is the seamless integration
of all of these pieces of automation. That will take an unknown amount of time, because it's both software integration
and procedural integration at multiple locations. These are complicated issues that will be a challenge to NASA's
proposed initiative.
For those of you who are not familiar with it, CTAS is a set of integrated tools that assist in traffic management. At
about 200 miles from the airport (45 min. from touchdown) the planning tool, known as the traffic management advisor,
examines airport limits and decides, based on actual aircraft tracks, measured velocity, and proposed routing, whether a
direct route to the touchdown point is feasible or a structured route with delay must be used. It devises a plan that works
within the hard constraints and attempts to minimize potential delays. Then the descent advisor tool helps controllers
implement that plan, including offering an unconstrained fuel-optimized descent to the feeder gates to the degree
possible without conflict. As the aircraft gets to the TRACON the final approach spacing tool assists in accurate spacing
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of aircraft on final. Each of these tools attempts to minimize the impact of constraints on operational efficiency, and in
that sense they all contribute to free flight.
Here is an outline for a proposal to define automation requirements for User Preferred Routing or Free Right in the en
route airspace: to conduct operational tests of automation tools in a limited airspace region within two years. It follows
in the footsteps of the CTAS development: field an early prototype and then expand its operational envelope and
functionality based on field test experience. Furthermore, we will use the CTAS predictive models for aircraft
trajectories and conflict probing and the descent advisor real time software and computer interfaces that have recently
been tested at Denver. The existing infrastructure at the Denver Center developed for CTAS lends itself to adaptation
for these tests in an efficient way. By installing a portion of this infrastructure at another Center, such as Los Angeles,
User Preferred Routing would become feasible for selected flights between these two hub airports.
The tests would quickly determine the accuracy and reliability of the trajectory prediction and conflict probing software.
In addition, human factors issues such as defining appropriate roles for flight crew, controllers and airline dispatching in
the operation of automation tools for User Preferred Routing and Free Flight would be resolved.
In summary, there is an opportunity to accelerate progress in free flight by applying CTAS trajectory synthesis software
and infrastructure that is operational at the two test sites, Denver and Dallas/Fort Worth. This proposed approach allows
us to get to these tests faster, cheaper and with greater realism than by simulation alone. Airline participation in the test
would help us resolve some air-ground integration issues. We can establish methods for integrating both en route and
terminal area automation functions in a way that is least constraining to the aircraft operators. At the end of the tests in
about 2 years there is a potential of having an interim capability built from the test system to support user preferred
routing in selected airspace until the necessary automation functions become integrated into FAA's future en route
operational systems.
Question (Phil Smith, Ohio State): You and Lane Speck both mentioned this 200-mile boundary. I was curious to know
whether there is any data available to indicate the extent to which that 200 miles is effective for airports with different
capacities and limitations.
Heinz Erzberger: There's an empirical process to determine it. You find that instead of 200 miles, a better way is to use
45 minutes in time. A 45-minute prediction interval is very large for accurate prediction under any circumstances (our
target accuracy is ±30 seconds). With GPS providing accurate up-to-date state information on the aircraft as well as
downlinked intent from the aircraft's FMS, you could probably go to about an hour and be accurate within 30 seconds.
That's a rule of thumb consistent with our experience in observing our trajectory predictor in operation. We've been
monitoring the errors of prediction in real time with live data at Ames, and we have a very good feel as to what level of
accuracy can be attained with different kinds of equipment on board.
Question (Harold Mortazavian, UCLA): It seems that the concept of free flight, although it provides additional
flexibility, does impose control problems that are more complex because they are more distributed than previous control
problems. What is your perspective?
Heinz Erzberger: I'm not sure what you mean by distributed. What I was referring to is that a more random distribution
of traffic rather than traffic along fixed routes may produce benefits in that there may actually be fewer conflicts to
resolve. On the other hand, those conflicts are now less predictable by the controller as to where they will occur: there
will no longer be will known hot spots at particular intersections that controllers can easily monitor. To illustrate this
problem, a live traffic recording of two hours duration for Dallas/Fort Worth depicts arrival tracks like freeways. A free
flight aircraft from San Antonio to Denver crosses this arrival stream, where some aircraft in it are already in descent:
there are rather complex conflict situations between en route free flight aircraft and a dense arrival stream where
technology could play a role in enabling constraints to be relaxed.
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Figure 1.
Design of Human Centered Automation
for Air Traffic Management
• Automation should serve the human (controller, pilot....) and not
vice versa
• Automation should enhance the controller's perception of traffic
situation
• Automation should complement controller skills
• Automation should achieve well defined objectives
• Automation should be designed with controllers as members of
design team
• Automation should be refined and validated in field tests
Figure 2.
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WHAT IS AUTOMATION FOR ATM?
• The engine that powers automation is prediction, performed
accurately and "on time"
• Prediction accuracy depends on the quality of modeling:
- Aircraft performance, trajectories
- Atmosphere
- Operational procedures (controllers, pilots)
- Operational constraints (airport capacity, separation minimums,
etc.)
- Surveillance, navigation and communication systems
• Prediction accuracy is the prerequisite for efficient planning and control
"Prediction is very hard, especially when it's about the future"
Y.B.
Figure 3.
The Air Traffic Management Process
^V^ Center TRACON
Nk^ Automation System
Tower TRACON Center TRACON Tower
Figure 4.
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NASA/FAA
CTAS Concept
TMA plans
sequence
landing time
DA advises
fuel efficient
descent to
meet time
FAST advises
for accurate
spacing on
final approach
Figure 5.
Center-Tracon Automation System (CTAS)
Computer intelligence and graphical interfaces for the planning and
control of arrival traffic
• Its "Brains" are:
• an FMS-like 4 dimensional trajectory analysis algorithm
• a sequencing and scheduling algorithm
• Its data bases include:
• a library of aircraft performance models
• real-time model of winds and temperatures
• Its functions refined in thousands of hours of real-time controllers-
interactive simulations
• Its 400,000+ lines of 'C' code validated using live ATC data sent directly
to this Laboratory from Denver and Dallas Ft. Worth ATC facilities
Figure 6.
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STEPS TOWARD USER PREFERRED ROUTING AND/OR FREE-FLIGHT
Evaluate automation methods for reducing constraints on routing and
flight operations in congested airspace.
Approach:
• Follow in the footsteps of CTAS development:
• Field early prototype and then expand its operational
envelope and functionality based on field test experience
• Field system capable of evaluating major alternative concepts
• Exploit field-tested CTAS and on-board technology
• Host-to CTAS interface device (PAMRI-E)
• CTAS predictive models for aircraft trajectories and conflict
probing
• Descent Advisor real-time software and computer human
interface
FMS and ACARS equipment
Information Flow among ATM-X Tools
Figure 7.
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A Technology Requirements Evaluation Test
of
User Preferred Routing (UPR)
Objective: Conduct a limited operational test within two years to expose
the technical and operational obstacles that must be overcome
in order to make user preferred routing safe and routine in the
enroute airspace
Expected Results: Information to define the technical specifications and
requirements for key technologies and operational procedures
that must be developed for UPR to become a reality
Success of the test will be measured by the lessons learned
and technical deficiencies exposed, not by demonstrating
an operational prototype
Figure 9.
Technical Issues to be Examined
Establish conflict detection probabilities
• Probability as function of prediction time-horizon
• Probability as function of flight segments: climbout, cruise, descent
• Probabilities of "False Alarm" and "Missed Alarm"
Identify cost-effective and fair procedures for resolving high-
probability predicted conflicts
Operational roles and integration of:
• Flight crew and cockpit system
• Controllers and ground systems
• Airline dispatching/operations
» Integration with CTAS ascent and descent management
Figure 10.
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Controller Issues
Enroute controller workload of monitoring separation of a mix
of free-flight and standard route aircraft
Change in workload with increasing density of free-flight
Potential for increased operational errors in free-flight environment
Role of automation technology for mitigating potential adverse
effect on controller workload and operational error rate
Role of controller/coordinator in free-flight planner automation
Figure 11.
Test Setup
Controller/Coordinator
CTAS Workstations
Voice Comm, data links
Note: CTAS at ZDV and ZLA
provides access to all track
and flight plan data for use in
conflict probing.
Free Flight
Airspace
IIErzbcrger/1.24.95
Figure 12.
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Figure 13.
Benefits of UPR Requirements Test
Opportunity to accelerate progress in Free Flight by applying field-tested-
CTAS trajectory synthesis
• Proposed approach allows this test to be done faster, cheaper and
with greater realism than by real time simulation alone
• Airline participation in the tests will help to resolve air-ground integration
and compatibility issues
Establishes requirements for modifying CTAS to handle both enroute and
terminal area automation functions
Potential for adapting UPR test Facility to serve as an interim
operational facility in selected airspace, until Free Flight Planner functions
have been integrated into the FAA's future operational systems
Figure 14.
31
Toward an Industry CNS/ATM Strategy
Bob Schwab is the Senior Principal Investigator for ATC Systems Analysis at Boeing. Bob also has over 30
years of experience in navigation and air traffic control research at Boeing. He's involved in the analysis and
modeling of ATC systems and their interaction with airborne systems. He's been a leader and a participant in
many industry committees addressing standards for these systems. The subject of Bob's talk is "Toward an
Industry CNS/ATM Strategy".
Bob Schwab: I want to underline the word "toward" in the title of my talk, "Toward an Industry CNS/ATM Strategy".
I won't say that we have a strategy but I'm going to talk about a process that we've been investigating and developing to
work toward industry strategy. That process is going to address a number of the themes that have been addressed this
morning. The value of technology is very much at the core of this particular investigation. For example, what is the
value of GPS? What is the value of all the technology that's being proposed in the system for incorporation on the
airplane and on the ground? Another theme is loss of productivity. How do we enhance the productivity of the system
and how much lost productivity is recoverable?
Part of what we've been investigating are some operational concepts that address the same kinds of issues as free flight,
but perhaps in a little different context than the RTCA activity. Part of the theme of this process is that nobody really
knows how the future's going to evolve and what we want to talk about is a process of decisions that are robust over a
wide range of possible future states of the world.
But before I get into the specifics of my talk I just wanted to say a little bit about kind of where we are going. The
FANS 1 program is being actively pursued with our suppliers, the FAA, and with CAA's in the Pacific and some other
parts of the world. This program involves our production program, a 747-400 in this particular case, and the
implementation on that airplane of GPS, ADS and data link functionality. This is a first step toward, a new ATM
paradigm. The difficulty is the lack of definition of ATM in this whole process. Somebody once said in talking about
FANS that CNS is all cost and ATM is where all the benefits are in the system. So we really have to address the ATM
side of the CNS/ATM equation. And that's the place where the definition probably of the future state is the least clear.
For the first time FANS is addressing RNP: required navigational performance, the basis for the certification of the
airplane in this particular case. This is the beginning of a shift in the way we're doing business when instead of
addressing specific navigation equipment to fly in various types of airspace, we address the underlying qualities of that
equipment to operate successfully in the airspace.
Product opportunities emerge when there is technical readiness. One problem is that there is so much technology that we
have a difficult time sorting out where the high leverage is. The process I'm going to talk about tries to address that
issue. Markets for ATM are complex; ATC systems differ throughout the world. Resource availability of many
divergent people and institutions is another key issue. It's the resources we have as airframers and suppliers, operators,
service providers, and infrastructure developers. And finally, and possibly most critically, is financial viability. How do
we recover the investment we've got to make in new technology? How do we get the benefit or increased productivity
out of this investment?
The process really has two components: a bottom up part of it, which might be to evaluate the value of a technology in
terms of product opportunity, and the more difficult part of making decisions about what technology gives me the most
leverage? How do I sort out what the compelling and driving technology that really dictates the product strategy?
The process itself is rooted in classical systems engineering and systems analysis. The process starts with an
environment definition, a mission analysis for the CNS/ATM system. The mission analysis involves a number of high
level tasks including the definition of high level system requirements, drivers, productivity, safety, capacity of the
system in a fundamental sense, as well as alternative operational concepts (not one operational concept but alternative
concepts). What I have then is a high level overview. This is based on work that's been done at Boeing over the last
year or so in the avionics and systems organizations, in which a cross-functional team got together and addressed this
problem.
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The process starts at the top with future scenarios. We don't know what's going to happen to the future, so let's define
different future states. Those scenarios drive global and regional air transportation system demand. This fundamental
notion that the system requirements ought to be driven by demand and capacity is the engine for the whole process. The
demand now has to be translated from revenue passenger miles (RPMs), an economic demand, into operations and then
into operations spread over different entities into a peak airborne count; a busy en route center into a number of
operations at Chicago O'Hare. These figures drive communication loading, conflict rates, and a number of fundamental
parameters in the system.
Once demand is characterized, we then address required system performance. Although there are a number of different
views of this, I think there's convergence on a few key aspects. We talked about different concepts of operation and the
tradeoffs that are involved in them as well as technical alternatives. Do we want GPS, automation on the ground, some
kind of advanced TCAS? What technologies could I plug into these requirements that satisfy the required system
performance; which is the system driver?
We postulated two not necessarily exclusive future states. One state we called a shared environment, a highly integrated
environment in which the airplane and the ground are working closely together. It includes a data link with exchange of
information. The other environment is an autonomous environment with AOC: the airline operational control in the
airplane that picks up many of the traditional ATC functions. The point is not to determine which way things will go,
but to determine how we will evaluate these different strategies, these different operating concepts, and how will they do
against our requirements.
In both cases we looked at the notion of free flight. In the shared environment we looked at it for en route flight with a
flex-track operation in the terminal area. In the autonomous environment we assumed operation in free flight all the way
to the final approach point if that's plausible in the terminal. What does that do to requirements, the point is to drive
requirements from the concept of operation. We then worked the problem linking these high level requirements and
those that we call functional or top level architecture attributes. We then examined design drivers for certain events that
occurred in the system; e.g., transition from free flight into a constrained terminal environment. The load on the system
in terms of conflicts and actions to resolve the conflicts is the driver, for example, on the requirement for
communications, navigation, monitoring and so on.
The next task is an analysis process that investigates various scenarios and regions of analysis in the world. The
methodology is to put together a decision model and examine it in terms of determining the drivers and sensitivities in
terms of performance and payoff, and then to compare the alternatives over a range of outcomes. We employed the
process in the early stages of the FANS 1; we computed costs, benefits, and investment from the points of view of ATC,
the airline, the supplier. And based on that we come up with a recommendation for alternative strategies.
Question (Heinz Erzberger, NASA): Do you have a tool to do these studies with?
Bob Schwab: Yes, we have a tool to evaluate the decision model in terms of net present value analysis, sensitivity
studies and so on.
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Product Opportunities Emerge When
Multiple Criteria Are Satisfied
Technical readiness
Market requirement
Product opportunity
Resource availability
Figure 2.
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Process for Industry ATM/CNS Solutions
Economic & Geo-Political
Air Transportation System
Industry Shared Scenarios
Air Transportation System
Global &
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System Architecture
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Evaluation Criteria
CMS/ATM Life-Cycle Return
Figure 6.
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Functional Category & Key
Characteristics
Functional Categories
» Relate to Historical ATM Tasks
» Provide Link between Present
and Future Concepts of
Operation
Key Characteristics
» Related to selected Concepts of
Operation
» Provide Focus for design
Alternatives
» , Support Assessment of
Technology Requirements/
Time line
» Associated with Different Design
Disciplines
RComP
» Data Link Requirements
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» Detection / Resolution Time Constraints
Figure 8.
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Analysis Process
Include all Scenarios and Regions in the Analysis
Use Meaningful Reliable Information: Know What's Important;
Have it Correct & Explicit; Account for Uncertainty
Have Clear Values & Tradeoffs: Identify all Stakeholders;
Explicitly Consider Timing & Risk; Win-Win
Use Logically Correct Reasoning
Model all factors that
will Impact Business
Value.
Identify Sensitive Variables
in Tornado Diagram
Compare Alternatives
over the Full Range of
Potential Outcomes
Figure 9.
Airlines FANS-1 Global Operations
Global Airline FANS ver.001r4
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Viewpoints of the Future ATM Systems
Neil Planzer is the FAA's Director of the Air Traffic Plans and Requirements Service. He has over 21 years of
service with the FAA, during which time he's held a series of positions with increasing importance related to air
traffic control, automation software and program management.
Neil Planzer: I want to share some thoughts and some concerns with you. I want to talk about goals, conflicts, egos,
elitism, management and leadership. I want to talk to you about the process that got us to free flight and how free flight
is influenced by that process. A lot of people in this room believe technology is the center focus of free flight. I'm
telling you it is not and it should not be.
Free flight is not a new concept. Controllers always talk about "moving tin". Every time a controller squeezes out one
more departure, every time a pilot flies his airplane at maximum efficiency in order to minimize the cost to his operator,
they're working toward and striving for free flight. Free flight simply means that we want to maximize the use of the
system; we want to put all our assets to work for us. People at the highest level, people in this room, people at my level,
and people above me have all of a sudden woken up and said, "What a great idea". They were driven there by natural
leaders, not by the bureaucracy. They were driven there by people like Bill Cotton, Jack Ryan, Lane Speck, Mike Biata
who generated a congressional hearing that caused people to understand that free flight was to our benefit. The people
who did this, the people who overcame the elitism that claimed, "we know best; it's a technology issue; I've got a Ph.D.;
I'm a technologist; I may never have flown an airplane; I may never have separated an airplane, but I have the answers,"
we're overcome by people with different ideas generated by different agendas. And those different agendas brought us
to the point when the time is right for us to take free flight and similar concepts and move it to a new plateau when it's
right to change the system.
The airlines do not have the goal of free flight; the airlines have the goal of maximizing profits. Free flight is a means of
getting there. They're assuming and demanding that when you do free flight, you will do it conflict-free and conflict-
resolved; that safety will not be an issue.
The FAA has a different goal; it shouldn't care only about maximizing profits. It is a factor, but it is not the agency's
primary goal. The FAA's goal is the safe, orderly, and efficient movement of air traffic. There's a conflict between those
two that we've worked on to overcome through the efforts of people in this room.
NASA has a different goal. NASA is a research organization. NASA is saying, "we can help you; we can look at things
that you can't see; we have resources that you don't have." And the FAA is threatened by some of what NASA says.
And NASA doesn't like what the FAA says when we talk about who leads and who supports the future ATM system.
That is a conflict that can be overcome and will be overcome.
The unions have a much different view of free flight. For them, it's a threat; they can lose their jobs; they're scared. We
have a labor-intensive system and we're implying that we're going to automate that and you're not necessary. How many
people here are doing research on transitioning controllers from controllers to system managers? I am not surprised that
no one here is doing that research. The airline pilots are nervous. They're scared because they're afraid that they're
going to dump equipment in the cockpit that they can't manage. And the pressure on them to perform, to increase their
company's profits, is extreme. You should remember that none of them are flying for Pan Am, Eastern, or Peoples
Express anymore. They know the real threat, that a lot of us in this room don't know: that they can be out of business.
Their drive is also profits but it's so they can keep their employment.
We've also gotten some unspoken voices in free flight: the people who fly in the airplanes. And if anybody thinks that
they're driving free flight, you're wrong. All they want to do is get from point A to point B safely in a reasonable amount
of time. They don't want to sit on the ground in a hot airplane waiting for a departure sequence. And they don't want to
give up one iota of safety to reduce a few minutes of flight time. That's what they care about: their agenda is different.
Congressman Peterson (D. Minnesota) went on the floor of Congress and said, "I've got a button that says Free Flight."
He tried to explain free flight as airplanes going wherever they want to go and landing on their own with no structure.
He talked with Lane and me the next day about free flight issues, and he said that we have got to change names. They
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told him he's out of his mind. That was a reflection of the unspoken voice. They don't understand air traffic
management; they don't understand how airplanes move in the system; and because of that they, too, are scared.
What we've done is taken an old concept, we've massaged it, we've agreed to it and we've set it out as a flag: we said
free flight is where we're going. Free flight is not all or nothing. Everything you do moves you along the continuum that
Ed Thomas (United Airlines presentation) talked about towards free flight. If it doesn't, you shouldn't do it. If it
damages safety, you shouldn't do it If it doesn't improve profits, you shouldn't do it. And if you're doing it because you
like to collect technology, you shouldn't do it. Because, as we were told at the opening, the budget is narrow and thin;
this is not the time to waste dollars in competition with each other.
In my view there are three steps of how to get to free flight. What we're doing now, what Lane talked about, is dealing
on the margin with current procedures. It doesn't change the labor intensity, it increases the labor intensity. We're going
to do lots of things that move us on that continuum, but please remember we're on the margin. Only one thing is
preventing us from going beyond that and it's a tremendously large hurdle. You can't get beyond where we are today
except on the margin until you solve the conflict detection and resolution problem in an automated way.
The term dynamic density is an excuse that says I can't deal with those many airplanes at one time. We talked about 203
airplanes at FL 430. There are 200,000 airplanes that fly below 10,000 feet. If you do not resolve conflict detection and
resolution, you're going to be hemmed into playing on the margin. Step 2 is an infrastructure to place automation into
conflict detection and resolution. Step 3 is the strategic work that deals with getting beyond the current labor-intensive
operation. The third step says that everything you do should be developing in regard to infrastructure and automation
takes you along the continuum towards a free flight environment.
Lane's slide containing the three parts, procedures, automation and infrastructure, was designed by Margaret Jenny and
me for a talk we did at ATCA. It's saying the same thing: that it is not a one shot deal, not an on and off. It's a
continuum that we have to move along. And in that movement, we're focusing on technology only to the detriment of
the controllers and the pilots that are going to have to make it happen. How many of you are familiar with cockpit
resource management? Now is a time in which research needs to change and not be technology-focused but human-
focused. The cockpit resource must include the pilot, co-pilot, and the ground.
There are three competing philosophies on where the system of command and control should reside now. One features
an all airborne system; another one features an all ground based system; the third is a shared system. I would suggest to
you that everybody who looks at that understands that today's system is shared and tomorrow's system will be shared.
But instead of being shared with visual approaches they'll be shared through technology. The research that should be
going on would address what portions of it should be shared; what makes the most sense to put ground based; what
makes the most sense to put airborne; and how the human is going to interface with those two.
Now there are five competing systems to automate the process that will lead to conflict problem and resolution. There's
NASA's CTAS and TATCA. MTTRE's doing AERA. NASA is now saying it wants to do a future system on a clean
sheet of paper. You also have avionics and GPS manufacturers with a whole different view of it Those four systems
and the FAA's own traffic flow management system are in competition for dollars. Those five have to be pieces in a
consistent plan. The overlap must be eliminated.
That brings us to the final issue, the one that I want to emphasize. It's not only the challenges to the pilots; it's not only
the challenges to the controllers; it's not only defining what dynamic density is; it's not understanding that the system is
shared, which is pretty obvious; it's not even understanding who's going to determine what parts of the system will be
shared and to what degree. It is who is going to lead the march to that flag. And I tell you from my heart that it
shouldn't be NASA. NASA's role is not to lead the march. NASA's role is to support the march.
The leader of that march is a conglomerate: it is the airlines; it is the pilots that live below 10,000 feet; it is the
controller's union; it's the Allied Pilots Association; it is ALPA and it is the passengers. Those people need to be brought
together in some unity, and that too is not NASA's role. I suggest to everyone in this room that the leadership role fits,
by legislation, intent, and directive, squarely on the shoulders of the FAA, and that the FAA has to break out of its ego,
its elitism, and share with NASA the role that NASA does best. And NASA has to understand that it has a supportive
role in this effort, and there is no place for a clean sheet of paper in a system that is moving as rapidly as ours is moving.
The work that you do here is marvelous; I'm a big supporter of the concepts and technologies. My only criticism for you
is that you sometimes are reluctant to let it go. There's a point where research ends and productions of the system begin.
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In my role involving air traffic requirements I'm going to put a lot of pressure on you to transfer that technology to the
field and to pay attention to the humans' role in that technology.
I'd like to introduce Clyde Miller, who is the Manager of the Research Division at the FAA. He has some projects that
came out of the two-day seminar we just completed as examples of the role that NASA has and can have in making the
flag and a march to that flag a rapid and successful one.
Clyde Miller: I think Neil has been very clear that the FAA does not support a NASA-led national research program in
advanced air traffic management. My senior manager, George Donahue, the Associate Administrator for Research and
Acquisition of FAA, called Wes Harris, the Associate Administrator for Aeronautics at NASA on January 6 and
explained that the FAA believes that this initiative is ill-advised and does not support it. Neil has done a good job of
explaining the reasons for that, perhaps there will be more discussion about this during the next two days.
I want to make a point for Bob Whitehead who spoke of the importance of establishing national partnership in
aeronautics and air traffic management. This group should recognize that there is a very strong national partnership in
air traffic management today. There has been an enormous investment made in that partnership by all elements of the
aviation community, and there is also a very strong and very active international partnership in air traffic management
under the auspices of ICAO. Anyone who would work in this area on a broad front must recognize that these
partnerships exist and be aware of the work they have done.
I'll point outthree particular areas where these partnerships have been very active and where there is broad community
consensus regarding what needs to be done. And in this there are important things for NASA to do. The first is the
ICAO CNS/ATM initiative, which addresses satellite communications and navigation capability, automatic dependent
surveillance and the automation that stands on the shoulders of these utilities. It's important to recognize that around the
world CAAs and airlines are making enormous investments in that work of ICAO, and it's not something to be taken
lightly; it must be taken as a stepping stone for where we go from here. A clean sheet of paper is not going to work.
A second focus is free flight, an initiative under the auspices of RTCA. RTCA is the premier national forum for
bringing the community together to talk about needs and technical alternatives. They have been in the forefront of the
free flight initiative and will continue to be. The third is the aviation safety conference that was held in Washington on
January 9th and 10th. One thousand people came to Washington and talked about aviation safety and what needs to be
done. There's a very clear consensus around the things that need to be done. I have a 50-page list with perhaps 200
recommendations that were generated by the group. I think most of you recognize the kind of work that needs to be
done.
So what are the initiatives that NASA can contribute to? The first on my list is human factors. We have for years been
developing and revising a national plan for human factors. We tell one another that it would take $90 million a year of
research investment to fulfill this plan over a period of five to ten years. But nobody's got the $90 million. People are -
working on bits and pieces of the plan, but we are fooling ourselves saying that we're going to spend $90 million or even
to say that it's required, recognizing that it's not available. And at the same time we know that fully 75% of our aviation
accidents have human error as their primary cause. So we are schizophrenic in this respect and we need to stop that. We
need to get busy on aviation human factors.
There was a very clear message from the airlines at the Aviation Safety Conference that they would like to learn to use
simulators as a primary means of flight training. Now, that's an idea whose time has come. If we can figure out how to
do that, we can make a fortune. A second area concerns the integration of flight management system operations with
ground-based air traffic management and airline operational control using data link to share information among them.
That's a clear requirement, a clear need, to which inadequate attention is being paid today. That's an area where FAA
and NASA need to work together.
The third is wake vortex. There is some national concern that we do not adequately understand the behavior of wake
vortices and that our current standards for separation do not fully protect all aircraft under all circumstances. That's not
acceptable. We need to do the research to understand wake vortices and change our separation standards if need be.
There's a need to improve situation awareness for the general aviation pilot, including navigation, traffic advisories, and
air traffic management and weather information in a coherent, integrated format in the cockpit. We need to pursue
participatory separation procedures based on TCAS or CDTI traffic display. We've already got the intrail climb
procedure in place. We need to develop cockpit moving map displays. We need to evaluate these displays to enhance
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situation awareness on the airport surface; the runway incursion situation is not acceptable. Work is required to apply
human factors principles to standardize procedures and communications on the airport surface, a very important
initiative that came out of the Aviation Safety Conference. We need to develop and evaluate systems capable of
detecting ice on aircraft. We need to develop materials and aircraft coatings that will shed ice. We are a long way from
having an effective means of inspecting the structures of older aircraft; airlines are interested and rightly so in operating
aircraft longer. We need to further reduce noise and air pollution emissions from airframes and engines. There's a
fortune to be made there and quite a lot of opportunity for improvement.
Finally, there is widespread national interest in proactively compiling and analyzing safety data so that trends can be
detected and corrective actions taken before accidents occur. It has been pointed out that if you extrapolate the current
accident rate to 2010, given the projected growth in aviation, we will lose one aircraft each week. The secret to avoiding
that is to proactively deal with safety data.
The people and facilities of NASA are a national resource with important contributions to make. A NASA-led program
for next generation air traffic management is a bad idea, but there are any number of specific initiatives to which NASA
will make important contributions.
Question (Victor Riley, Honeywell): It seems to me that the value of a clean sheet of paper approach is that you can
open up the solution space and explore technologies and design concepts that you might not otherwise consider if you
were constrained by an evolutionary approach. While you wouldn't necessarily actually implement what you would
come up with as a total system from a clean sheet of paper approach, to the extent that it can provide you with the
opportunity to develop new design concepts that could be integrated into an evolutionary approach, it seems to me that
this role of technology development would be an appropriate role for NASA. Is that not your view of what NASA's role
is?
Neil Planzer: No, it's not mine. If it's semantics, I'm simply saying this: we've done a review; we know where the
system is going. What we need is to figure out how to transition a system that's in constant evolution. It operates 36
million instrument operations a year; it has a tremendous existing infrastructure that must be changed out; safety cannot
be diminished; but volume must double and triple in the next two decades. And all of that must be done simultaneously.
A clean sheet of paper may work very well when we're designing an operational base for the Fiji Islands, because they
have no existing infrastructure and you can equip airplanes any way you want, but it doesn't work well and has failed for
us a number of times before. So the answer to your question again: no, I don't believe a clean sheet of paper is the
correct approach nor do I think NASA's role is to do that.
Victor Riley: I don't think I expressed myself very well. The value of a clean sheet of paper would not be to develop a
total system concept that you would implement as a total system, rather to give you the opportunity from a research
standpoint to explore potential solutions that you might not otherwise explore. And to the extent that this approach can
provide the opportunity to come up with better design solutions that could be integrated into an evolutionary system, is
that not a potentially valid role?
Neil Planzer: Yes, I think that's correct for identified problems. I don't think there's the time, the dollars, or the ability to
correct unidentified problems. If I don't have an identified problem, I don't have a problem. And a clean sheet of paper
assumes that we don't have it, that we have no idea where the problems exist. I think you heard from Clyde and from
one of the other speakers, that it's pretty clear to us what we need to do. What we need to do now is figure out which
technology will do that and which technology makes the most sense, because in most cases multiple technologies can
accomplish it. If that's what you mean by your clean sheet of paper I have no problem with that.
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Air Traffic Control in China—Now and the Future
Jimmy Boone is the Director of Avionics and Flight Systems for the Boeing Commercial Airplane Group. His
30-year career at Boeing has been focused on avionics and flight systems. He played a key role in the
introduction of both autoland and digital avionics into the Boeing aircraft.
Jimmy Boone: I'll be discussing work that we're doing in China with respect to the air traffic control system and the
impact of traffic growth in Asia. I'd like to discuss what that impact has been on China and the status of air traffic
control capabilities in China. I will describe just briefly our joint air traffic services task force, the status and immediate
objectives for that task force as well as the long-term objectives.
Everybody is talking about dynamic density. One of the questions you have to ask yourself is how does all this play out
outside the United States? Elsewhere in the world the dynamics of the overall industry are really astounding. The Asia-
Pacific area is growing over half again as fast as average world growth. It's growing a third again faster than the next
most active growth area, Latin America. And we're talking about doubling traffic in that area just within the next 16
years. This has been despite the huge economic downtrend around the world; that economic downtrend did not affect
China. Chinese air traffic growth has been an amazing 20% per year for two decades. Their density today is still pretty
low compared to the United States, but they're a little bit like Los Angeles was before they learned how to build
freeways.
We forecast that China will grow at an estimated 13% per year, roughly equivalent to their economic growth. This
implies a doubling of traffic within the next eight years. So, how are they going to handle this? The eastern region of
China is pretty well populated with modern radar equipment and modern conventional control. The problem that they
have there is it has never been networked together and they've never been able to put together a comprehensive control
capability. The western part of the country literally is desert. The southwest part of the country is all Himalayas with
not a lot of traffic over there except in very narrow selected routes.
Due to potential oil reserves and global position, China really becomes a confluence of all the international markets as
well. What are they going to do about that? How do they afford to put a high capacity system together? They were very
concerned for a while that they were going to have to establish a moratorium on bringing any more airplanes into the
country at all because they had such congestion and reduction of relative safety just in the eastern part of the country.
And this was particularly true in an area that we now call the triangle, between Beijing, Guangzhou and Shanghai.
About half their traffic and boardings all occur within that area, and they experience greater than 20% growth.
We picked a new metric, so we wouldn't contaminate it with things that people normally look at, because I wanted to see
the total impact of their current traffic congestion. We started off with what we call a "total system delay" of 5,000
minutes. This includes delays due to overflights, delays within the specific airports because of the normal procedures
and so on. And what does 5,000 minutes mean? If you look at the average traffic mix within that area, that's roughly
equivalent to having a fleet of eight 757s sit on the ground all day long burning fuel, doing nothing else. With 10%
traffic growth delay increases quite a bit more, and 20% growth gets it up to the order of 17,000 minutes system delay:
an equivalent fleet of about 37 757s. In Beijing in July this year, they had 22% growth. So they're really in trouble.
We also looked at their operation from a more conventional set of metrics: delay per operation. The rule of thumb is
that you're in trouble any time you're approaching five minutes average delay. In January of 1994 they were slightly in
excess of five minutes! So they had asked Boeing if we would help them put together a systems approach to their air
traffic management problem. We agreed and established a team of people not only from Boeing, but CAAC, Harris, and
SITA (Societe" Internationale Telecomunique Aeronautique).
We established a statement of work for five years. It had to be an integrated team because the Chinese have to buy into
anything we're going to do if it's going to happen. And they demonstrated their commitment to the program by making
the current Director General of the Air Traffic Management Bureau part of the team.
We determined that we had long-term and near-term problems. In treating those problems we decided that we had to set
up a modus operandi that would allow us to develop ICAO-compliant solutions, not necessarily American solutions.
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(Remember: LAX operations run close to 2500 to 3,000 depending on the season; Beijing runs about 300 depending on
the season. So there's a big difference in where they are.)
There's some misunderstanding about what this team does. It's a consulting group; we don't procure nor do we work as a
contractor. Our immediate objective is to work the triangle problem, to increase safety and capacity. We discovered we
had to refresh them all in their English Air Traffic Control phraseology. We updated their telephony standards and radar
separation procedures. We had to conduct training, set up simulators, update their internal standards. They thought they
had a valid certified technician policy and program. They didn't really. We're working on that now. They need
effective, trained certified technicians so controllers will trust their radars.
For our near-term status, we've completed training. Radar control will be initiated within the triangle starting March of
1995, this will migrate throughout the entire triangle to provide a combination of radar control with DME backup by the
end of the year.
What we're doing near-term has to be compatible with the long-term, a ground rule I set up in the beginning. It turns out
that the concept of clean sheet of paper isn't realistic. You always start somewhere with an existing system. It turned out
that we were really fortunate we had to work the near-term problems, because it reinforced the necessity of developing
the controllers along with operations and equipment improvements. In China, when a controller has perhaps three
airplanes that he's working, he's starting feel a little bit maxed out. That's what he's used to. At LAX or SEA/TAC; they
start to feel a little maxed out and pressured with nine airplanes. There's a big difference just in their own psychology.
You cannot take an individual who's been working only three airplanes and suddenly "stuff him into a seven, eight, or
nine airplane environment!
In the process of working the triangle problems (which primarily focus on the controllers and on the controllers'
equipment), we think we're laying the basis for working the controller into a CNS/ATM environment of the future. Our
purpose is to develop a plan for stepwise implementation; you just don't do it all at once. When I first talked with
CAAC, there had been a number of studies they previously commissioned by various organizations including the FAA.
In one report, 175 recommendations had been made. I asked the CAAC, "What have you done about those
recommendations?" And they said: "Nothing". I asked "Why?" "Well, they only told us what we already knew. They
said you're deficient here. You need to fix this up. You need to improve that and you need to add this". And we said
we know all that. But they didn't tell us how to do it. I was surprised. But then I got back home and I considered
progress on the ICAO FANS initiative. ICAO's been pushing CNS/ATM technology for a long time trying to make it
happen. It wasn't happening because nobody could tell "how to do it". "How to do it" means taking a stepwise
approach.
Today, we're limited to considering free flight 200 miles from the departure terminal to 200 miles from the destination
terminal. That's a step. But who has been working getting it from 200 miles to down on the ground? A flight starts at
pushback and it ends up at power-off. I'm not aware that any of us has taken a real systems approach to that problem and
developed the technical migration path to its solution. Countries like China, Russia, and others can't afford to build their
national traffic management system, with the safety standards and all that is implied, using non-technology-ready
designs. They must be reasonably validated and proven.
We know that if third world countries can't make the money off of these new technology systems, if they can't amortize
their investment. Since the domestic densities are low and they don't yet have a level of competition we have here in the
United States or in Western Europe, domestic airlines cannot support an adequate fee structure. They really have to
build their new technology routes starting with international routes, a source of hard currency. With international routes,
there is the promise of amortizing investment costs.
In conclusion, current developed CNS/ATM technology is technically ready for en route use only. More needs to be
done for the terminal area. To my knowledge there is no credible R&D program looking at the integration of both the
ground-based and airborne-based equipment and ground-based and airborne-based procedures applied to all phases of
the flight. That's one area where I think NASA can play a strong role because of the facilities and the interface they
have.
The other thing we discovered in dealing with CNS/ATM routes is that you have to develop a whole route at a time. We
started off with the idea that we would just work within the borders of China; it immediately became obvious you can't
do that. When we start with Beijing over-the-pole route, we're going to go Beijing/Detroit. The weakest FIR in the
system is the one that regulates the whole system.
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Fleet mix in the airspace is important. For a long time to come, the fleet balance will favor older, lower technology
aircraft non-compatible with CNS/ATM technology. This poses a real problem in countries with a lot of restricted
airspace where it's difficult to provide preferred routes for preferred (i.e. CNS/ATM compatible) aircraft. This leads one
to consideration of retrofit capability; making all airplanes usable in this kind of environment. If you consider the rate at
which we introduce new aircraft with McDonnell Douglas, Airbus, and Boeing Company and Fokker (even working
overtime), we still don't introduce many new technology airplanes into the system at a rate to effectively support
CNS/ATM development. Retrofit is a big deal and it's very expensive. And we're not going to get anywhere until
somebody works that problem!
Question (Jimmy Krozel, Hughes Research Laboratory): Is there anything about the Chinese culture that brings to the
air traffic control situation something we in the West can learn from?
Jimmy Boone: One of the things that we bring to the table for the CAAC (and this is what they hoped for) is a system
engineering approach. This includes establishing a vision of where you're going to go, and then making sure that
everything you do keeps you on plan to achieve that vision; then everything is task driven and coordinated. That's not in
their culture right now; you find a lot of almost disconnected initiatives. They still have a lot of "prestige driven"
programs. One individual will get an idea, and will push the idea. Another fellow will have a different idea; he'll push
that. And they'll do both of them, but not necessarily connected together, not necessarily task driven, often not on plan.
Their culture is hierarchical, and we're very egalitarian. This does make a difference, especially in the quality assurance
area. We're going to conduct an extensive seminar for all the CAAC middle management along about mid-year. The
idea of having continuing inspection to check on equipment or on proficiency is something they know they have to do
but haven't worked out within the context of their own society. On the other hand there are important cultural
similarities where they're no different than we are. Although any one of their controllers may get nervous because he's
got more than three planes on his scope, the reason he gets very nervous is because he's just as dedicated to safety as
anybody anywhere else in the world. When it comes to their personal integrity, their desire to do the job right, they have
no peers.
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Conclusion
• Current CMS/ATM technology only allows
exploitation of En-route
• No R&D organization looking at integration of
ground-based and airborne elements to extend
CMS/ATM from En-route to TMA and runway
operations
' CMS/ATM routes must be developed a route at a
time (half route has little value)
- Fleet mix
- Economics
- International coordination and cooperation
Figure 17.
56
Future Challenges in ATM—An International Perspective
Dr. Bob Ratner is a director of Transportation Decision Systems and has been involved in a range of air traffic
control and aviation activities for about twenty-five years, in North America, Asia, Australia, and greater
Europe. For the past dozen years he has spent most of his time in international activities, on the far side of the
Pacific. His work has focused on safety enhancement and quality assurance for air traffic services, especially as
regards human factors in ATM and man-machine interfaces. He has been involved in the requirements design
and specification of a number of advanced ATM system components, and has contributed to the new Australian
ATM system in the areas of requirements evaluation and specification from concept inception to the present.
Bob Ratner: We can say "ATM" in one breath, but the truth is that ATM represents the integration of quite a number of
technologies, both "hard" and "soft" ones. I want to address some of these technologies that seem particularly relevant to
the international aviation scene.
ATM is achieved when safe separation of all participating aircraft is achieved, when the inherent capacities of all
elements and parts of the aviation system are used most efficiently and effectively, and when all information necessary
for safe and efficient flight operations is readily available as needed. I expect quite a lot from ATM, and in particular I
include in that expectation the performance of the human element of the system, in whatever role or roles evolve for it.
We've moved a long way in air-ground communications, from flags and lights to data links and satcoms. We assume
that within a relatively short time, communications will not be a limiting factor in ATM anywhere on the globe. But
"need not be" and "is not" are two different things. We will not reach the ideal in our lifetimes, because of costs, mixes
of aircraft and services, and because it's not necessary, for ATM, to have continuous communications where densities are
low and separation can be coordinated by other means.
To many of us, GNSS seems to be the solution to all our navigation and surveillance problems; therefore it would be
silly to include any other navigation technology in a discussion of ATM futures. Not everyone agrees; there are still
questions about system control, security, and achieved operational accuracies and reliabilities in the cockpit. And of
course, long term, there is the issue of who pays. Can we relegate ground-based aids in the future to backup roles in
dense terminal areas? Time will tell.
Radar, both primary and secondary, are what most people think of first for surveillance, although in this audience I
suspect that it's ADS that first comes to mind. But let's not forget the first and key surveillance sensor, the human eye.
No busy airport can expect to run safely at capacity traffic levels without it. And of course the second surveillance
sensor, if you care to think of it as such, was the pilot position report. Now ADS promises to be cost-effective solution
for much of the world in the not-too-distant future, and this means that all the operational aspects and data
communications aspects need to be worked out. For example, there is still a healthy debate going on about required
ADS reporting rates. This affects costs significantly, at least where satcoms are involved .
I think of automation and augmentation technologies together because many people say automation when they really
mean augmentation. The distinction for me is whether we are talking about bringing information to a human decision
maker, which I call augmentation, or about computer programs that make decisions currently made by people. By
"making decisions" I mean selecting among alternatives according to complex criteria, especially using incomplete or
conflicting information.
The line of separation between information processing and decision making isn't precise, of course; there are computer
programs that some would call automation and some would say are merely information processing. I won't talk any
more about automation in the strict decision-making sense, because the aviation community is not ready to consider
taking the man out of the ATM loop, and because the limits of augmentation are still out of sight. The type of
augmentation that will have the greatest payoff in the foreseeable future is information integration, about which I will
say more shortly.
The fact that air transportation is part of the world's economic infrastructure today is largely because it has been made
extremely safe and reliable. This has been the result firstly of engineering advances in hardware engineering,
manufacturing, and testing, resulting in better technologies, better delivered. The level of safety enjoyed in many parts
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of the world today has been the result, secondly, of software engineering, development, and testing advances, which
have led to more timely and accurate information for operations and operations planning, and to better control systems
and human-machine interfaces. RDP systems on the ground, and FMS computers in the air are examples.
The third part of achieving reliability, quality, and thereby safety, has to do with the human part of the air transportation
system. It would be incorrect to say the human part of the system has not advanced over the years. We understand
better how people learn and therefore how to do better training. We understand better how to enable people to work
together in teams. And, we are beginning to understand the causal factors in human error and how to limit their effects.
Most of the money spent in ATM has been spent to provide ground infrastructure for those areas of the world where
traffic densities were growing fastest, so as to facilitate economic growth of the aviation industry and its contribution to
national economies. This meant North America and Western Europe in the main, and other isolated regions such as
Eastern Australia, parts of East Asia, and the terminal areas of a relatively few large cities. But the regions of greatest
potential aviation growth in the next 20 to 50 years are certainly in greater Asia, probably in South America and the vast
area of the former Soviet Union linking Eastern Europe and the Far East, and quite possibly in Africa and the Pacific
Island Region as well.
These areas have common characteristics far different from the North American and Western European nations where
ATM grew up. In much of these areas communications are currently based on HF or non-existent, radio navigation aids
are few and far between, and civil radar systems for surveillance exist only around a relatively few major cities. There is
no money to duplicate the ground infrastructures of the West. Were it not for the success of the ICAO FANS work in
defining a global CNS system based on GNSS, we would have no hope of supporting the potential economic growth of
these regions.
There is competition pressure among the world's airlines, airframe manufacturers and other industries supporting
aviation. The western nations will be competing not only with each other, but quite naturally with developing regional
aviation companies as well. Just as in most businesses, competition is based on price and quality, although in
international aviation institutional, national, and political factors will continue to have effect. Price is based on cost,
which means that keeping airline operating and ATM costs down is of primary importance. Quality is based on a
number of factors, including availability and reliability of service, which places requirements both on ATM quality and
on aircraft reliability and capability.
Quality also means safety, and safety requirements are set more by sociopolitical expectations than by technical or
economic considerations. What can be said about the evolution of safety expectations and requirements, from an
international perspective? First, safety expectations for aviation rise in proportion to a society's reliance on aviation.
Second, a basic tenet of aviation, that when an accident or serious incident occurs we work to determine the causal
factors, and learn from these investigations how to enhance safety in the future, will endure as global aviation continues
to grow. And third, human factors, especially as regards the performance of teams of people, are dependent on cultural
norms and the extent to which they are shared. Within this context it will be necessary to develop and maintain world
standards of aviation safety, to support the increasingly globalized international economy.
Lastly, we live in a world in which safety can be threatened by dissident groups, and there doesn't seem to be much
prospect of this changing. So security requirements will continue to be with us. Requirements notwithstanding, the state
of airline security in the world is not very good. Paradoxically, perhaps, it may be better in those countries where
personal freedoms are not held more highly than national interest. As airline traffic levels grow internationally, security
requirements will become proportionally greater. It remains to be seen where and whether society will demand that
these requirements be met.
Today heavily trafficked long-haul routes outside of radar surveillance are often handled with organized track structures.
These represent compromises with operational efficiency. Given the advances in CNS associated with FANS
implementation, increased availability of wind field information, and increased competition, there will be more and more
pressure for most efficient routing. With current aircraft trends, this means virtually everyone will want the same route
at the same altitude, and often at the same time. With ADS, in principal, enroute capacity can be increased dramatically
from today's procedural standards, virtually to the standards used in radar airspace. "All one does" is raise the ADS
reporting rate. But there are some open issues here. Reporting rates for particular separation standards are not yet
agreed, and human capacities and requirements for high density ADS operations are not yet understood.
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Economic growth in some areas will lead to large multiple airport terminal area complexes eventually rivaling the New
York Metroplex. For example, the Pearl River Delta area of South China will have at least five airports handling
significant international traffic within fifteen to twenty years. A great deal of development of regional ATM will be
necessary to operate such a metroplex safely and efficiently.
While technology for enroute and terminal area ATM has continued to receive quite a lot of development attention in the
western world, airports in most places, both in the industrialized west and internationally more broadly, continue to
operate in a manner not well integrated with the rest of ATM. Tower controllers must accomplish direct traffic control
duties, essentially-clerical information-recording tasks, and voice coordination with terminal controllers and planners, all
without well-integrated operational information. Information on current and forecast traffic, weather, facilities and
equipment status, flow management plans or requirements, and systems status, are often presented in a difficult, isolated,
and sometimes untimely way. Both safety and efficiency suffer. This is so for the busy airports of the industrialized
West, where controllers have considerable experience, training, and support infrastructure. How much worse it is then,
for airports elsewhere where traffic has grown and is growing without such preparation.
Let me describe what I see as the present state of the art in ATM systems for the parts of the world I've been discussing;
not for radar-saturated countries, but for the rest of the world. The most modern national ATM system not based on
virtually-complete radar coverage, that is actually being built, is the Australian Advanced Air Traffic Services system,
TAAATS. Since capability without radar coverage is so important internationally, I want to show you its major features,
before closing with some challenges for the future.
TAAATS is a system based on the creation and maintenance of timely and accurate flight data; it is not an augmented
RDP system, as are the systems used in radar-saturated countries like the U.S. Whatever information is available, radar,
GNSS, pilot report, or any other, is used to update the flight plan data, which is disseminated wherever and whenever
needed in the system. The TAAATS system design is based on presenting information via electronic display.
Information and functions of the paper flight strip are distributed to tactical and planning controller displays. The design
has been tested quite a lot, and seems to get us over the paper flight strip hurdle.
As has been said, an international aviation infrastructure that will support world trade and economic growth in the future
must provide a uniform standard of product quality. This implies further research and development at least in the
following: multi-cultural human factors, improved incident and accident investigation methods and protocols, and
comprehensive command and team training programs.
No one should end a talk like this without asking the bottom-line question: Do we need air traffic control in the future?
This really boils down to where and how can aircraft operators provide safe and efficient services without ground-based
ATC? This is a tough and often emotional question, because it involves economics, technology, cultural norms, and
vested institutional interests. It involves exploiting the capabilities of cockpit-based FMS, and integrating appropriate
air-ground and perhaps air-air communications capabilities, understanding the proper role of an ACAS/TCAS system in
maintaining safe separation, defining the residual role of ground authorities, and analyzing the costs and benefits to see
where this would pay off.
We'll have to understand together the difference between automation and augmentation, and which one we want where.
I don't think it is beyond the near-term state of the art to implement a safe system of airborne distributed traffic
separation control for high altitude operations world wide. The difficult part will be figuring out how to transition into a
traditional ATC environment at destination.
Question: Bob, you mentioned the status of the system was half done. Does this mean that half the software is done?
Bob Ratner: The TAAATS system has been under development from the requirement stage for three years now. I've
had the opportunity of helping in the developing of those requirements. A year and three weeks ago a contract was let
for the building of the system, and as of three weeks ago the system had actually completed all scheduled milestones up
to that point. There're two more years worth. There's already interim hardware deployed to work that, although
admittedly is not the FDP part of the system that's deployed. But the software is in place for the next phase, and I fully
expect that in two years it will be fully working.
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Future Challenges for ATM:
An international perspective
R. S. Ratner
Figure 1.
What I'd like to cover today
Principal Underlying Technologies of ATM
International Implications for ATM
An Example of a State of the Art ATM System
Some Challenges for ATM R&D
Figure 2.
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Threads of the ATM cloth—The Component Technologies
Communications
Navigation
Surveillance sensors
Automation/Augmentation
Reliability/Quality/Safety
Human Factors
From the ICAO ADS Panel (Montreal, May 1994)
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Event contract request
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Figure 3.
Table 5.1.-1 Exchange Rates Expected for ADS Messages (of various types, for various airspaces)
"Where ranges of values are shown, they reflect substantial uncertainty in the expectations.
They do not merely reflect expected variation among data contributing to the averages.
Figure 4.
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An International Perspective
Higher Growth Rates
Isolated Terminals
Increasing Competition
Uneven Safety Levels
Security Vulnerabilities
Leading to...
Figure 5.
Enroute Congestion
New Terminal Areas
Airports Lagging Behind
Figure 6.
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An Overview of The Australian Advanced Air Traffic Services
System (TAAATS)
A Flight Data Based System, not an augmented RDP system:
All Surveillance Modes Update Flight Plan Trajectories
The Focus is on Maintaining a Timely, Accurate, Conformance-checked
Data Base from which All Displays are Driven, and All Decisions are
Made.
Figure 7.
An Overview of TAAATS (cont.)
System Integrates
Radar Data Processing
Flight Data Processing
Controller Pilot Data Link
Automatic Dependent Surveillance
Flex-Track Display and Management
Pre-departure Clearance via datalink
Aeronautical Information Distribution
Figure 8.
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An Overview of TAAATS (cont.)
No Paper Flight Strips (except towers)
Separation by Display, not Flight Strips, with
Sufficient Flight Data in Track Labels
Single Display of Radar, ADS, and Flight Plan (Procedural) Tracks
Integration of Sensor and Flight Plan Data to provide Route and Level
Conformance, Conflict, MSAW, Alerts in both Radar and ADS Airspace
Automatic Handoffs and Distribution of Flight Information
Figure 9.
An Overview of TAAATS (cont.)
Modern Graphical Display Interface, with Windows, Menus, Mouse with
Dual Integrated Scalable Offset-able Screens
Integrated Traffic, WX, Facilities, NOTAM information
Data Link Managed From Display
Automatic ADS Contract Management Dependent on Availability of
Independent Surveillance
Figure 10.
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An Overview of TAAATS (cont.)
On-screen Tools for Conflict Management and Separation—Route Probe,
Time-of-passing, Track Angle, Range/Bearing, Inter-console pointing
System and Aircraft Estimates Cross-checked
Flight Plan Conflict Probe
OLDI Interface with Adjacent FIRs
Figure 11.
Challenges for International ATM
Efficient Operation of New Multi-airport terminal Areas
High Capacity Enroute Flows
Integrating airport operations with terminal enroute in congested
environments.
Regional capacity and demand management
"Beyond flex tracks" on oceanic and low density long-haul routes
Figure 12.
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Challenges for International ATM (cont.)
A World Standard of Safety
Multi-cultural Human Factors
Improved incident and accident investigation methods and protocols
Comprehensive command and team training programs
Figure 13.
Where can aircraft operators provide safe and efficient services
without ground-based ATC?
Exploiting the Capabilities of cockpit-based FMS, and integrating
appropriate A/G and perhaps A/A communications capabilities.
Understanding the proper role of an ACAS/TCAS system in
maintaining safe separation
Defining the residual role of ground authorities
Analyzing the costs and benefits to see where this would pay off
Figure 14.
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USER REQUIREMENTS
Chair: Tom Snyder
Director, Rotorcraft Technology Planning Activity
NASA Ames Research Center
Moffett Field, CA
Summary
The session begins with four speakers representing a spectrum of professional groups who each discuss ATM issues and
requirements: Jack Ryan, ATA; John O'Brien, ALPA; Pat Gallagher, APA; Karl Grundeman, NATCA. Robert Ken-
examines the impact of ATM on avionics systems including design issues and retrofitting. The general aviation
revitalization issues and their relationship to ATM development are outlined by Bruce Holmes. Tom Salat focuses upon
the special issues concerned with rotorcraft operations including altitude restrictions and common IFR routes. John Zuk
concludes the session with a status of tiltrotor activities and the special requirements needed to integrate tiltrotor
operations into advanced ATM design.
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ATA Requirements
Jack Ryan is Vice President, Air Traffic Management, for the Air Transport Association. Before that he spent
33 years at FAA in air traffic control. He's a member of the RTCA Committee on Free Right.
Jack Ryan: Since the primary responsibility for implementing the U.S. air traffic management system lies within the
FAA, and they generally understand the airline community's requirements, albeit with the predictable and occasional
disagreements, and understanding that we always seem to want things yesterday, I'm going to focus my comments today
on what NASA can do in several areas to help the FAA achieve and the users benefit from breakthroughs and analysis in
technology and procedures.
I think it's vital for FAA to capitalize on NASA's expertise in these areas as they are doing now in the fine and
innovative work of my friend, Heinz Erzberger, on the Center-TRACON Automation System. The first area of research
is in free flight. This concept that has received a lot of publicity lately, but I'm not sure it is generally understood. In the
final report of the ICAO FANS Committee it is said that because new CNS systems permit closer interaction between
the ground system and the air space users, Air Traffic Management would permit a more flexible and efficient use of air
space and more specifically improved accommodation of a flight's preferred profile in all phases of flight based on
operators objectives. In other words, the provision of user preferred trajectories.
Is this free flight? Not quite. Free flight is one more complicated and gigantic step. In free flight the aircraft operators
have the freedom to determine their flight paths in real time in the four dimensions of latitude, longitude, altitude, and
speed. But this is without prior clearance from air traffic control. I'm not so sure that everybody grasps this important
difference between user preferred trajectories and this definition of free flight that the RTCA Committee on Free Flight
adopted.
How do we do that? A proposed concept suggests that a flight plan is filed generally outlining the user's intention.
When the aircraft is airborne, ATC grounds surveillance, either secondary surveillance radar or automatic dependent
surveillance, tracks the aircraft. ATC automation could create around the aircraft an imaginary hockey puck of protected
air space which would encompass any changes in altitude or heading that the operator could make without permission
from ATC. When ATC ground automation predicts that two or more hockey pucks would overlap, then some
intervention by ATC would be necessary.
The question that NASA can help FAA and the industry to answer is whether this and other free flight concepts are
feasible. What is the size of the hockey puck? How often will ATC have to intervene given a certain level of traffic, or
if you will, dynamic density? What capabilities must ground automation have to accomplish this? And ultimately, does
it make any sense and is it more efficient to free-the-flights or to continue with the current system of mother-may-I?
A natural outgrowth of the improved accuracy of GPS is the possibility of reducing current separation standards.
Notwithstanding the accuracy, there is a point of diminishing returns for ground-based ATC when considering the
reaction times of controllers and pilots and communications lags at closing speeds of 1,000 knots. But, if the
responsibility was assigned to involve aircraft in certain instances to separate themselves using an agreed-upon scenario
of responsibility, what would the benefits be? At what point should the transition of control responsibility be made from
air to ground? What equipment must be available to the crews of participating aircraft? What are the human factors
implications? And lastly, given the aircraft densities of the future, is this necessary at all, and if it is, where?
To clarify that point, assume that GPS can provide super accuracy that we've never known before, and it is built into a
separation standard. If the separation standard could be 1,000 feet, not vertically but horizontally, is that the kind of
separation standard a controller on the ground can manage? Even given data link and resolution advisories that AERA
might promise, I'm not sure that the reaction times required on the part of the pilot, the controller, and the
communications system, whatever it is, should be managed from the ground.
I think it's important for NASA to analyze these situations and decide if there's a cost benefit associated with reducing
separation standards from the current five miles enroute to something less than that, and if there's a benefit, at what point
do you transfer separation responsibility to the two pilot managers, if you will. I'm not advocating that all separation
responsibility goes from ground infrastructure to pilot. What I'm addressing is a cooperative system where, generally
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speaking, infrastructure on the ground manages separation, but in certain instances it's passed to the aircraft to
accomplish the separation in an already predetermined procedural way; not one where everybody has to ask each other
10 or 20 questions to figure out who has the responsibility. This would be a predetermined responsibility scenario.
Researching these questions seems like a natural for NASA to undertake through modeling analysis and actual flight
trials.
There are two more areas in which NASA can augment FAA's work on the CNS system. Continuation of the flight tests
and analysis involving GPS CAT 2 and 3 landings. The latter involve the development of the so-called TCAS-4. I think
that ADS-B is TCAS-4 taken to its logical conclusion. How does it fit in free flight? How are its squitter capabilities
used on the ground? What display and symbology does the crew need? These projects cover the heart and soul of ATM.
Answers to these questions bring you close to solving the big issues necessary to implement CNS ATM in the United
States. If we are to move forward in this time of diminishing government budgets and tight fiscal policy, we must
encourage the FAA and NASA to pool their resources both fiscally and more important intellectually. FAA must be the
manager of the overall ATM project, but NASA has the expertise to perform a very important role. I recommend that
FAA and NASA agree on their relationship and roles, otherwise we all will suffer. Get on with this extremely important
project and vital work for the benefit of all of us.
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Suggested NASA Directed Tasks
Jack Ryan
Air Transport Association
1. Analysis of "ATC Contract Free"
Operations
2. Reduced GPS Derived Separation
3. Participatory Pilot Separation Needs
4. GPS CAT II III
5. TCAS IV Design and Use
Figure 1.
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ALPA View on Future ATM System Cockpit Issues
John O'Brien started his career with the Airline Pilots Association in 1972 as a staff, engineer in the Engineering
and Air Safety Department. He was the staff coordinator for ALP As All Weather Flying, Air Traffic Control
and Pilot Training Committees. In 1975, he was promoted to Deputy Director-Operations; in 1978 was
promoted to Manager of Engineering and Operations; and in 1982 was promoted to Director of the Engineering
and Air Safety Department. Prior to coming to ALPA, he spent 7 years with Pan American Airlines, two years
with the airline division and five years with the aerospace services division. In addition to flying for Pan
American, he was a project engineer for a NASA contract to study margins for space shuttle design operations
and safety. His credentials include an M.B.A. from Stetson University and a B.S.A.S. from Embry-Riddle
Aeronautical University. Today, he oversees an office staff of 27 and assists in all aspects of the activities of
the entire ALPA air safety structure which consists of 15 technical committees, 14 regional safety chairmen, the
safety committees of 42 airlines (both central and local), and a number of special programs and projects which
total over 700 pilot volunteers.
John O'Brien: The comments this morning brought up a very important recommendation that I was going to cover at the
very end of my presentation. Rather than waiting, I'll address it now. That is, there is a reduction in financial resources
available to do research, certainly within the FAA and also probably within NASA. And without some kind of a shared
responsibility, not just in free flight or future air traffic management, we're certainly not going to see the result of
properly focused research.
I want to present a brief view from a pilot's perspective of some important air traffic management issues. First let me say
that I do not mean to imply that today's air traffic system is not safe: it is indeed safe. However, as demand on the
system has increased, there have been, for lack of a better term, innovative approaches taken to get the last bit of
capacity available, through use of avionics, procedures, hardware and software, both on the ground and in the airplane.
The system today doesn't provide the most efficient way of doing business. We pilots are certainly concerned about the
efficiency of operations, not just for our pocketbooks, but for our employer's pocketbooks, because without our employer
we're not going very far.
Our prime responsibility is the safety of flight. We see many things happening today, that doesn't allow the operator to
live up to the operator's responsibility under the 1958 Aviation Act: to operate to the highest degree of safety. An
example is operations like land-and-hold-short. Such operations have been implemented to increase capacity; however,
they've been implemented by tweaking the system in ways that were never intended. Are they done safely? Yes. Is the
system operated as safely as it could be operated? No. Not if we're to accept the challenge issued by the Secretary of
Transportation just a few days ago to operate with zero accidents. Yes, human error accounts for 74% of accidents, and
is primarily in the pilot ranks. The issue underlying that human error, referring to some of the work that Boeing has
done, is not just the human making a mistake but the reason why the mistake is made. It has to do with the procedures
used, how the procedures are developed and implemented, how training programs are developed and used, how
hardware automation is developed and used. All these factors play a role in the overall safety equation.
All those new systems and associated procedures that everybody agrees are needed will come along eventually; progress
has been promoted by joint efforts between NASA and FAA in the past. But there are other issues that need to be
addressed, especially in ground operations. The duties and responsibilities of the pilot and controller are not defined
anywhere for ground operations. Given that, how can we expect a proper response to unusual circumstances that may be
encountered, especially as we get into high density traffic conditions, weather impairments or other unique situations that
might occur at individual airports because of things like obstructions blocking views. There certainly are human factors
involved there. Who is better equipped to do human factors work than NASA? There's human factors involved in the
establishment of these duties and responsibilities. The runway incursion task force that was established after the Detroit
accident in 1991, made a specific recommendation to FAA to define the dudes and responsibilities of the pilot and
controller for ground operations. It hasn't been done yet, because we couldn't get agreement within the FAA on some
recommendations that came out of a contractor's report to specifically refine those duties and responsibilities. NASA
certainly has a role in assisting in this kind of research.
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Since 1954 ALPA has had a policy goal which basically embraced the free flight concept: this policy addressed the
concept of putting traffic information in the cockpit. As long ago as 1946, RCA (the company) was talking about doing
the same thing. More recently, Captain Cotton and Jack Howell co-authored a paper in 1975 at an RTCA conference
that discussed traffic situation displays as being a catalyst for a concept which they didn't call free flight, but had all the
ingredients of free flight. They commented that the use of traffic information in a cockpit had been around for 30 years.
Here we are in 1995 after 50 years of exploring the concept. Perhaps it's ready to be implemented. To its credit, in 1978
NASA developed a program to look at cockpit display of traffic information.
What has happened today regarding operating to the highest degree of safety? There's no question that capabilities of
aircraft systems have far outstripped the capabilities of the ground system to operate in the most efficient manner. The
result of that is proposals such as using TCAS for intrail climb. We support those proposals; however, there are many
aspects to those proposals that we don't feel are being addressed properly in areas such as, what can humans be
reasonably expected to do based upon what information is available to them in the cockpit or on the ground. In the case
of intrail climb, it's proposed to use a piece of hardware and associated software to perform a function that this
equipment was never intended to do. That's not to say that it can't be done with proper procedural attachments, but is
"band-aiding" the way we should be doing things ? That's where we've come to today: "band-aiding" over and over in
order to gain capacity.
How about using TCAS for intrail climb? What about over the ocean? Who is responsible for the separation during that
maneuver? Is it the pilot or is it the controller? I think the latest discussion about that issue concludes that the controller
will retain that responsibility. How does the controller do that? Should it not be the pilot? If it is going to be the pilot,
is the TCAS system and its display capable of providing the pilot with the tools required to assume that responsibility?
There's probably some work for NASA to do there.
Satellite-based systems are certainly going to increase efficiency, but they can also increase safety. Perhaps we can have
the same kind of safety in a non-radar environment that we have today in a radar environment through the use of ADS-B,
GPS, as well as improved satellite based communications. What do we need in the cockpit, then, to allow reduction in
the separation standards? Pilot control of separation will probably be the least costly way to do that, especially when we
consider that some countries will never be in a position to provide the ground system necessary to support reduced-
separation operations. And if ground systems can't support those kind of operations on a worldwide basis, maybe you're
going to have to do it from the air. It may even be cheaper in this country to implement reduced separation standards
based upon avionics capabilities, especially considering the cutback in government resources.
What do we need in the cockpit to assume those responsibilities and to gain full advantage of all that free flight can
really bring to us? Cockpit display of traffic information can indeed provide the basis to achieve not only the full
benefits of free flight but also some needed safety improvements. There's no question that we feel that there is indeed a
role for NASA in all this work. What kind of analysis are we currently doing to make sure that all factors are considered
as we step down the preferred route procedures in 2,000 foot increments? The airlines can tell us how many minutes and
pounds of fuel they may have saved, but how are we actually measuring what's going on in the ATC facilities? How are
we measuring what's going on in the cockpit? What innovative techniques are the human beings using in the ATC
facilities and in the cockpit to make that system work? I think there's a short-term research role for NASA to play in
those kinds of operations. If nothing else, to put together a questionnaire for those people to fill out when the unusual
circumstances come up that they encounter as a result of these new operating techniques. I'm suggesting that there is
need of a partnership between NASA and FAA in order to do things like that properly.
But beyond that, if we're going to examine the use of airborne traffic information in the cockpit, there is a real place for
NASA to put together a program. There's a NASA report from 1982 that summarizes all of the Langley and Ames CDTI
programs. A lot of work was done on some very basic human factors and CDTI display issues. That work should be
picked up and used as a basis for more timely research. A lot of the assumptions made back in the late 70s are no longer
assumptions today; for example, the assumption that precise position information would be available in the airplane.
I talked a little bit about the fact that today's system really doesn't do for us what it should do both in the areas of
efficiency and safety. The demands for service being placed on the system have certainly outstripped its capabilities to
satisfy those demands. So we are involved in some innovative techniques, and not all those innovative techniques are
well thought out. Free flight can enhance safety as well as efficiency. However, as far as we're concerned we can never
get the complete benefits of the free flight concept without defining - not shared responsibility - but definitive
responsibility for various modes of operation. There is no such thing as shared responsibility: it has to be defined.
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There has to be a detailed definition of who is responsible for what and when. And you can't do that properly without
doing some good, basic human factors research, the kind of research that NASA can perform.
With that I'm going to end with a slight admonishment to both FAA and NASA. Even in this time of reduced
government spending, there will still be a focus on safety, because public perception drives government spending to a
significant degree. The safety banner, used judiciously, will provide a level of funding for some of these research
efforts. Research is needed in order to gain not only the safety benefits but the efficiency benefits these efforts can
provide.
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Figure 1.
ISSUES
PRESENT ATM SYSTEM DOES NOT PROVIDE
SERVICES WHICH PERMIT AIR CARRIERS TO FULFILL
THEIR MANDATE AS DESCRIBED IN 1958 AVIATION
ACT. "...TO PERFORM THEIR SERVICES WITH THE
HIGHEST POSSIBLE DEGREE OF SAFETY..."
NOR
DOES THE PRESENT ATM SYSTEM PROVIDE
SERVICES WHICH PERMIT AIR CARRIERS TO
OPERATE IN THE MOST EFFICIENT MANNER.
Figure 2.
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(Continued)
ATM SERVICES REQUIRED IN ORDER TO IMPROVE
SAFETY MARGINS.
ROLE OF NASA RESEARCH IN ASSISTING
DEVELOPMENT OF THESE ATM SERVICES.
ALPA POLICY GOALS.
Figure 3.
OPERATING WITH THE HIGHEST POSSIBLE
DEGREE OF SAFETY
• AIRCRAFT VS. GROUND SYSTEM FUNCTIONS AND
CAPABILITIES.
• PILOT VS. CONTROLLER DUTIES AND
RESPONSIBILITIES - TODAY'S SYSTEM AND
FUTURE ATM SYSTEM.
Figure 4.
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OPERATING WITH THE HIGHEST POSSIBLE
DEGREE OF SAFETY
(Continued)
• COMMUNICATIONS, NAVIGATION AND
SURVEILLANCE.
• COCKPIT TECHNOLOGY.
Figure 5.
ROLE OF NASA RESEARCH IN ASSISTING
DEVELOPMENT OF THESE ATM SERVICES
»HISTORY
• CURRENT/RECENT ACTIVITIES
»RECOMMENDED FUTURE ACTIVITIES.
Figure 6.
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COMMUNICATION
NAVIGATION
SURVEILLANCE
Figure 7.
SUMMARY
• ADDITIONAL SPECIFIC RESEARCH NEEDED.
• IMPACT OF BUDGETARY CONSTRAINTS.
Figure 8.
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The Future ATC Systems—A Line Perspective
Captain Pat Gallagher represents the Allied Pilots Association. Captain Gallagher has a very diverse civil
aviation background, including flight instruction, corporate aviation, commuter airlines and a tenure career as a
pilot with American Airlines. He is Vice Chairman of the Allied Pilots Associations National Safety
Committee and is Chairman of the ATC Subcommittee.
Pat Gallagher. I'm your garden variety airline pilot. I fly for American Airlines and represent the Allied Pilots
Association. Do we think the Air Traffic Control System needs to be enhanced? That's a safe bet. Going into Dallas
one early afternoon, a beautiful day, clear, 35 miles of visibility, wind down the runway at 10 knots. We ended up
holding for about 10 minutes. One of the gentlemen who got off the airplane stopped me at the cockpit door and said,
"Why did we do that?" I didn't really have a good answer for him except to say there's a lot of other airplanes in the sky
and everybody has to get their turn to land. That question has haunted me for a while.
I understand that the airlines exacerbate the ATC system by their scheduling practices; we can't seem to do much about
that, even though we've tried. But it seems to take just less and less for the system to saturate now. It takes less for the
first falling domino to get things to clog up and stop; the efficiency of the system just goes away like that. And when
that repeatedly happens in different parts of the country, you realize that we need to do this better; we need to take a
different approach.
There are a number of aircraft in the American Airlines fleet that have the capability to outstrip technologically our
current ATC system. The airplanes can navigate point-to-point or to a point in space and cross that point at an altitude
and airspeed and be there very accurately at a given time plus or minus a couple. Our current ATC system has a lot of
trouble handling that much performance. We get restricted a lot of times to FAA preferred routes, altitudes, and
airspeeds. Future aircraft are going to have so much more processing power on board. GPS and related systems are
going to make navigation and position reporting so much more accurate. Nowadays we try to get direct routings,
minimum time routings, minimum fuel routings. A lot of times we can't get optimum altitudes, especially in the
Northeast, or in and out of Chicago. So there's no incentive for Boeing to build airplanes with all this enhanced
performance and processing power; and there's no incentive for airline management to buy these airplanes. If we have
so much excess airborne processing power, capability, performance, what incentive is there to further optimize the
aircraft? There's a dichotomy there.
One of the things that I want to talk about is the flight crew's involvement in the separation of airplanes. We embraced
the concept of free flight and we talked about it on a philosophical basis. And philosophically we understand we're
going to get involved in it. We need to explore the interrelation between the pilot's and the controller's responsibilities.
Because it is dynamic and ever-changing as to who's got responsibility for this and who's got responsibility for that.
We understand that separation between airplanes can be reduced in some areas. But separation to us is like fuel: you
can never have too much (the only time you have too much fuel is if you're on fire). If three miles is good, five is better,
what's wrong with seven miles? But we understand that must change. We agree that the capacity we feel is there, but
we want some science involved in it.
A lot of operational delays that we run into are weather-based. Even on good days it'll affect operations, because you
can have transcontinental departure and destination wide open with a lot of weather in the middle of the country. The
terminal facilities and enroute facilities are affected by weather in much different capacities and they show it differently.
We think there is much to be gained by getting the Central Flow involved more in how weather information is
disseminated. This is a perfect avenue for data link. We need a multi-channel, multi-level user data link. I want to be
able to data link with a dispatch office and with the FAA host computer, and I want to be able to do it all at the same
time. I want messages coming and going in a user-friendly format, but I don't want to have to sit and wait on a party
line. Let's build a lot of capacity into the data link system. Let's make it open ended, with a modular, user-friendly
architecture. We can use the data link for dealing with severe weather. One of the hardest things to do is encounter a
weather event and have very few options as to how you're going to handle it. It's important to get this information early
on in a trip. Once the door is shut and the jet bridge pulls away a lot of the planning and anticipating that you have done
can go out the window in a rapidly changing scenario. Operationally, we get very little real-time update about what's
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really happening; we rely a lot on reports from other aircraft out in front of us. So having the Command Center take part
in a data link operation would help us a lot.
We took part in the Free Flight Committee. We want industry to understand that our Air Traffic Control System has got
to change. We are committed to help. We need a usable system when it's all done. We don't want the controllers to go
away. If we give the controllers as much information as you can, build the infrastructure up from the ground up, I think
we'll have a good system. For the first time ever there are two entities within the ICAO community that are getting
ready to surpass the United States, and I'm uncomfortable with that. I want us to set the standard if we can do it. We
have got to do this.
Question (Frank Newman, Ames): There's something I don't understand. I'm studying scheduling, and I'm looking at
the schedules at DFW for Ames. Every noon there's this big noon balloon. This guarantees delays. Apparently the
airline must assume that they have to schedule themselves at noon otherwise nobody will fly them. I don't understand
how this all comes about.
Pat Gallagher: I will be frank with you and say that in a lot of ways I don't understand it either. You can sit on the ramp
at Dallas Ft. Worth or Chicago and hear 25 airplanes all call to push back literally within three to four minutes of each
other. This is the theology of scheduling, a black art as far as I'm concerned. Marketing runs the airline. Believe me. In
a lot of cases operations is sometimes just an adjunct to the Marketing Department. I wish I could come up with a good
qualitative answer for you, but I cannot, because I don't know.
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Controller Requirements
Karl Grundmann represents the National Air Traffic Controllers Association. He is currently serving at the
request of the President of NATCA as liaison to FAA headquarters. He has a very long career in the air traffic
control business. He began in the 70s with the Navy, and after his discharge he joined FAA at Sacramento and
he served there and at Burbank TRACON, and then he rejoined the Department of Defense at Lemoore Naval
Air Station, and then rejoined the FAA at Los Angeles. In 1985 he was elected to the position of Western
Pacific Region Representative for NATCA, which at that time was still uncertified. After that he returned to the
Los Angeles TRACON and served as Facility President and Region Safety Chairman until 1991 when he re-ran
and was re-elected to the regional position.
Karl Grundmann: I'm going to give you a more "in the weeds" approach to our (NATCA's) perspective on these issues.
When we talk about NRP (National Route Program), there are widely differing opinions on its success. At FAA
Headquarters it's regarded as a great thing to do. But at NATCA Headquarters it's another story. There are concerns
about overloading sectors, increasing numbers of operational errors, route conflictions, and lack of training.
The last item (training) and perhaps some of the others are attributable to local situations and not necessarily a national
program. But as we all know, once you get a program out of development and into the field that's where the rubber hits
the road. Now while NRP works well at FL 390,410, and maybe even 370, that's only 250 to 350 aircraft. What's going
to happen at FL 350, 370, and 330? There are some people in my industry and NATCA who are scared to death of this.
One of the controllers called up from a midwestern center and said, "When you guys start free flight after NRP, I'll come
in and run free flight with you. I'll go home that day and come back to work the next day, and if there are any airplanes
left, I'll free flight again." So you can see what the attitude is out in the field. Now, being part of the free flight group
responsible for the white paper, I felt pretty bad about that. And I wondered: what's the problem here? The problem is
that we have not sold this to the people to whom this program and process needs to be sold: the pilots and the
controllers. Now, understandably, there are some technical issues we have to deal with; for example, getting it out of
RTCA and over to the administrator prior to going out with our road show. But still there are many people who are
scared to death of this issue.
Now, when Lane's NRP phase 3 still has to be negotiated with the controllers' union. If the present sense of NRP
continues, that is not going to be easy. I think every controller in the United States comes to work wanting to do the best
job possible, without causing delay or scraping paint. That's a very sobering thought to somebody who puts a headset
on.
Let me get away from NRP and get back to original discussion topic: Controller Requirements. While I could be talking
about job security, salaries, benefits and all those typical union labor issues , but I'm not going to address these because
some of those are within our purview in the federal government and some are not. Who knows what's going to happen
next week when corporatization and privatization roll around the corner? Who of us are going to have jobs left and who
are we going to be working for? So controllers are a little uncertain about our future.
First, controllers will do whatever it takes to ensure the safety of the system. Anything, including working without
choice with equipment that they consider unreliable, going to their congressman and complaining, and going to the press,
much to the chagrin of the FAA (and sometimes the union). But those are the things we have to do and that's what we
will do as a group. One of our biggest issues with new technology that of reliability and whether equipment is as reliable
and stable as we all say it is.
I am reminded of a dedication of the host computer at Los Angeles Center. It was touted at that time as having an
unscheduled down time of ten seconds a year; in the first month it used up 250 years. You can't imagine what that feels
like to sit in front of a radar scope with a headset on and have it go blank. I don't trust the technology. Is that a very
bold statement to make? Yes, it is. Why do you think terminal areas have held on so tightly to the requirement for raw
radar? Because most of us remember the days when the ARTS used to blink off at a moments notice, when all the fancy
information on the scope went away. You recall this morning that somebody was discussing (removing) paper flight
strips. Why do you think we have those? Because the reliability of the systems in place today, although very good, are
not perfect.
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There's a lot of talk these days about "nine nines" reliability of equipment you're trying to put on the street. That's all
well and good, but I think Aviation Week and Space Technology did an analysis of the Air Traffic Control System and
the human factor, and they came up with human reliability of nine to the thirteenth power. Even taking into account all
the traffic that we run in this country, the number of operational errors, the number of accidents, isn't that amazing? This
tells me that the human factor or the human component of the Air Traffic Control System is the most reliable and it is the
most credible portion of that system.
Now, having said all that, I'm not saying that we don't need the technology. What I'm trying to say is that as you go
forward with your technology, programs, and projects, please remember us. Please remember the air traffic controller,
please remember the pilot, and most of all, please remember the passenger. Because those are the people that you're
building a system for. You're not building it for NASA Ames, you're not building it for FAA, you're not building it for
Boeing; you're building it for the flying public and the people who operate this Air Traffic Control System.
Now, there are a few controllers here today and a few pilots. But the majority of you are engineers and -this is not a
derogatory term - rocket scientists. How many of you have ever been sued for $75 million in a wrongful death suit? I
have. So until you've walked that mile in our shoes, I want you to understand that the decisions you make, the
technology you produce personally affects us greatly and affects how we do our job.
I heard a lot of discussion this morning about FAA versus NASA. I'm going to make a very organizational statement: I
don't care who does it. I hope you do it together - it only makes sense. But whoever designs the boat, whoever provides
the funds to do it, whoever provides the vehicle to move into the future of the Air Traffic Management System, please
don't forget to include the operators, technicians, the controllers, the pilots and, yes, the passengers. Those are the
people that we're serving.
Now, one last issue I'd like to bring up. One of the things that we as an agency or as air traffic controllers sometimes do
is to become too dependent and reliant on automation. The question that you must keep in your minds as you go forward
with developing this program and process is what to do when it fails. There needs to be a fallback position at all times.
Free flight is based on automation, programs, and processes we can't even imagine right now. My biggest fear is what
will happen when we free flight a complete system above FL 230 anywhere in the United States, and a required portion
of that automation fails: the conflict probe, the conflict resolution advisor, the data link.
CTAS was an issue that I took up with Heinz Erzberger. It reminded me that we're going to need to keep controllers and
pilots in tune; they must continue to have the ability to work in a system that is not as automated as it could be. We
cannot just throw technology at this system and expect it to work better. It is going to take the melding of all the entities
in this room (and some that aren't) to decide how we're best going to operate this system and how we're best going to
build in into the future.
The road map that Lane Speck showed this morning, while a very good one, ignores one thing: the human issue. How
are we going to sell this to the controllers, the pilots and the flying public? How do you think it's going to go over after
an accident when we say we we're using just-in-time separation? We can't allow that to happen. We must sell this
properly. We must get everybody heading in the same direction. I thought those things needed to be said from the
standpoint of a line controller, somebody who has worn a headset. We are not opposed to free flight. We are not
opposed to new technologies and advanced automation. In fact, we're big supporters of it. But let's do it right. CTAS is
a very good example of outside agencies using controllers and building a project. FAA in the past (let me emphasize
past) has not been very good at that. They've always come to the controllers after technology development. We're trying
to change that, and it is happening slowly but surely. I do want to commend NASA for their work in CTAS and how
they went about it.
Question (Jimmy Krozel, Hughes Information Sciences Laboratory): First, what controllers' tools or technologies would
you really like to see that you don't have today? Second, what do you really need for trust to be built up in these
systems? What are you looking for: never to see a failure or do you want lots of redundancy?
Karl Grundmann: Two very good questions. I think the two primary systems we'd like to see in the field are a conflict
probe that works and conflict resolution advisory. There are dozens of others: the CTAS capabilities and functionalities,
all of the AERA functions, but those two are the biggest ones. Second, concerning reliability, probably the biggest issue
is how automation is introduced into the field. In the past, it was not unusual to be working in a TRACON and have
someone bring in a new piece of equipment and have it fail the next day. That is where a lot of this skepticism comes
from.
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Question (Sandy Lozito, San Jose State University): We heard John O'Brien with ALPA discuss some of the potential
shifts in duties and responsibilities from the pilot perspective. Does NATCA have any equivalent concerns about the
next generation ATM?
Karl Grundmann: There is shared responsibility in separation of aircraft as we speak today. Not at the level that we're
talking about down the road in terms of using a cockpit display, not necessarily TCAS, but we do it today. We are in the
process of trying out the new technology for the intrail climbs using an aircraft situational display. And do I see a
problem with it? No, I think it's going to be necessary to continue to increase the capacity of the system. There has to be
closer cooperation between the ground-based control system and the pilots.
Question (Heinz Erzberger, NASA Ames): You brought up TCAS, and we know there's always been concern about
responsibility and where that is leading to. Can you tell us what your experience from a controller's side has been
concerning the use of TCAS, how it has impacted your work, and what concerns you may have over the evolution of a
system that is like that?
Karl Grundmann: There are two parts to answer, because part of the problem with the TCAS project lies squarely with
my organization. We chose to oppose TCAS in the beginning, and as I was once told: even if you oppose it you need to
be involved and to mitigate the risk. We weren't. We chose to turn our backs to the TCAS issue and say it was unsafe.
And while frankly I personally am not so sure that's an incorrect statement, let's talk more about the TCAS problems. A
lot of the things that you don't hear about TCAS are problems that you might associate with shakedown: working the
bugs out of the system. When you work the bugs out of a system in something that goes into the Air Traffic
Management System, you put peoples lives at risk. When we test something in the air traffic system, there is the
potential, bluntly, of killing people. Now that's why we would like to better integrate controllers in the front half of the
project, and perhaps consider a different way of selling it into the field.
Question (Bill Kramer, NASA Ames): You and some other speakers mentioned including the flying public. Do you
have any specific suggestions on how that group of people might be involved in these activities?
Karl Grundmann: The project that produced the RTCA Free Flight white paper had a diverse group of people involved.
I think expanding that group would be worthwhile. There are some credible groups that could participate in this.
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Air Traffic Management Impact on Avionics Systems
Robert Kerr has worked on avionics development for 15 years. He has been involved in Flight Management
System development for several airplanes (767, 757, A320, 747, MD-80), TCAS and Mode S, and
Communications Management. He has participated recently on several industry committees: RTCA, AEEC,
Developing Standards for Airborne System and Software Development, Airborne Telecommunications and Air
Traffic Management Applications. His current assignment is as Engineering Department Manager responsible
for Digital Communications Management and Flight Deck Communications.
Robert Kerr: During this presentation I'd like to talk about the key issues which are currently being investigated in
today's development of the future Air Traffic Management System. I'll discuss some of the lessons learned and how
these might relate to a more advanced environment. I'll then discuss how these issues impact today's and future avionics
systems, and how these avionic systems can contribute to a future ATM system.
First I'd like to discuss a bit about what Honeywell is doing today in Air Traffic Management. Honeywell is primarily
an airborne equipment supplier and system integrator involved with standards and requirements, development, as well as
the actual building of the equipment. And in ATM we are currently working the final stages of the FANS 1 (for the 747-
400) in the South Pacific. This incorporates several applications that are "FANS-knowledgeable", if you like. This
includes ADS (Automatic Dependent Surveillance), CPDLC (Controller Pilot Datalink Communications), and RTA
(Required Time of Arrival): applications that are very important in Air Traffic Management. We also have a broad
expertise in various other airborne systems.
So what are the issues today? Today we're at or we're very close to FANS 1. There are some implementation and other
issues to be resolved going into the future. Many of these have been discussed previously today, and I must apologize
and ask you to bear with me if I go over some of them again. One of the key issues that has to be addressed up front is
where we're going and what the requirements are to get there. This is obviously the key to success. We need to start
work with the end in mind, and then work out the requirements and the applications to get us there. During this time we
need to work the issues concerning what applications and what functions are going to be in the airplane versus on the
ground. What is the pilot's responsibility? What's the air traffic controllers' responsibility? These requirements must be
clear, complete, and timely.
One of the problems that we have in building avionics is incomplete or late requirements. We start to build, and then
there's a lot of rework and wasted effort. This inflates the cost of the equipment and also delays installation more than
our customers would like. As I said, there's a clear opportunity here for synergy between the ground and the air, and we
need to make sure that both the ground and the air are supporting the same goals: that they're consistently working
together in the development of the ATM system. The ATM system must be considered to be a complete system, not an
airborne system and a ground system that's going to be developed independently. This is very important I think.
Typically in the design of avionics equipment we haven't worried too much in the past about the ground side of things,
because the ground has been only linked to the airplane through voice communications. This is changing rapidly with
the advent of data communications. Along with that, there are issues of what information needs to be available where
(air versus ground), and what are the volume and latency requirements of the data that's available to these various
functions, again both in the air and on the ground. We need to know this so that we can design a system that has the
necessary processor power, throughput, and memory to be able to handle both these and future opportunities.
Over the past several years and especially with FANS 1, we in industry have thrashed about on Air Traffic Management
concepts only to be stymied when trying to put a product or a potential product in front of our customers. The real
problem there is that the airline customer has had a very difficult time understanding what financial benefit they're going
to derive from the capital investment in equipment. This must be considered up front, since the cost benefit analysis can
and will be performed before anyone will buy the equipment.
We've talked a little about international operation. ICAO has developed the CNS ATM or FANS concept, and we must
make sure that any Air Traffic Management System is in alignment with that. ICAO continues to evolve that concept
and we must make sure that we follow where that is going. How will international interoperability be guaranteed? This
is quite a big issue because different places in the world have differing opinions of what Air Traffic Management is.
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Here in the U.S. we are working towards FANS 1, as is the South Pacific. In Europe there is a very different idea about
which direction they want to take, at least in the short term. We need to make sure that we have international
cooperation to be able to fly internationally, and have a common Air Traffic Management concept.
There's been a lot of discussion about human-machine interface requirements, both on the flight deck and at ATC. This
is something with which we've had difficulty on several occasions in developing FANS 1, at least in the flight deck.
How will enroute, terminal area, and airport surface air traffic management be integrated? It doesn't do us a whole lot of
good to have a fantastic enroute Air Traffic Management System only to find out that everything is tightly controlled in
the terminal area. It's like having a ten-lane freeway with a dirt road off-ramp. We have to be sure these are all
integrated and work together.
There are very strict certification requirements in airborne systems. There are standards put in place by the certifying
agencies, and we have to look very carefully at issues of integrity, and availability, and the effects on safety and
interoperability. Each one of those factors is a concern during the design and development of the system. It's clear that
in ATM systems where both parties are working together, both the ground systems and the airborne systems need to
have a common set of availability, integrity, and safety specifications when doing the development.
We talked about cooperation. Another lesson learned from recent experiences is that it doesn't do any good for a group
of airframe and avionics manufacturers to sit down and design an ATM system without the input from the airlines, the
certification agencies, the data link service providers on the ground and, of course, air traffic control. It wasn't until all
these parties could come together that what we're currently putting in place in the South Pacific in the form of FANS 1
could even be started. It took a few dedicated people from each one of those groups to agree that it could be done, to get
together and figure out how to do it.
Flying around today are many different types of airplanes, and a lot of what we may consider to be Air Traffic
Management will require certain equipment for those airplanes. For future type of airplanes it may be very easy to build
systems today that would evolve into having the functionality necessary to participate in an Air Traffic Management
environment that requires some minimal set of characteristics. But what about all those older airplanes that are flying
around today? When we built those we didn't even think about evolving ATM systems. Back in 1960 we were building
747-lOOs and 747-200s that had iron gyros and electromechanical instruments; no FMS. But they were still able to fly
across the Atlantic and the Pacific. In 1981 the B-757 and -767 and the Airbus A310 were introduced. During that
period of time digital concepts came into avionics: glass cockpits, CRTs in the cockpit, FMS, ring laser inertials. More
reliability and a lot more functionality. Now the navigators could fly "direct-to's"; area nav on board was standard.
Currently we're working on, and in 1995 we'll have certified, the first highly integrated digital airplane. This uses an
integrated modular architecture. The processing power dedicated to the FMS in the IMA architecture is an order of
magnitude greater than it was back in the 1980s for the FMS. Flat panel displays are replacing glass CRTs, and we're
considering fault tolerant systems much more closely.
All these issues are currently being considered in today's ATM concept: FANS 1 is the example. But most of them are
applicable to any Air Traffic Management System that we want to assemble. The development of the requirements
needs to be done up front, obviously. We must develop models and then some demonstration equipment for proof of
concept. But all these issues must be either addressed directly or we must make the decision to ignore them for whatever
reason.
So what is the FMS's role in today's ATM? The basic FMS functions historically are navigation (integrating information
from various navigation sensors, and melding that information to determine where the airplane is both in time and
space), path generation (both flight planning and performance computation; flight planning is the desired lateral and the
vertical flight plan that, combined with aircraft performance capabilities produces a 4D path through space), guidance
(control to that desired path with commands being issued to an autopilot or autothrottle to compensate for errors). As we
transition to ATM, many new requirements are being added, several in the area of communications. You notice that
communications is not included in basic FMS functions; it was not included until fairly recently. But with the advent of
ATM, communications is taking a much bigger role in FMS functionality, as is navigation with the advent of onboard
satellite navigation facilities. Surveillance is also becoming a key part of the FMS as ADS and such become common.
A typical FMS road map is shown in Figure 16. And as you can see, in 1993, only two years ago, we had a box called
an AFMC that was installed on several different types of digital airplanes. It wasn't long before the processor power,
memory, etc. of that box got used up by required added functionality. As ATM is introduced, there is need for two-way
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data link (or CPDLC), ADS, GPS, ACARS for communications, printer interface. Likewise it will be with the next
generation avionics we're developing, which will be integrated with high powered processors and used to forward-fit
airplanes. This of course does not solve the problem I mentioned earlier of what to do with the 747 "classics" that are
still going to be flying around out there and want to participate in ATM.
So what is the role of FMS and avionics in general, in future ATM? We have to anticipate many types of situations
during flight, including failures. If we've got all our eggs in one basket, either all the applications on the ground or all
the applications in the airplane, and one cannot operate without the other, a failure is able to cause significant trouble.
We have to be sure that we've designed a system that is flexible and fault-tolerant, that can handle failures and continue
to operate adequately: perhaps with a little bit more workload, but certainly safely and with very little difference in
operation. In future ATM concepts the ATC computer may directly negotiate clearances, routes, and so forth with the
airborne computer with no direct human intervention. The actual negotiations might take place just computer to
computer. Obviously this is going to require a very good communication system: high bandwidth, high integrity, high
availability.
Surveillance is key to navigation.
We're already seeing enormous attention paid to GPS. With ADS today and potentially ADS-B in the future (whether it
is TCAS-4 or another), the FMS and avionics in general is really integral to their operation.
We do a lot of work on trajectory algorithms for the FMS today, but there's still a lot of work that can be done in
optimizing the trajectory, especially for free flight. Use of winds across altitudes is involved in that, as is economic trade
modeling and negotiations, which could possibly be used to resolve conflicts. Obviously the FMS has access to onboard
data, and with the advent of data link, can get at data that's off the airplane as well, and meld this data together to
produce situational awareness for the crew. Position, weather, digital maps, terrain information, electronic library
systems and so forth might be all integrated together to provide a much better view for the crew of the flight situation.
Question (Vern Battiste, NASA Ames): I'd like to know your views as to where are we on the path of developing a
multiple channel air-ground or air-air digital data link system.
Robert Kerr: ACARS, which was developed back in the 70's, is a character oriented data link over VHP voice
frequencies. It basically modulates data like a modem. Over perhaps the last five years or so, there's been a lot of talk of
a Digital Datalink Aeronautical Telecommunications Network, that would involve ground to ground, air to ground via
VHP, SATCOM. Until there is an absolutely clear need for a high bandwidth air ground data link, it's going to be
difficult to justify the expense of putting it onboard. We were told that ATN would be in place in 1994, 1995, and then
1996. Now it will probably be 1998 before it's readily available. This is not to say that tests are not going on. Trials are
going on, for example, on a British Airways airplane across the Atlantic using a primitive version of ATN. The
Europeans are also working quite heavily on ATN. AVPAC is being experimented with, I think, by American Airlines
in the northeast. But to answer your question, it's like predicting the future — as was said earlier, it's always just out of
reach.
89
Air Traffic Management
Impact on Avionics Systems
Presented to
The ATM Workshop
NASA Ames Research Center
January 31st, 1995
by
Robert B. Ken-
Honeywell Inc.
HoneyweC
Air Trvi^ iorl SysUm*
Figure 1.
Agenda
• Key issues identified while developing ATM
• Lessons learned
• How do these issues relate to ATM-X?
• Impact on airborne avionics systems
• Airborne avionics contribution to ATM-X
Honoywof
Air Transport Sy»t*m*
Figure 2.
90
Honeywell Involvement in ATM
• Airborne avionics system integrator
• CNS airborne equipment supplier
• Standards and requirements development
• FANS 1 implementation
• Technology expertise in broad airborne and
ground areas
• Systems, hardware, software
• Navigation, control, communications,
displays, scheduling, maintenance
AJr Trvttport Systems
Figure 3.
ATM Issues Today
FMS, FANS1
TODAY
Key
Implementation
Issues
CNS/ATM
FUTURE
In analyzing the evolution towards CNS/ATM,
many key issues that must be resolved become
apparent.
iloncpwol
Air Transport Systems
Figure 4.
91
ATM Issues
• What is the total set of functions needed (best
estimate today)?
• Airborne & ground based
• Timely, complete requirements
• How do we ensure synergy between airborne and
ground functions?
• Mutually support the same goals
• What information needs to be available where?
• Air Vs.. ground
• Volume and latency requirements of data
• What are the (guaranteed) benefits Vs. cost?
Air Trm«port SytUma
Figure 5.
What is required for success?
New & Modified
Avionics
Revised
Procedures
& Training
Upgraded
ATC Centers
Communications
Infrastructure
AJr Trwi sport Systems
Figure 6.
92
The Payback Model for CMS-ATM...
Service
Charges
Modified
Avionics
New
Avionics
COST
Delay
Reduction
Fuel Cost
Reduction
Payload
Increase
Crew Cost
Reduction
BENEFIT
Payback Model
Adequate ROI required for all parties.
Air Transport Systems
Figure 7.
ATM Issues
• What is the relationship to ICAO FANS concept?
• How will international interoperability be assured?
• What are the Human-Machine Interface
requirements?
• Flight deck
• ATC
• How will en-route, terminal area, airport surface
traffic management be integrated? Today's
examples:
• CTAS, ASTA, AERA, ODAPS
Air Transport Systems
Figure 8.
93
ATM Integration
Mr Trmtport Sy*Um*
Figure 9.
ATM Issues
What are the certification requirements?
• Integrity, availability, safety, interoperability
• Airborne Vs ground equipment certification
process
How will cooperation between all stakeholders
be secured?
• Aircraft operators, CAA's, ATC, datalink
service providers, aircraft manufacturers,
avionics equipment suppliers
Air Transport Systems
Figure 10.
94
Negotiated Benefits Vs. Equipage
Airframers
& Suppliers
Negotiated
Objective
Each benefit requires a negotiated objective &
Joint refinement of requirements
Air Trvi sport Sy»t»m«
Figure 11.
ATM Issues
• How do the concepts apply to various types of
aircraft and architectures?
• Forward fit in 'future' architectures
• Back fit in existing architectures & platforms
AJr Transport Systems
Figure 12.
95
Aircraft Affected bv ATM
I960 1991
Analog
•Electro/Mechanical Instruments
•Iron Gyros
19
Air Transport Systems
M«MT»* MMMS
81
Digital
•Glass Cockpit
•FMS
•Ring Laser Inertials
|^> Forward fit Vs. Retrofit]
995
Highly Integrated Digital
•Integrated Modular Architecture
•Flat Panel Displays
•Fault Tolerant Inertials
HoiMQwel
13
Figure 13.
ATM-X Issues
• All these issues are being worked in relation to
the FANS 1 program and CMS/ATM
• Most of the issues need to be addressed in the
context of ATM-X
• Development of requirements
• Development of models
• Development of demonstration equipment
HaneyweB
Air Transport Systems
Figure 14.
96
FMS Role in ATM
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FMS Role in ATM-X
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General Aviation Requirements
Dr. Bruce Holmes is from NASA Langley where he has had a very distinguished career. Rejoined NASA in
1977. He served as Head of the Flight Research branch there from 1986 to 1989. In 1989/90 time period he
was detailed to NASA headquarters where he served as Acting Deputy Director of the Aerodynamics Division.
He served as Assistant Director for Aeronautics at NASA Langley following that, and he currently serves as
Manager of the General Aviation Commuter Element of the NASA Advanced Subsonic Technology Program.
This is a multi-year $63 million program that supports technology development to support revitalization of the
U.S. general aviation industry. He's responsible for the formation of partnerships between NASA, the FAA,
industry, and universities to conduct the program. He leads the Advanced General Aviation Transport
Experiments Consortium known as AGATE which includes over 150 different organizations. His aviation
experience includes a broad range of professional general aviation flying as well, including flight instruction,
commuter flying, test pilot work and agricultural aviation. He's received many awards from various bodies.
Bruce Holmes: I'm here to talk about the general aviation community's user requirements as they are evolving in the
construct of the general aviation element of the Advanced Subsonic Program. Clyde Miller and Neil Planzer referred to
it as the other 200,000 airplanes below 10,000 feet. I would offer a thought that if general aviation had not had its
downturn of the 1980's and the early 90's that continues today, but rather had continued to grow at the rate of expansion
of the other transportation sectors in the nation, today's general aviation aircraft population would number nearly
400,000. There would be around a million pilots compared to an actual 200,000 airplanes and around 680,000 pilots.
The use of the air traffic infrastructure for general aviation would consume nearly 70% of the IFR operations instead of
the nearly 40% of total IFR operations that general aviation uses today. And so as we think about the future of our air
traffic infrastructure, obviously we need to deal with one of the possible futures which is that general aviation can
become revitalized.
That is the goal of this program: the Advanced General Aviation Transport Experiments (AGATE) program. And, in
fact, we argue that we want to go beyond revitalization. Revitalization is a term that's used in the 1994 Revitalization
Act passed by Congress that changed, although it didn't quite fix, the product liability situation in general aviation. We
argue that general aviation in certain respects was never really vital in the sense that it could become a more full player
in the transportation choices that the nation can make. Those of you who travel in general aviation aircraft know that it's
a very difficult endeavor to maintain instrument proficiency and have a good day job as well. And so we're both after
revitalization and vitalization.
I'd like to talk about the AGATE user requirements for Air Traffic Management. I'll say a few words right away about
the definition of revitalization, and I want to address ATM implementation under the new and exciting business
mechanisms that are available to us today in the government. These are mechanisms that most of us have never used
before but are worth investigating, and I'm going to propose just for thought one such mechanism.
Revitalization is aimed at the commercialization of technologies that can bring volume back to this very threatened
sector of the United States aeronautical industry: volumes not just of airplanes but of pilots, student pilot new starts,
hours flown, business hours flying, FBOs that make money instead of lose money, public use airports that remain open
instead of being paved over and turned into shopping centers. The targets are technologies that can affect volume in the
marketplace, because volume, is the big indicator of the decline in industry. We're seeking to do this through
coordination of industry and government resources. The program size, $63 million is not a lot of money. $63 million
will buy you one mile of four-lane interstate highway.
We had to do something inventive in order to leverage that $63 million into a meaningful sum if we were going to
attempt something as bold and ambitious as revitalizing and, in fact, vitalizing the general aviation industry. And so we
pooled this resource with industry resources: it's a matching funds program. And we went a step further: in creating the
AGATE consortium, we found a mechanism by which we could bring SBIR (Small Business Innovation Research) and
STTR (Small Business Technology Transfer Resources) into alignment with the directions of this program in such a way
that we could further leverage moneys. And so we turned this $63 million into over $130 million over the period
between now and the year 2001. That kind of leveraging which is one of the powerful influences of one of these new
mechanisms that I'll refer to as the Joint Sponsored Research Agreement way of doing business.
99
The last point about revitalization is that we need to be driven by all of the actions required to facilitate deployment of
these new technologies in the marketplace. You've heard time and again today that there aren't many new technologies
we have to invent. What we have to do is learn how to develop the design guidelines, system standards, and the bases
and methods for compliance with rules and regulations that certify these technologies in the marketplace. Integrate
them, apply them, and prove that they have the reliability, the redundancy and the reversionary capabilities to be useful
in a safe, high utility environment. We can only do that by having the FAA as a strong partner in the program, as they
are. This means it's going to be easy, but we have 150 different organizations in the United States, including 75
companies, 50 of whom are full member companies fully cost-sharing who have committed to make this happen.
What we're aiming at is the vitalization of the rest of the nation's air transportation infrastructure; the 17,000 landing
facilities that serve general aviation's needs, every one of which incidentally is a potential GPS-based CAT-1 precision
approach site for at least two ends of the landing strip. Fifty-one hundred of those are public use airports, and that
number is shrinking. It's one of the threats to this infrastructure. This is an asset that we've owned for many years and
we've paid for: it's in place, but we're losing it. When I first started giving this talk over a year-and-a-half ago, this
number was 5,300. It shrunk that much in the last 18 months and it continues to shrink at the same rate because the
business volumes are threatened.
ATM is a pivotal technology to the vitalization of general aviation, because it enables full utilization of the rest of the
nation's airspace capacity. This is underutilized capacity. These are airports that today do not, for the most part, have
too many landings per runway per hour. It's interesting to look back in history at where we've been. What we're trying
to do is speculate about the growth in the percentage of the population that will want and be eligible to use these vehicles
in an IFR/IMC environment, not just economically but from the standpoint of time and capability.
If you look back in history you'll see where we started with high frequency communications, AM ranges, beacons, fires,
bam roofs with circles, arrows and mileage painted on them. As fairly primitive kinds of technologies moved into the
current era, World War n to the 1995 timeframe, two-tenths of 1% of the population in the United States is qualified to
fly IFR. This growth was leveraged on technologies like VHP communications, VOR-DME, ILS, ADF, radar, approach
plates, weather radar, iron gyros.
Our market research, which is of course the initiation of our systems engineering in the AGATE program, is addressing
what happens beyond the year 2000, when we move to a data link environment with differential GPS and ADS-B,
moving maps, NxRad in the cockpit, GPS/FOG AHRS capabilities, glass cockpits, diagnostics, FADEC, highway in the
sky expert systems, desktop computer-based training and perhaps synthetic vision. What's the market then? Of course,
it depends on what the price is. We're trying to understand where those price utility breaks are in our market research in
order to know what technologies we should work on in order to make decisions in the AGATE program.
AH these technologies relate to ATM. There's nothing that's being proposed that does not matter to general aviation's
vitalization, which itself is pivotally dependent on ATM. So we've taken another look at the national airspace system,
and guessed at the translation of ATM needs for the airline community as compared to the ATM needs for the AGATE
community. Now, I want to make a point here. I'm talking about AGATE ATM not necessarily retrofit into the 200,000
airplanes. That retrofit requirement is very important, especially to the AOPA and the NBAA community, consortium
members with whom we're closely working. But although some want backward compatibility, we're focused on the
future.
I'm going to give you my conclusion now: these comparisons show that there's a great deal of commonalty between the
airline needs for ATM and the general aviation needs. There are some nuances, however. I would argue that the
airplane in the airline community would have 4D nav with CAT-3 capabilities, whereas in the AGATE community the
aircraft would have 4D nav with a CAT-1 capability. There would be a relatively sophisticated FMS system in the
airline system; in the AGATE system it would be a relatively simpler FMS system, perhaps a hand flown airplane.
Everything we do in the AGATE program is totally driven by cost constraints. In the case of the pilot, obviously we
have multi-crew as compared to single pilot. We're also talking about a single pilot that needs to maintain proficiency in
a very different environment than the airline pilot does. Because in many cases this will be a part-time pilot, not a full-
time pilot.
I'm not sure what the training drivers for ATM are in the airline community. Although I understand from past work with
airline operators that obviously training cost is an issue, I don't know to what extent ATM is viewed as a means by which
training costs can be reduced. However, in AGATE it is absolutely essential that the result of the development of the
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system reduce the cost and time required for achieving a given level of capability. Because when we conduct our
marketing research the answer we get back from the user community is that one of the big inhibitors to expanded use of
general aviation today is the cost and time required for maintenance and skills.
In the controller arena one could argue here that the controller moves into a supervisory manager kind of function.
That's no different than it is for AGATE. In airspace, obviously airlines operate principally in classes A, B and C; not
too much outside of that. But the AGATE airplane will operate in airspace in a way that's contingent on equipment and
training and will operate additionally in classes C, D, E and G arenas as well, as they're categorized today.
Categorization in the future is unclear: how do you categorize an uncontrolled airfield that has a category 1 precision
approach?
ATC procedures themselves for the airlines will obviously include some comprehensive automation support, planning,
conflict resolution, and so forth. We need the same for general aviation. However, the general aviation airplane will
probably have a hockey puck defined a little differently than for the airliner. It will be defined by onboard system
capability: there won't be quite as much certainty as there will be for the airline system. And so maybe the hockey puck
will be bigger. On the other hand, the general aviation airplanes maneuverability is greater and speed is less: this might
be traded off in the direction of small hockey pucks. Those all need to be considered. All of these differences will affect
the size of the alert or protected zones for general aviation aircraft.
Considering the facilities part of the National Airspace System, in terms of flight information services, SUA, NOTAMS,
ATIS, and so forth, the airlines would have an automation-supported electronic access to those data bases and flight
information services as would general aviation. We're looking for e-SUA, e-NOTAMS, e-ATIS, that come to us
digitally for display on our multi-function screens. The weather information services ATIS, AWAS, PIREPS, and so
forth, also need to be electronically digitally communicated. And airport status information needs to be in electronic
format as well at a vastly increased number of airports. Communications through ATM for both the airlines and the
general aviation community will have a great deal in common. General aviation will need it for low altitudes and will
need it for thousands - not just hundreds but thousands - of airports and landing facilities all across the nation. In
navigation, of course, DGPS, WAAS, capabilities will be the same between the two. In surveillance, ADS-B for both.
And we need low cost, by which I mean $1,000 ATM capability, in the airplane. Can we do that? It depends on the
volume. If we're going to be successful in vitalizing general aviation, we're looking to grow to at least the manufacturing
rates of the late 70s and hopefully beyond: tens of thousands of units a year.
Let me now address some implementation options. First, let me start by making a point: consortia in America go
against 100 years of Sherman Anti-Trust-Act-based legal policy and business practices. In fact, the very premise of the
strength of business in America is unfettered competition. The paradox is that today it is through collaboration between
competitors that the tide of competitiveness is raised by producing protocols, standards, guidelines, and shared methods
for compliance with rules and regulations that no one company or no one segment of the community can afford to take
the risk to do by themselves.
Since the 1984 passage of the National Cooperative Research Act in the United States over 300 kinds of joint R&D
ventures have been filed. One of the larger, more visible ones was MCC; another one was Sematech. The AGATE
Consortium knows in large part what makes them work and what sets them up for failure. What I'm going to suggest
here is that some of the motivations that drove us to investigate consortia for general aviation may exist here as well.
This is a viable business mechanism for developing consensus on pre-competitive issues. The Joint Sponsored Research
Agreement or the Childs Act process may be a way to do this, especially if there are segmented user community
requirements. This kind of collaborative method might make sense if you want to produce system design guidelines and
standards and certification bases and methods. I would argue that ATM is at a stage in which these make sense; it would
be good to explore this as an option for how to implement the program. If you need to pool resources including
technical discipline capabilities, systems engineering and management expertise, workforce, facilities and equipment,
then a consortium is a way to do it that gives the participants credit for what they're offering to the partnership. That
credit can be parlayed into intellectual property rights in these negotiated agreements that we called JSRAs, Joint
Sponsored Research Agreements.
Certain elements of those resource pooling activities make sense for ATM. This mechanism streamlines procurement by
setting aside the federal acquisition regulations; it allows for negotiation of tasks and having statements of work written
by the companies, the participants, rather than by the government. It allows the selection of the performing
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organizations by the industry team combined with the government participants. Finally, if you would like a means by
which technology transfer can be enhanced, this Joint Sponsored Research Agreement mechanism for R&D
collaboration is one which can make sense, because you wind up with industry committed to the task, matching funds
from industry's own coffers. That is only going to come from industry if there's alignment with the directions of the
program, and government partnership in such a way that you ensure such issues as certifiability of the results of the
effort.
Now, what would a partnership actually look like? There are many models, of which this is one. You ought to look at
about six in order to really make a decision, but here's just some examples. An ATM alliance led by the FAA with a
board of directors and a set of technical councils, one for each one of the communities that needs to be represented in the
partnership. You might choose to create these technical councils and technical teams around the user communities of the
airlines, government, and military users, general aviation users, rotorcraft, public service aviation, sport and recreation.
The ground infrastructure community or team could organize together with the FAA, state facilities, and operations
groups: the equipment companies, organizations that equip the ground infrastructure, the information services
companies, and NASA as a supporting organization. That's just one of many models that should be investigated to build
such a partnership.
In the AGATE Consortium we pooled the resources of NASA, the FAA and the universities and industry through this
JSRA of over 150 members. We set up a federation of five affiliated independent work packages. They're independent
in the sense that they can keep their secrets unto themselves. One of the keys for success of consortia is that the
members have fairly homogenous interests; we implement that by separately grouping the avionics companies, power
plant, and airframe interests, etc. So we have flight systems work, work on propulsion, controls, integrated design and
manufacturing, composites, icing protection systems, and finally integration platforms, referring to both simulation and
flight.
Some other motivations of using a JSRA. Industry leadership is one. Control of technology transfer both in a proactive
and defensive sense. Underneath the JSRA business agreement, all of the results of the AGATE Consortium are exempt
from the Freedom of Information Act for five years. This means that the industry members have control of the
proprietary information. You share what you need to make the partnership work; you don't have to publish any results
outside of the membership itself.
An anecdote about speed of project performance: in a period of 60 days three of us put together 30 what you would have
called contracts with 25 companies under the Federal Acquisition Regulation. No marching army of procurement
specialists or COTRs. The companies themselves wrote the statements of work; the company teams told us which
companies should do which tasks. That mechanism is not supportable under the FARs (Federal Acquisition
Regulations). If there was agreement, that's what we did; if not, we decided. Everybody signed up for that. This is
about ten times as fast, I think, as any other business mechanism I know of in the federal government, and it requires
about one-tenth of the workforce. And I would argue it's probably about ten times as relevant to industry's needs.
Let me wrap this up by saying that the general aviation activities are focused on revitalization through commercialization
of technologies that address volume. We're looking at expanding, spreading the mainstream of business, commerce,
trade and tourism out to the small communities in the nation not directly served by the hub-spoke infrastructure. And we
argue at the same time that this diffusion actually enhances the capacity of the nation's airspace system by making use of
currently underutilized airspace, creating worldwide demand and jobs.
Question (Jim Krause, Honeywell): I'm probably really shooting myself in the foot here, Bruce. We're one of your
partners on AGATE, and I was glad to hear how the procurement process has worked out well on the government side.
On our end it's been pretty unpopular: it's been a lot of work to get the statement of works agreed upon. There are
mechanisms like RNAs and B AAs that allow industry to write a statement of work, and we find that those tend to be
easier for us; they take less hours and calendar time.
Bruce Holmes: Jim brings up a valid issue. We're inventing the way to do this as we do it. We now know how to do
this. We know now, for example, what the formats need to be for the statements of work. We didn't know those things
even three months or four months ago. As we were inventing, we asked all of you to work with us in an experimental
mode through this first year. The point I would make about this exercise, and one of the reasons I stressed that you need
to analyze it for application to your ATM program, is to make a decision whether or not you want to go through this kind
of an effort to make it work. Is it going to be worth it to you from the standpoint of these potential savings? If you're
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talking about downsizing government, I don't see any mechanism that has this much effect on making us able to work in
a more relevant way to your business.needs as fast and with as little workforce as this.does. What I'm asking is for you
to give us the rest of the maturation process, another three to six months, to get all of these in place. We're putting into
place a partner satisfaction measurement process aimed at addressing the problems you just brought up.
One last thing I would like to do is introduce two people who are key to this whole process in NASA. One is Maylene
Duenas. Maylene is in the Office of Commercial Technology at Ames and is the JSRA advocate program manager for
the maturation of this process. The other person is Paul Masson. Paul works for American Technology Initiative Inc. in
Menlo Park. His job has been to be the negotiator between the public and the private sectors. This is an important
element of this process. Amtech is a not-for-profit corporation specifically developed to facilitate public/private
collaboration of this kind. The value that they've added is to conduct all of the research necessary on government policy
and legal practices that allow us to work in these ways: aimed at putting the decision making power into the hands of the
industry participants.
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Ease of use / Convenience
Ease of ATC access
Safety
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Datalink
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TECHNICAL PLAN OVERVIEW
Work Package Objectives
AERONAUTICS
Fliaht Svstems
• Reduce cost of all-weather flight systems
• Implement "Graphical Pilot Interface" situational awareness technologies
• Reduce time and cost to learn and maintain all-weather safe operations skills
• Integrate AGATE airplane operations with evolving ATC system model (ATM-X)
• Develop low-cost design tools, operation, and certification guidelines for
control system and autopilot functions
Figure 15,
TECHNICAL PLAN OVERVIEW
Work Package Objectives
AERONAUTICS
Propulsion Sensors & Controls
• Establish certifiable digital single-lever powerplant control systems
• Develop engine diagnostics, condition monitoring by trend analysis
for greater safety, efficiency, and lower cost
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TECHNICAL PLAN OVERVIEW
Work Package Objectives
AERONAUTICS
Integrated Desian and Manufacturin
• Develop and validate low-cost manufacturing methods
• Develop and validate QC / NDE methods
• Establish material property/design data base
• Develop and validate advanced crashworthiness concepts
• Develop low-cost, quiet propeller design, manufacturing, inspection
capabilities
Figure 17.
TECHNICAL PLAN OVERVIEW
Work Package Objectives
AERON/lUnCS
Ice Protection Svstems
• Develop Natural Laminar Flow compatible system
• Develop in-flight weather information display capability
• Provide regulatory support for certificable autonomous icing systems
• Support icing simulation/design tools development relative to GA
Leading Edge Ice
Protection for
Wings and Tails
Figure 18.
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TECHNICAL PLAN OVERVIEW
Work Package Objectives
AERONAUTICS
AGATE INTEGRATION PLATFORMS
Integrated Cockpit Systems
Integrated Flat-Panel Displays
Data Link
Decision Aids
Flight Controls
Training Systems
Propulsion Sensors and Controls
Single-Lever Power Control
Engine Diagnostics
Integrated Design and Manufacturing
Low-Cost, Low-Noise, Composite Propeller
Icing Protection Systems
Sensors
Icing Information Systems
Figure 19.
WORK PACKAGES IN DEVELOPMENT
AERONAUTICS
Training Systems Technologies (FAA WPL: Peter Hwoschinksy)
- Membership: Training industry
- Goal: Reduced training cost and time
- Objectives/Products
» Industry standards for desktop CBT (FAR 141; 142)
» FAA Flight Standards for pilot training, certification, test standards (FAR 61)
- Time table: FY 1996 Start
Airspace Systems Infrastructure (FAA WPL: Steve Fisher)
- Membership: Airspace equippage industry
- Goal: Increased airspace capacity, safety, standardization of GA user capabilities
- Objectives/Products
» AGATE cockpit equipment, procedures requirements
» ATC equippage & procedures requirements
- Time table: FY 1996 Start
Ground Systems Infrastructure (FAA WPL: Paul Erway)
- Membership: Ground infrastructure equippage industry
- Goal: Increased airspace capacity, safety, standardization of GA user capabilities
- Objectives/Products
» Ground equipment requirements
» Flight information Services database and systems standards
- Time table: FY 1996 Start
Aero/Acoustics Design and Analysis (NASA WPL: Steve Robinson)
- Membership: Airframe, Propeller, Engine manufacturers
- Goal: Reduced product development cycle time and cost
- Objectives/Products:
» Design tools and concepts
- Timetable: FY 1995 Start Figure 20.
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INDUSTRY-LED
GENERAL AVIATION PARTNERSHIP
AERONAUTICS
. NASA / FAA / INDUSTRY / UNIVERSITIES
$$ -- FACILITIES - TECHNOLOGY -- PERSONNEL
JOINT
SPONSORED
RESEARCH
AGREEMENT
ADVANCED GENERAL AVIATION TRANSPORT EXPERIMENTS
(AGATE)
CONSORTIUM
* INTEGRATED FLIGHT SYSTEMS
•f PROPULSION SENSORS & CONTROLS
INTEGRATED DESIGN & MANUFACTURING
-> ICING PROTECTION SYSTEMS
* AGATE INTEGRATION PLATFORMS
Figure 21.
ORGANIZATION
AERONAUTICS
I AmTech, Paul Masson
Executive Council
GA Element Manager
Dr. Bruce J. Holmes
I Systems Engineering, Malcolm Burgess, RTI
j SBiR GA Subtopic
STTR GA Subtopic
L
Technology
Applications
Group,
Thayer Sheets
FAA Manager
Rick Weiss, ARD-30
RTCA
' Training Technology
> Air Infrastructure
1
 Ground Infrastructure
Deputy Manager
TBA
#5 AGATE Integration Platforms
Daniel J. DiCario, LaRC
Work Package #1J
Flight
Systems
H. Paul Stough, ill,
LaRC
Technical Advisory Councils
#2
Propulsion Sensors
& Controls
Jeffrey Musgrave,
LeRC
Integrated Design &
Manufacturing
H. Benson Dexter,
LaRC
lcing_Protection
Systems
Tom Bond,
LeRC
• Cockpit Systems Infrastructure Task
• Flight Control Systems Task
• Integrated Cockpit Information
Systems Task
• Communinicaticns Task
Figure 22.
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VALUES / MISSION / VISION
Revitalize the U.S. General Aviation Industry
Affordable-safe-utility for General Aviation single-
pilot, light, fixed-wing transportation airplanes in
service of nation's economy
Design Guidelines
Systems Standards.
Certification Methods for Compliance. Bases
Team to leverage resources and technologies in
efforts beyond single company scope
Share non-competitive & precompetitive technologies
which expand worldwide market demand
Figure 23.
WHY JSRA?
• Industry Leadership
• Control of Technology Transfer
• Driven by Commercialization
Forum for Communications/Coordination
Shared Pre- and Non-Competitive Interests
• Flexible, rapid funding by NASA, FAA
• Pool Resources (SBIR, STTR)
• Speed of Project Performance
Figure 24.
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AERONAUTICS
JOINT R&D VENTURES
DILEMMAS & ISSUES
BALANCE
Private
Benefits
Short Term
Research
Autonomous
Decision Making
Sub-critical
Membership
Protecting
Proprietary
Information
Competitive
Interests
Collective
Benefits
Long Term
Research
Participative
Decision Making
Large
Membership
Sharing
Proprietary
Information
Pre-competitive
Interests
Figure 25.
FAA PARTICIPATION
Figure 26.
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AGATE CONSORTIUM MEMBERSHIP
5 NASA
26 Universities Organizations
&Non-Profits
(Supporting)
16FAA
Organizations
4 Trade/Consumer
Associations
(Supporting)
29 Industry
Supporting Members
50 Industry Full
Members
23 Industry
Associate Members
* Preliminary total based on active negotiations with prospective partners.
Figure 27.
RESOURCE SUMMARY
STTR, GA SUBTOPIC*
SBIR, GA SUBTOPICS"
AGATE, INDUSTRY IN-KIND
$, M
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
FISCAL YEAR
Assumes 8 Phase I awards (@ $70K) beginning in FY 1995
and 4 Phase II awards (@ $700K) per year beginning in FY 1996
Assumes 24 Phase I awards (@ $70K) beginning in FY 1995
and 12 Phase II awards (@ S700K) per year beginning in FY 1996
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Figure 28.
AGATE OBJECTIVES
AERONAUTICS
U.S. GENERAL AVIATION REVITALIZATION
THROUGH TECHNOLOGY COMMERCIALIZATION
FOR INCREASED VOLUMES
Expand the nation's economy to "off-airways" communities
Increase efficient utilization of nation's airspace
Create worldwide demand for new, U.S.-built
"owner-operated" small business and personal aircraft
Create jobs in airframe, engine, avionics,
airport, training industries
AERONAUTICS
Figure 29.
Figure 30.
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Integration of Rotorcraft into the National Airspace System
Tom Salat represents the Helicopter Association International and will be speaking on the integration of
rotorcraft into the national airspace system. Tom's got quite a broad background. He was an Army medevac
pilot during the Vietnam era. He served for three years with the FAA Air Traffic at LaGuardia. He currently is
a captain with ROP Aviation and is pilot to the Chairman of McAndrews & Forbes Holdings. He flies
Gulfstream and Sikorsky aircraft, and he is currently Chairman of the HAI's Flight Operations Committee. He
represents HAI on the FAA Administrators Air Traffic Procedures Advisory Committee.
Thomas Salat: As Chairman of HAI's Flight Operations Committee, I represent the interests of helicopter operators in
about 59 countries throughout the world today, but I'm just going to be addressing some issues that we have here in the
United States. We are some of those 200,000 aircraft that operate below 10,000 feet. If we had our way, we'd like to
operate below 3,000 feet. Unfortunately we can't. There are approximately 6,400 helicopters active right now in the
United States that fly approximately two-and-a-half million hours per year; roughly the equivalent of Delta and US Air's
domestic revenue hours. Our twelve million takeoffs and landings per year is equivalent to the operations of the top 24
airports combined in 1993.
Does the current ATM system provide to the helicopter pilot an economical and efficient operating system? Not even
close. Whose fault is it? Doesn't make any difference. If it weren't for people in the FAA such as Lane Speck and his
people in Terminal Procedures Branch, we would not be able to get from New York to Philadelphia in an IFR
environment.
Helicopters in use today, particularly in the corporate markets, are for the most part Bell and Sikorsky products. I have
the capability of programming my flight management system on the ramp to wherever I want to go. The aircraft will
take off, fly its flight plan as I'm sitting with folded arms, execute an ILS procedure with the aircraft decelerating to 70
knots and an altitude of 50 feet right down the center line of the runway. With the exception of autoland, we have the
exact same technology as in large fixed-wing aircraft today. We've been flying glass cockpits in helicopters for the last
ten years. When I say glass cockpits I mean full blown EFIS, integrated display augmentation systems. The only
needles and gauges I look at right now in my aircraft are standby attitude and airspeed indicators. We have the
technology to do whatever we can, without the opportunity to use the technology.
In this country we have never really developed procedures for helicopters; we have never been able to use helicopters in
the manner for which they were intended. The helicopter was never intended to go from airport to airport. Helicopter
operations are essentially divided between offshore oil support; EMS activities, which is the largest growing segment of
rotary wing aviation today; corporate operations; and some private pilots who have the money to fly helicopters. There
are approximately 4,400 heliports in the United States; Unfortunately over 97% of them, as private use facilities, are
closed to the public.
As a result of this, helicopters are forced to use airports and IFR fixed wing procedures. The helicopter was designed as
a transportation tool to go from city center to city center; not from city center to airport; not from airport to airport. As a
result of current operations, there is congestion in the system, not necessarily in the enroute environment but in the
terminal environment. It's the same terminal environment that is usually co-located with a major city in which the
helicopter is operating, usually in very close proximity to that airport.
Let me just give you a rough idea of the New York City metropolitan area. There are a couple of heliports on the East
River; one on the Hudson River, with operations in those areas exceeding 250,000 per year. That's a significant number
of operations in a very small uncontrolled area, seven miles from LaGuardia, 12 miles from Newark, and 12 miles from
Kennedy. As a result of this, helicopters are forced to operate inefficiently in terms of what they were designed to do.
The helicopter is probably one of the most versatile air transport platforms for a number of reasons: high speed cruise,
high stability at low altitudes and at low air speeds, excellent climb performance, excellent margins at low speed, which
is something that doesn't occur in the fixed wing environment. A helicopter also has one big advantage: it can, for the
most part, operate independent of wind direction. It doesn't need runways or need to land into the wind.
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However, operating below 3,000 feet is important. As a helicopter's altitude increases, the air speed that helicopter can
maintain decreases rapidly. At 2,000 or 3,000 feet I can maintain 150 knots all day. At altitudes above 5,000 feet, my
indicated air speed or Vne is probably down to about 125-130 knots. Add to that perhaps a 20 knot head wind from the
southwest. That will preclude my going 180 miles from New York to Washington in the present IFR environment at
altitude. In certain parts of the country we need the lower altitudes because helicopters do not have de-icing capabilities;
freezing levels are a very important consideration.
We don't know what we want because we don't have a lot of good experience in terms of procedures that were designed
for us. So we're at a crossroads in the helicopter industry: should the helicopter be fully integrated as the national
airspace system in terms of routes and procedures, or should we be separate but equal? Do we want to develop a
helicopter-unique air space? There are altitudes in the air space system, for example 2,000 to 4,000 foot, that are not
used at all. Should we develop an air space system that would let helicopters take advantage of these altitudes? Should
we develop procedures that would be independent of those fixed wing procedures at the major terminals?
For many years helicopters have been executing point in space approaches. The problem has been that the ends of those
procedures were too far away from the desired destination; the helicopter was forced to scud-run, to operate in special
VFR conditions for sometimes 15 to 20 miles to get to an airport or a city center heliport. We have developed sterile
routes and we're in the process of developing GPS routes for helicopters. We have a route structure established now that
goes from New River, North Carolina through the New York metropolitan area to Albany and Boston. The route
structure works. The helicopter can get from point A to point B very expeditiously and not have much of an impact on
fixed wing traffic. But what happens when the helicopter gets into that terminal environment? We don't want to go to
airports or create congestion or delays; we just need to get to that city center heliport.
Hopefully some of the LDGPS (Local Differential GPS) procedures we're working on now will soon come to fruition. A
lot of helicopters out there right now are flying with full GPS systems. In the aircraft I'm flying we've taken out a lot of
sensors and we're basically just using GPS rho-theta information. Hopefully we'll have some test sites in short order that
will eventually lead to getting away from those major terminal areas. We don't care who develops the system, but we
would like to be included for input and we would like you not to forget about us. We are a very unique tool and we
would like to maximize the uniqueness of that tool.
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Tiltrotor Aircraft Desired ATM Requirements
John Zuk, Ph.D., is a Technical Manager in the Advanced Tiltrotor Transport Technology Project Office at
NASA Ames Research Center. Dr. Zuk has a BSME from the Ohio State University, MS in Aerospace
Engineering from the University of Rochester, and a Ph.D from Case Western Reserve University. He has been
involved in conceptual design studies, research and technology in the full spectrum of aircraft classes ranging
from Lighter-Than-Air, Remotely Piloted, Helicopter, Tiltrotor, Advanced Subsonic, High Speed Civil
Transport, and National Aerospace Plane.
John Zuk: The tiltrotor aircraft is an example of a new class of aircraft with an operational capability that can be enabled
by technology embodied in Air Traffic Management System (ATM) of the future. Tiltrotor aircraft combine the low-
disk loading vertical takeoff and landing capability of a helicopter with the cruise speed performance of a fixed-wing
turboprop aircraft. The tiltrotor has the ability to fly in one of three different modes: in the helicopter mode, in the
partially converted tiltrotor mode, and in the fully converted airplane mode (Fig. 1). For takeoff, the proproters are
rotated to the vertical position where the developed thrust completely supports the aircraft weight. The tiltrotor rapidly
converts from the helicopter mode to the airplane mode by continuously tilting the proprotors from the helicopter rotor
position to the conventional airplane propeller position. In the airplane mode, the wings provide the lift, whereas, the
proprotors act as propellers and provide propulsive thrust. The process is reversed for landing. The design concept has
been proven by the XV-15 Tiltrotor Research Aircraft (shown in Fig. 1)
The success of the XV-15 program has led to the development of the V022 Osprey tiltrotor aircraft (Fig. 2). The V-22 is
a multimission aircraft which will serve the Marines, Navy, Air Force, and Special Operations. The program is currently
in the Engineering Manufacturing Development Phase which involves building 4 aircraft. A production commitment to
purchase 12 aircraft has been made by the military with the first aircraft to be delivered in 2001.
In addition to giving the military unique operational capability, tiltrotor aircraft have the promise to revolutionize short
haul civil transportation. Studies by Boeing Commercial Airplanes have shown a large market potential for aircraft sizes
ranging from 9 to 75 passenger carrying capability with operating trip lengths to 350 nautical miles. Especially
promising is a 40 passenger vehicle which is based on technology from the V-22 Osprey (Fig. 3). If a market responsive
vehicle were available by the year 2000, the market size is forecasted to be over 2500 aircraft. Tiltrotor aircraft could
operate as commuter feeders to airports, freeing runways currently used by turboprops, or bypassing the airport
altogether by flying to and from strategically located vertiports close to demand centers (Fig. 4). Although tiltrotor
operating costs would be higher than fixed wing aircraft (due to vertical takeoff and landing (VTOL capability), case
studies show that total trip cost could be the same or lower than that of fixed wing aircraft and ground transportation
combined - where trip costs are higher when the airport is significantly farther from the demand center than a vertiport.
In addition, the traveler would realize considerable total time savings (on the order of 25% in the Northeast Corridor).
Many helicopter and small turboprop missions, such as high value cargo express flights, are also candidates for future
tiltrotor markets. All potential tiltrotor missions are time critical; hence, a very efficient ATM system, which allows
operational flexibility to vertiports and vertistops, as needed, is essential to the success of this new class of aircraft.
For tiltrotor commuter aircraft to act as hub feeders from smaller airports or vertiports to a hub airport, tiltrotor aircraft
must be allowed to land independent of fixed wing traffic at the hub airport under IMC. Since up to 60% of the aircraft
operating at the current 55 hub airports are commuter aircraft, tiltrotor aircraft, as replacement aircraft, have the potential
for significantly freeing runway space for larger narrow body and wide body transport aircraft. An example of the
potential benefit of tiltrotor aircraft increasing airport capacity is illustrated in Figures 5 and 6.
Tiltrotor aircraft will fly enroute the same as today's high performance turboprops and the civil tiltrotor (CTR) will
efficiently cruise at altitudes from 17,000 to 30,000 feet. Hence, the tiltrotor enroute future ATM requirements will be
the same as high performance turboprops (Fig. 7) - including free flight. In the terminal area their operation is similar to
that of a helicopter except that steeper approaches can be flown (horizontal attitude can be maintained for passenger
comfort and pilot visibility). Also, since the tiltrotor is a "winged" aircraft, it is desirable for the vertiport to have
railway lengths of about 800 feet. With a 800 ft. railway, the CTR can increase its range 2 1/2 times over a vertical
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takeoff operation and still meet Cat A requirements. Of course, the future ATM must allow efficient transition from
enroute to terminal area operation.
Since 1947, when the first civil helicopter was certified, helicopters have not been allowed to conduct Instrument
Meteorological Conditions (IMC) operations independent of fixed wing traffic at airports. As an example, under IMC,
commuter helicopters operating from the Wall Street Heliport in NYC to JFK have to queue in with fixed wing traffic
and approach the runway using the fixed wing Instrument Landing System (ILS). This requirement has been very
detrimental to the economic viability of such commuter operations. However, first steps of IMC operations to heliports
have begun.
Recently, using the Global Positioning System (GPS), non-precision approaches to heliports, under IMC, have been
certified. The helicopter approaches to a point in space (with minimum 500' ceilings and 1 mile visibility), then
continues under special VFR conditions to the heliport. In late 1995, using Differential GPS, precision approaches under
IMC to heliports may be granted by the FAA.
The Boeing study recommended three areas that needed to be addressed before a civil tiltrotor could be operated
successfully: (1) technology must be developed for safe operations and environmental acceptability; (2) vertiports must
be built and located near demand centers, and (3) the ATM system must allow the tiltrotor to operate efficiently under all
conditions including IMC. Critical CTR aircraft technology and environmental acceptability issues (such as a low noise
rotor) are currently being addressed under the NASA Advanced Subsonics Technology program - Short Haul (Civil
Tiltrotor) element. Achieving desirable vertiport locations are more probable with aircraft technology enabling safe and
low noise operation. Low noise, safe, efficient operation requires the ATM system to allow a precise flight profile which
avoids noise sensitive areas and obstacles and permits segmented and steep approaches (9° -12° ) under IMC. Ames
and industry (Bell Helicopter Textron and Boeing Helicopters) CTR simulations are proving the feasibility for steep
approaches in simulated urban environments. The Ames Civil Rotorcraft IFR Terminal-Area Technology Enhancement
Research (CRITTER) flight program using the NASA/ARMY Rotorcraft Aircrew Systems Concepts Airborne
Laboratory (RASCAL) helicopter is showing very promising results for noise avoidance through precise, segmented
approaches (Fig. 8).
Future helicopter ATM requirements enabling IMC operations to a dedicated heliport or vertiport, stand alone or at an
airport, would include: (1) Differential GPS, (2) non-radar low level surveillance using a GPS derived location Mode S
squitter, (3) VHP communications, (4) local weather conditions real time monitoring, (5) non-interference operation
compatible and independent of fixed wing enroute and terminal area traffic, (6) appropriate visual markings and lighting,
and (7) direct communication from the cockpit to the Flight Service Office using a cellular phone. These are exactly the
same requirements for a tiltrotor in a terminal area. (Fig. 9).
Transportation planners are beginning to recognize the potential of intermodal transportation centers with tiltrotors
providing a vital air-link with various ground transportation modes - lightrail, subway, bus, etc. It would be desirable to
have a transparent interface with ground transportation at such centers. A model vertiport is now in operation at
downtown Dallas - using helicopters as the air link. Some existing heliports such as the Wall Street Heliport in New
York City (NYC) can accommodate a civil tiltrotor.
In conclusion, the challenge is to design, develop, and implement a flexible, free flight ATM system which will enable
the full potential of tiltrotor aircraft, other rotorcraft, and helicopters to be realized, and allow seamless integration with
other modes of transportation. The tiltrotor aircraft is an example where ATM can be an enabling technology for the
operational viability of a new class of aircraft.
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Figure 1.
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Figure 4.
CURRENT NEW YORK TRAFFIC (1988)
THREE AIRPORTS COMBINED
56%OF DEPARTURES
CARRY
82%OF PASSENGERS
>300 MILES
44% OF DEPARTURES
CARRY
18% OF THE PASSENGERS
<300 MILES
AOCI & OAG DATA
Figure 5.
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PRO FORMA NEW YORK TRAFFIC (1988)
TRANSFER 50% OF LESS THAN 300 MILE TRAFFIC
TO TILTROTQR SYSTEM
9%PASSENGERS
^= — -22% OF DEPARTURES
RESULTING ECONOMIC LEVERAGE
SAME NUMBER OF RUNWAY DEPARTURES PROVIDE:
• 23% PASSENGERS [18,2QO,000/YEAR]
•$3,600,000,000 REVENUE/YEAR
• $350,000,000 T1LTROTOR SYSTEM REVENUE/YEAR
Tiltrotor
ATM Requirements
Figure 6.
Enroute: Same as a high performance
turboprop (17 - 30,000 foot cruise).
Terminal Area: Similar to helicopter
operation at heliport except:
1) Steeper approach (9 deg.),
2) Longer rollway (800 ft.).
Transition efficiently from enroute to
terminal area.
Figure 7.
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NASA/FAA Civil Rotorcraft IFR Terminal-Area Technology
Enhancement Research (CRITTER)
RASCAL DGPS-Guided, Multi-segment Noise Abatement Tests
\\1/
Differential
corrections
Standard constant
glideslope approach Multi-segment
noise-abatement
approach profile Ground
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Figure 8.
Helicopter
ATM Requirements
• Enroute: Low altitude system similar to &
compatible with General Aviation fixed wing
aircraft
• Terminal Area: Allow IMC operation
independent of fixed wing traffic.
• 1) IFR Approach Capability - Avoid
obstacles & sensitive areas (noise,
controlled airspace,etc.) & utilize
Differential GPS, 2) Non-Radar low level
suryeillence - GPS derrived location (Mode S
Squitter), 3) VHF Communications, 4) Non-
interference operation (independent of
fixed wing enroute and terminal area
traffic), 5) Local Wx conditions real time
monitoring, 6) Visual markings & lighting.
Figure 9.
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Concluding Remark
The Challenge is to Design, Develop, and
Implement a Flexible, Free Flight ATM
System Which will Enable the Full Potential
of Tiltrotor Aircraft, Other Rotorcraft, &
Helicopters to be Realized, & and allow
Seamless Integration with Other Modes of
Transportation.
Figure 10.
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LESSONS LEARNED
Chair: Kelly Harwood Olsen
NASA Ames Research Center
Moffett Field
Summary
This session addresses lessons learned from the development of large automation systems for air traffic control as well as
allied fields. For ATC, Fred Schneider discusses problems related to the design of the Advanced Automation System.
Dallas Denery discusses the design philosophy and NASA-FAA cooperation in the development of the Center TRACON
Automation System. Dave Woods discusses human centered automation. Rail traffic management including issues of
problem decomposition and phased deployment are discussed by Milt Adams. Automation in the nuclear industry is
discussed by Kim Vicente. The final subject is cockpit situational awareness, as discussed by Robert Landy.
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Avoiding AAS Mistakes
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managing editor of the Springer Verlag texts and monograph series in computer science. He is a fellow of
AAAS and ACM.
Fred Schneider: About five years ago I became involved in AAS. I'd like to give you a personal view of problems that
I've seen in the design of the AAS system and those I expect you're going to encounter again if you try to build another
air traffic control system. AAS is a large system: it's the largest civilian-built piece of software in the history of
mankind. It's not yet operational. The system is regarded by the software people as roughly being three levels. The
lowest level is the hardware; the middle level is operating system and applications support; and the top level is the
application itself. The application level is aware of airplanes, tracks, and the like; the lowest level comprises objects
such as token rings and processors; at the middle level is an operating system and various protocols whose function is to
provide abstractions that make it easy to build the application.
I was involved in designing the application architecture. IBM Federal Systems approached me at the time that the
application layer was being designed with questions about how to make the application fault tolerant.
I also helped design some of the systems many special-purpose protocols; an example is the one that allows an airplane
to be handed-off from one controller to another as it moves through airspace. Handoff is a surprisingly difficult problem
because one must ensure that the system doesn't lose track of the airplane or have two controllers controlling the airplane
even if there is a processor or software failure. What's particularly interesting about our handoff protocol is that it was
derived using formal methods. We wrote a formal specification and we're able to derive the protocol from that. We thus
know that the protocol is probably correct; in fact, there's a proof of it. It's a short but subtle protocol. It took enough
time to derive that you would not imagine going through this process for the millions of lines of Ada that define the
system. But, for selected portions of the system—like the handoff protocol—there is a substantial payoff.
Another problem that I worked on was system management. Each AAS installation has over 100 processors. The
problem is what to do when some subset of the processors fail, something one expects to happen regularly. How does
this system reconfigure itself? When the system observes that there are failures, how does the system avoid using
components that are known to be faulty? System management is an example of an aspect of the project that was never
finished. The FAA stop-work order came before we had resolved the problem. I conjecture that enough of the system
will never be fielded so that system management problems will never be significant. Clearly system management will be
a problem for future systems.
Building a large mission-critical or fault-tolerant system like AAS is very difficult. There are problems with AAS that
can be blamed on management and process, but even had we dealt with all of those problems it would still have been a
difficult task. We don't know how to build systems like AAS: we haven't built very many of them. Building the third
airplane was also a very difficult task. It's just we have built many airplanes since then, and some aspects of airplane
design are now accepted as routine. In building large, complicated, real-time, fault-tolerant, multi-processor systems, we
don't have enough experience to regard any part of the task as routine.
There are at least two schools of thought on how to build fault tolerant systems. One school says you add fault tolerance
after you've designed the system; this never works. A second school says to build support for those abstractions that we
think application designers will need when building their fault tolerant system; that was the view taken in designing
AAS. This comes back to my statement that there are three levels in the system. The middle level contains protocols for
implementing fault-tolerant abstractions and the upper level contains the abstractions. We now know—courtesy of AAS-
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-that completely separating fault tolerance support from the application is a bad idea because it leads to poor
performance and to difficulties in devising an application design.
A complex systems software should be viewed as mostly providing glue. The components are known and are fixed:
radars, planes, controller workstations, etc. The software provides glue whose function is to allow the objects to
communicate and cooperate. That means that the software has to reflect the structure of the procedures and the
environment. Regarding the software as driving the process is the wrong way to think about it. The right way is to
regard the rest of the environment as driving the design of the software. You need to figure out the right structure of the
entire system, and then determine what glue you need to make that structure operate.
When I came to the AAS system, I knew a lot about how to support fault tolerance but not very much about air traffic
management. When engineers explained the application to me, it was abundantly clear that air traffic management is
solved with a real-time, fault tolerant, distributed database. The database contains information on the planes, where they
are, and what they're doing. There is a need for various "views" of this database. For example, the controller desires a
"view" of all the planes that are in a given area and where they are going.
In fact, air traffic management defines an easy database problem, because unlike most database systems, there are no
user-written transactions. There's a transaction that corresponds to getting information from the radar, and there's a
transaction corresponding to a controller changing what a plane should be doing, and so on. Because there are no user-
written transactions, it should be a very simple database system to build. I was surprised, then, to find that that's not the
way AAS is structured. It was only in one of yesterday's lectures that I learned why: AAS is a radar data processing
system that happens to have a database hanging off it. That is a structural mistake. It means that AAS is much more
complicated than it needs to be. And, being more complicated means AAS is less likely to work properly, less likely to
work quickly, and will take longer and be harder to develop.
One lesson to learn from this experience is that if you were building another air traffic control system, you should
structure it as a database system. If I were going to produce an air traffic control system tomorrow, that's what I would
do. And, I was happy to learn that the Australian air traffic control system has taken that view. But it would be wrong to
infer that the next-generation air traffic control system should be a big database system. A database is the right glue if
you have a centralized view of the world; that is, if you think the controllers are running the show. But apparently we're
moving in the direction where the controllers are not running the show. In fact, lots of agents are running the show. The
pilots will run the show as part of "free flight". So, having a single centralized database is a bad idea, because it doesn't
reflect the structure of next-generation air traffic control.
You've probably seen advertisements for new handheld computers that control the actions of an agent that operates on
your behalf. The concept of a network agent architecture seems to be very promising as the right glue for the kinds of air
traffic control systems we've been talking about for the last few days. It's a glue where autonomous agents represent
different stakeholders in the game, all knowing how to interact. For air traffic control, there will probably be an agent
for each airplane, one for each controller, etc. The airplane's agent is a process that wanders through the network and
performs useful actions to support the airplane; for example, finding out what other agents, that is, other airplanes, are in
the vicinity.
The lesson to learn is that software architecture echo the structure of the problem it solves; one shouldn't be afraid to
pick an appropriate software architecture. That architecture would have been a database management system for AAS; I
think it's going to be a collection of network agents for the next generation air traffic control system. We don't now
know how to build reliable systems with agents; useful research would prepare for this task.
Let me now make some comments about fault tolerance from a software developers point of view. The requirements for
fault tolerance have to be useful; for the controller fault tolerance means that the system doesn't fail. But that's not a very
useful requirement for a software developer, because systems with finite amounts of hardware are going to fail
eventually, a truth that everybody appreciates. A requirement that says the MTBF has to be "nine nines" is not a
measurable, hence not a useful requirement because none of us will live long enough to test any system we build and
ascertain that it exhibits that level of performance.
So, a requirement for system fault tolerance must have measurable parameters and measurable results. By measurable
parameters I mean that the requirement needs to depend on things that we can measure. The AAS system is based on
models about how frequently the operating system and hardware is going to fail. But these models just come out of the
blue: there's no way to validate them. By slightly changing the parameters of these models, you can get a different
134
result. So, while the fault tolerance requirements for AAS are stated very rigorously, they are stated rigorously in a way
that can't be evaluated.
One idea that we never had a chance to check out for AAS is that if you're building a system that's supposed to be fault
tolerant, perhaps you can exploit that fault-tolerance in normal operation. For example, after repeated system tests, it's
likely that you'll get to the point where the system only fails after a long time: not in the first five minutes, but only after
ten hours. And, while a system that fails after ten hours isn't anywhere near good enough for an ATM application, if the
system is also fault tolerant then we can exploit that capability as follows.
When you test a system, you're taking one of the possible trajectories that the system can run through. The short
trajectories—that is, trajectories that start from the initial system state and run for a short time (e.g. ten hours)~are likely
to be tested well, because the map of all possible trajectories looks like a tree that gets bushier and bushier as you move
away from the root. Each branching point corresponds to some uncontrollable event, like an input or a clock tick. If you
test the system and you know that it's likely that all trajectories close to the root are acceptable, but you don't know about
a large fraction of the trajectories in the remainder of the tree, then it's not prudent to drive the system down to the
remainder of the tree.
If the system is fault tolerant, then you can "shoot" any component that strays beyond the well tested trajectories. The
fault tolerance mechanisms will cause a new component to start. In this way, the system runs for much longer than ten
hours, even though components never venture beyond short, well tested trajectories. Now, "shooting" a component as it
ventures beyond the well tested trajectories means that component must be regenerated; there can't be left over storage or
orphan processes, for example. We don't really know how to do this regeneration, but it's a promising approach to
achieve fault tolerance in a way that's measurable.
Another issue that came up with AAS concerns independence assumptions. It's critical that components alleged to be
independent really are independent. The way you build a fault tolerant system is to replicate some computation on
independent components. That they're independent means they fail independently. If they don't fail independently—that
is, if there's a common mode failure—then this common mode will take down the entire system.
AAS makes many independence assumptions. For example, there are two token rings, which are assumed to be
independent. (There actually are more than two communications networks, but the ring, which is a primary mode of
communication, is replicated.) The argument was made by the AAS designers that if there are two independent token
rings, then the second can take up the slack after a single failure, and communications can continue. Only late in the
system design, was it discovered that messages from both rings are stored in the same buffer pool. That meant that if a
processor ran out of buffers it could not communicate using either ring. So there was an implicit dependence assumption
in the architecture. The problem was easily fixed, but that it existed at all was disturbing.
We need a way to analyze systems to discover independence assumptions and dependence assumptions. Such an
analysis would be the technical basis for system reconfiguration, as well. Redistributing load among a collection of
processors is not a hard problem. Doing that redistribution so that things that are assumed to be independent continue to
be independent is a hard problem.
Finally, AAS made great strides in procurement. The system was supposed to use COTS (commercial off the shelf)
components, so that the FAA didn't get stuck with special purpose machines that only IBM could sell and service. That
was a step in the right direction, but not a big enough step. One of the problems with AAS is that it is a big monolithic
system. It's true that the system was to be delivered in stages (segments), but the interfaces between these segments are
hidden. And this hiding leads to problems.
We need to think about building systems that will evolve, as opposed to systems that are dropped into place and
supposed to live for a lifetime. The only way to build systems that can evolve is to start making internal interfaces
public. That is, the way each piece of software interacts with the system has to be documented and these software
components have to be able to be unplugged and replugged. For example, we need to be able to switch the window
manager without having all kinds of implications for the rest of the system. The only way to support replacing the
window manager is if the interface of the window manager to the rest of the system is public. In AAS, interfaces are not
public; to replace pieces of AAS, one is going to have to analyze and modify big pieces of the system.
Just to give you a feel for this, AAS was originally bid with IBM PCs and IBM mainframes. IBM mainframes were no
longer the architecture of choice by the time the system was being delivered; networks of distributed workstations were.
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If the system were structured with public interfaces, such a replacement wouldn't have been a problem. It would just be
a matter of pulling out the lowest level that created the process abstraction and replacing it.
At the moment, the future of AAS is uncertain. It is not clear how much of the system will be fielded, for example. But
however the politics play out, we learned a great deal from AAS that can be exploited in any next-generation air traffic
control system. I hope that the designers of such a system are able to profit from our venture.
Question (Mike Bondi, NASA Ames): I was wondering if anyone has looked at the fault tolerance of the telephone
system. Over many years and over many disasters that system seems to be able to maintain itself.
Fred Schneider: The question about the analogy with the phone system is a good one. The phone system seems to be
able to maintain itself. But I've been told that if all of the telephone companies turned off their telephone switches, it
would take forever to get back our telephone service. The phone system also has some flexibility that we don't have in
air traffic control: the phone system is allowed to drop telephone calls. There's no guarantee that any given telephone
call will be completed. In air traffic control, we are not allowed to drop airplanes.
You can learn some things about how to build large, robust systems by studying the telephone system. However, many
of the approaches that telephone companies use to solve their problems do not translate into our domain. The phone
system also doesn't have the requirement that it had to be written in a high level language and it had to use COTS
components.
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Consulted on:
• application architecture
• hand-off protocol
• system management
... plus various "hard problems"
Worked with:
• chief system architect {Jon Dehn)
• colleague (Keith Marzullo)
Figure 2.
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Software system perspective:
real-time
fault-tolerant
distributed
database
No user-defined transactions, so special
purpose protocols possible.
Build a dbms?
Build support for "network agents"?
Figure 3.
Fault-tolerance:
• Need useful requirements:
- measurable parameters
- measurable results
... catenation of short runs?
• Independence assumptions critical
... but hard to identify.
• System reconfiguration
... is not understood.
Figure 4.
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Build an Open System?
• Make interfaces "public".
• Use COTS.
Implications:
• hardware upgrades.
• software upgrades.
• incremental installation.
Figure 5.
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CTAS Lessons Learned
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Dallas Denery: I'm going to cover some of the lessons we learned during the course of CTAS development. Before
reviewing the lessons learned, I would like to give a brief overview of the CTAS system. It consists of three sets of tools
for handling arrival traffic in the terminal area. It includes a traffic management advisor, which basically sets the
sequence and the schedule for the aircraft, and a set of advisory tools to assist the center controller in managing the
descent of the aircraft (the DA), and a set of advisory tools to aid the TRACON controller in handling final approach
spacing.
The implementation of these tools is based on very accurate trajectory prediction capability. The only way that you can
obtain the required accuracy is through very accurate modeling of the aircraft and knowledge of the winds and aircraft
operating procedures. That translates into very complicated code, over 300,000 lines.
We implemented the system on a set of Sun workstations in order to separate its functionality from the primary host and
ARTS computer systems. The interface between the Sun and the primary ATC computers is strictly the extraction of
radar and track data and the feedback of information to the controller displays. The scheduler is displayed on a monitor
directly connected to the Sun network, providing a stand alone display capability that makes the implementation and
testing straightforward.
In order to present the controller with the advisory tools to meet the schedule, however, the data must be integrated back
into the controllers' existing radar screens. The interface becomes a very complex problem in working with today's
system; that has been a major cause for increasing the magnitude of the program over what was initially anticipated.
This program is a prime example of NASA and the FAA working together extremely well. CTAS is a joint project
between NASA and the FAA. The FAA's technical office, ARD-40, headed by John Rekstad managed the program.
NASA's development partners in the activity are MIT Lincoln Labs, the FAA Technical Center, and MITRE. Both MIT
Lincoln Labs and MITRE are under direct contract to the FAA. The FAA's air traffic requirement service specifies the
operational requirements for the system. The FAA's field office located at Ames provided the human factors support for
the program as well as training activities. NASA had responsibility for developing the system and software and for
operational testing at our two test sites: Denver and Dallas/Ft. Worth. NASA and the FAA jointly assessed the
performance of the system at those two test sites. The FAA has full responsibility for converting and hardening the code
and issuing it to a deployment contractor for national deployment. So the paradigm makes sense to us in terms of the
correct way of running a joint activity of this type. Because air traffic is an international issue, the program made a
conscious effort to enter into collaborative research with other laboratories in other countries. We have collaborative
MOAs through NASA with Germany's DLR, the Netherlands NLR; the FAA has similar arrangements with CENA in
France, and Transport Canada.
So with that background I'd like to address lessons learned. The first rule or lesson learned is to start off with a solid
guiding design philosophy. Laying out a set of ground rules that everybody can clearly understand is absolutely
essential to the programs success; it's necessary to review that periodically during the program. It's not something you
put up at the beginning and put it down and forget about for the rest of the activity. In the case of CTAS, the overriding
design philosophy was that the automation should be designed to extend the abilities of the controller and pilot, not to
replace them, a very important distinction. The other principles really derive from that overriding first principle. The
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last principle (on the chart) is that automation should be refined and validated through continual field tests. It's not
possible to do this in the absence of actual operational experience.
And that leads me to the second rule that has guided the program: the program must be structured so that the
conceptualization phase, the development phase and the operational testing phase progress in parallel. At the risk of
overstating the point I'm trying to make, the traditional approach often used in the development of a large system follows
this course: a great deal of effort is spent on the front end laying out the requirements, followed by conceptual design,
simulation, operational test, development of specifications, and deployment. This sequential approach may work well
when there is good understanding of the requirements up front; however the air traffic system is so complex that the
chances of using this approach and actually meeting the requirements of the controller are very low.
The approach that we used condenses those activities into a set of parallel activities. The only way this can be done is by
taking a simplified and reduced capability to the field as early as possible, having designed it to allow for continuous
improvement. Instead of the sequential approach, we build a little, test a little. There are several advantages with this
kind of approach. First, the detailed requirements in design now evolve naturally from actual feedback from the
operational testing. The approach absolutely ensures what I would call a human-centered automation design philosophy
throughout the program. This produces a concurrent design of the computers human interface. It also forces
consideration of the training program because you are quickly going into the operational field. In many programs the
training is not even considered until the deployment stage.
Probably the most significant advantage is the opportunity of leading to early products that may provide a payoff,
hopefully in their own right. In the case of CTAS, we've had the TMA in what we refer to as a one-way mode operating
at the Denver Center for over two years. We're just beginning to start the testing of a passive version of the final
approach spacing tool at DFW this summer.
The third rule is to design the program to minimize the complexity of the interface with the existing system and
minimize the need to change operational procedures. To be successful in testing something of this complexity you have
to design the system so that you minimize the impact on the other operational elements. If you design the system so you
have to make major modifications to what's already there, you're not going to make any progress. In the case of CTAS
the approach has been to offload the software on the Sun workstations, have a fairly simple interface to the host and the
ARTS computers to extract the radar and track data, and try to minimize the requirements for the interface with the
displays. As I mentioned, the interface with the controller displays tends to be a tougher problem with which we're still
wrestling. But the point is that you have to try to design the system to minimize those interface requirements.
Another area, which is a little bit more subtle, is procedures: the very idea of inserting automation into the system is for
the purpose of improving traffic flow. This means that the controller is controlling traffic differently than he/she would
if they didn't have the automation. How do you introduce automation to the controller and tell the controller to use the
automation as an advisor if it doesn't match his background or knowledge? The only way that you can do it is by
training him over a period of time. The controller must learn that the advisors can extend his awareness of the global
situation. The CTAS timeline gives him a more global view of traffic; the advisors are a consolidation of that
information into a form that improves his situational awareness.
The system has to be designed, though, so that on the initial introduction to the field, the automation is tuned to mimic
current procedures; that way you can build up this confidence and not destroy the operational integrity of the system.
The advisors initially should tell him to do exactly what he would do under normal situations. Then as he becomes
familiar with the system, as he understands what information is being provided to him by the advisors, that it is
extending his awareness to the more global operation, you can start tuning towards improved performance. That has
been an important guiding principle.
Question (Jimmy Krozel, Hughes Research Laboratory): We heard from Karl Grundmann that he doesn't want to see
anything surprise him when we introduce anything new. Is there any way you can do this tuning so as to introduce new
systems passively to minimize any surprise element that they have when being introduced to new equipment?
Dallas Denery: I don't think you want to do anything that the controller's not aware of. So we first start in our testing
using simulation. We then go into a shadowing mode. We tune the system for improved performance. It is during this
period that the system may actually tell the controller to do something different with traffic than what he might expect
without the advisories. If the controller challenges the automation, we show the controller what information was used by
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the system that the controller was not aware of that leads to the advisory decision so that he can gain confidence. The
controller must be assured that he can maintain separation.
Question (Duane McRuer, independent consultant): Would you give us a few summary statements about your metrics
and assessment procedures at each step of the way? In particular, how do you assess controller acceptance?
Dallas Denery: The primary assessment right now is through the use of an FAA Air Traffic Requirements System
Development Team. We set up simulation tests that emulate the sites in which we're going to be installing CTAS in as
much detail as we can within the simulation environment. In fact, we use actual flight data to set the initial conditions
for the traffic flow in closed loop simulations. We have a human factors team monitoring the controllers' performance
during that assessment. We also measure the separations that occur during the course of that simulation to assure that
there's no violation of that separation.
We measure work load, but those are all subjective measurements. In terms of performance measurements, we do
offline simulations where we put in uncertainties in terms of the trajectory prediction capability to determine the impact
on overall performance: that's a little bit more solid analytically. So that we have a pretty comfortable feeling of how to
assess the performance gain. I don't have as much confidence in how to measure the more subjective issues of human
acceptance of the system other than the very subjective means that we're using.
Question (Jimmy Boone, Boeing): We have just about a million lines of code of a 777 airplane controlling very
distributed processing. And we've had to adopt the approach of "build a little, test a lot" because it's the only practical
approach. We built a 500,000 square foot lab to start looking at the various .development levels of the software. I think
that this multiple build cycle is the right way to do business. This project is a good model for FAA/NASA joint work for
CNS ATM. Of all those lines of code on the 777,400,000 lines of code are in the flight management computer. How
will the CTAS system take into account that the onboard capability of the airplane is advising the pilot on descent and
time control so that it coordinates with your overall arrival schedule?
Dallas Denery: A major objective of the Terminal Area Productivity Program is to start looking at the use of data link.
One of the advantages of data link in a system like CTAS is that you can start transmitting information from the aircraft
down to the actual CTAS system for improved trajectory prediction. There's no way, even with the extensive modeling
that we do on the ground, that we can know as much about the aircraft as the aircraft knows about itself. The basic idea
is that the FMS system would downlink information about its preferred trajectory and intent. Those parameters then
would be set within the trajectory prediction calculations within CTAS and integrated with the other traffic. So CTAS
makes the best guess of the trajectory if there's no information coming from the aircraft, but if the aircraft does have
some information that it can transmit to the ground, CTAS can accommodate that and use those trajectories in context
with the other trajectories to do the scheduling and derive the advisories.
Question (Alan Campbell, Airline Pilots Association): I haven't heard anything about the flight deck interface; I'm
concerned about the overall impact of such systems, rather than individual pieces. Will there be follow-on work to try to
integrate CTAS and similar projects along with new FMS systems; secondly, will the training implications be looked at
as this continues to meld with the ATM system?
Dallas Denery: Concurrent with the development of the CTAS there is a concentrated effort to look at the aircraft-
ground integration, starting from the beginning of the program. In fact, in building up our operational testing
environment, our primary facility for testing traffic is using keyboard (pseudo) pilots. To explore the aircrew-ground
interface we have a data link to both the Langley TSRV cockpit as well as the cockpit in our Crew Vehicle Systems
Research Facility. We just recently completed the first evaluation of the descent advisor tool at Denver in which we
made a deliberate attempt to address phraseology between the aircrew and the ground. Another part of that program is
the use of the Langley 737 aircraft with which we began looking at what FMS modifications are required to be consistent
with CTAS.
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AMES ATC TERMINAL AREA AUTOMATION RESEARCH
OBJECTIVE
DESIGN OF AN AUTOMATION SYSTEM
FOR ASSISTING AIR TRAFFIC
CONTROLLERS IN OPTIMIZING TRAFFIC
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PAYOFFS
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• AUTOMATION ASSISTS BUT DOES
NOT REPLACE CONTROLLERS
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CTAS Development Approach
CTAS development program is a joint project of NASA and FAA
- FAA's TATCA Office, ARD - 40, manages the program
- NASA's development partners are MIT Lincoln Labs, FAA Technical
Center and Mitre
- FAA's Air Traffic Requirements Service specifies operational
requirements
- FAA's Field Office provides human factors and training
NASA develops system and software for operational tests at Denver
and Dallas/Ft Worth areas
NASA and FAA to refine system and assess performance jointly at
field sites
FAA converts to operational system for national deployment
MOA's for collaborative research with DLR (Germany), NLR (Netherlands),
CENA (France) and Transport Canada
Figure 5.
LESSONS LEARNED
I |)> Rule 1 Establish a Guiding Design Philosophy
Figure 6.
146
Design of Human Centered Automation
for Air Traffic Management
• Automation should serve the human (controller, pilot....) and not
vice versa
• Automation should enhance the controller's perception of traffic
situation
• Automation should complement controller skills
• Automation should achieve well defined objectives
• Automation should be designed with controllers as members of
design team
• Automation should be refined and validated in field tests
Figure 7.
LESSONS LEARNED
Rule 1 Establish a Guiding Design Philosophy
I S Rule 2 Structure Program so Conceptualization, Development, and
Operational Testing Progress in Parallel
Figure 8.
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Take reduced capability system to the field as early as possible - design for continuous improvement
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Figure 9.
ADVANTAGES
Detailed Requirements and Design Evolve from Knowledge of Actual Operations
Forces a Human Centered Automation Design Philosophy Throughout Program
Forces Concurrent Design of Computer Human Interface and Training Program
Leads to Early Products
Figure 10.
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LESSONS LEARNED
Rule 1 Establish a Guiding Design Philosophy
Rule 2 Structure Program so Conceptualization, Development, and
Operational Testing Progress in Parallel
I y Rule 3 Design to Minimize Interference/Impact on Operational System
- Hardware/Software
- Procedures
Figure 12.
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Human Centered Automation
Dr. David Woods got his Ph.D. at Purdue University in 1979. He is Co-Director of Cognitive Systems
Engineering Laboratory at the Ohio State University. He's a fellow of the Human Factors and Ergonomics
Society. He received the 1994 Eli Award for the best paper in human factors and he recently completed a book
titled "Behind Human Error". In 1994, he gave the keynote address at the Conference on Automation
Technology and Human Performance. He has been advisor to various government agencies on issues
pertaining to human performance and error in complex systems. He is currently Technical Advisor to the FAA
Human Factors Team examining advanced automation on the flight deck.
David Woods: I would talk about some of the work that we're doing in the lab at Ohio State, except we don't do any
work in the lab at Ohio State. What do we do is we go out and work with you, with various organizations in the
industry. One of our themes is how to make automated systems and people team players. We're looking at pilot
interaction with cockpit automation, cooperative strategic planning for air traffic management, developing guidelines for
human centered automation.
The term "clumsy automation" was coined by Earl Weiner. He coined it to describe the kind of automation in the
cockpit where it lowered workload when the task was already easy. But it turned out that these systems increased
workload when things got really busy, like in terminal airspace. The point is that there's a problem in the coordination of
the people and the automation. The second important insight from Earl is that the penalties for poor coordination show
up only in the critical high tempo situation. During routine textbook kinds of situations you won't see the penalties, even
though the design problem may be there.
We've come to summarize our research results as: "Strong, silent and difficult to direct: Why advanced cockpit
automation is not a team player". We've used four different strategies for learning about human performance. We've
studied performance with pilots who were new to glass cockpits, although very experienced on the line; we've done it
with people with over 1,000 hours on glass cockpits. We have used different kinds of studies to generate information
about pilot interaction with automated systems-building a corpus of automation surprises on the line, observed pilot in
transition training, and designed high fidelity simulation studies. Finally we have examined different glass cockpits.
What we've tried to do is pull together a systematic, converging set of evidence that indicates what are the real problems
behind the issues that come up with advanced automation in the cockpit. The way we can think about this is a term that's
come more and more: automation surprises. Earl Weiner talks about those three famous lines on the advanced flight
deck: what's it doing, why's it doing that and what's it going to do next? Our research has added a fourth question to
that: how in the world did we get into that mode? The key in the anatomy of automation surprise from our studies is
that a mismatch occurs. So the crew's view of what's going on and the automation's view is different.
How is it detected that there's a mismatch? Our and other people's converging research shows that it's generally not from
displays that you can tell what the automation's doing. It's only later that people are able to conclude that there's a
problem, when the aircraft's behavior does not match their expectation. And the problem from a recovery point of view
is that detection may occur fairly late in a sequence of events.
These kinds of automation surprises don't happen all the time. They tend to happen when this very capable automation
does something on its own: mode reversions or indirect mode changes. In effect you can think about it as kind of a side
effect. The pilot gives a specific instruction or takes an action, but the automation, because of its capabilities, goes
further and says, "Oh, given that you're doing that, I think I'll change another mode as well."
The other key element is weak feedback about what's going on with respect to the behavior of the automation. Again,
the empirical results systematically show over multiple studies that detection of these surprises does not come from the
displays about the automation. This chart is a short list of incidents and accidents where these kinds of factors have
occurred. These are not only when we look at the training of new pilots on the line for glass cockpits, not only when we
stage simulated situations, but in the real world with real consequences. There are common threads. Some people say
it's just pilot error; others emphasize the complexity of the automation ("the automation did it; the automation flew into a
stall; the system has a mind of its own").
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This question is very interesting for advanced ATM systems. What's the problem? Our conclusion is that strong, silent,
hard-to-direct automation is not a team player. But isn't that what we're trying to do in almost every other setting with
people in the system, with CRM training: how to get people to work together as team players? To achieve coordination
in ATM, we have to avoid taking very strong automated systems but making them non-transparent. We just heard that
the CTAS project created visualizations so the controllers could see what's going on in the algorithms in a way that could
be appreciated and was compatible with the kinds of thinking that controllers do.
If you make strong, silent, hard-to-direct systems and they're not team players, predictable errors will occur; not just
some random event, but predictable and avoidable human errors. It is not really appropriate to think of these problems
as just human or machine. The kinds of problems we're seeing associated with automation surprises derive from the
interaction of the two. They are really coordination failures, and we have to get away from the conventional language
where we identify errors as either human problems or machine problems.
In ATM, which human do we consider is in the system? Is it dispatcher-centered, crew-centered, or controller-centered?
We believe the proper way to think about this is not about individual people but rather that we have a cooperative,
distributed traffic management system and that our analogy is to CRM on the flight deck.
We've heard much at this workshop about the need for human factors study. In order to do that we have to go behind the
traditional label of human factors or human error to consider what we really need to focus on. In ATM systems, there
are many different coordination issues. There is human-human coordination that's mediated by technology. There's
human-automation coordination. ATM comprises automated systems in several different places with different kinds of
people trying to interact and make use of computations and resources in the system to make better decisions. To do that
properly is going to require a great deal of coordination with people in the middle of it all.
Behind the term "human factors" or "human error" there's many different issues. I want to point out three different
important kinds of factors. One is knowledge factors. When we look at cooperative situations we find over and over
that they work well when there's a shared understanding. This applies to human-human coordination: It's going on
today in the air traffic system to negotiate non-preferred routes where carriers put together their ATC coordinators with
ATC in order to achieve a balance of the different constraints both sides have. Shared understanding also applies to
human-automation interaction. Now the machine may not completely understand the person, but if we build the right
kind of feedback (don't make the automation silent), we can provide the person with the kind of feedback so that team
coordination can occur.
The second factor is situation awareness or mindset. Complexity without transparency creates error. Let me predict a
future accident report. After we have the new ATM system this will be a paraphrase from an accident report: "All of the
necessary data and knowledge was available somewhere in the system, but no one of the multiple people in multiple
places was able to integrate all of the different pieces of the puzzle, see all of the implications and recognize the
developing problem." This is actually a paraphrase of a quote that occurred in the Three Mile Island accident report in
1980. It's also a paraphrase of statements from other accident reports, including some in aviation. It's not much of a
risky prediction because small-scale events like this have already occurred in aviation.
Sherlock Holmes told us that this was the critical problem a long time ago. "It is of the highest importance in the art of
detection to be able to recognize, out of a number of facts, which are incidental and which are vital." Technology is
going to allow us to collect and transmit more and more data to more and more parties in the system. How are people
going to sort through that flow of information and find out the really significant subset?
The third factor is goal conflicts or dilemmas. There are multiple goals and constraints operating within the air traffic
system. The desired improvements come from better coordination across those different goals. The goals of the
company operations center on economic grounds, the goals of controllers including safety, but other things as well, such
as managing workload and uncertainty, the goals of flight crews, etc. But in some situations, these multiple goals
conflict. Then it is up to the people who serve on the front lines to resolve these conflicts. System breakdowns are often
associated with situations where goal conflicts arise, and there is great potential for this to occur in future ATM
concepts.
To get the highly touted benefits of ATM, there's an investment required in terms of this human-machine system and the
kinds of coordination we have to work out. On the knowledge front, will there be cross-training? Even today, the
controllers don't understand all the constraints on the pilots. Dispatchers don't understand all the constraints of all the
other parties. If we're going to achieve the benefits, everybody's got to step outside of their traditional role and develop a
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shared understanding of the other players' constraints and roles. To do that we've got to start creating cross-simulations
to train all these people to coordinate in different situations to get maximum resource utilization.
We must innovate and create new forms of feedback, which will have several important characteristics. It's going to be a
bigger picture. It must provide "status at a glance," so that anything developing outside of our set of expectations can be
detected. Side effects will be a problem: one of the kinds of errors that you would predict in the kind of system we'll
have will be caused by some activity or action which propagates through the system in a funny sort of way; no one be
able to put the whole picture together and recognize that there are side effects of that action which turn out to carry risk.
Norbert Weiner said, "in the designing we must foresee all the steps of the process for which it is designed, instead of
exercising a tentative foresight which goes up to a certain point, and can be continued from that point as new difficulties
arise. The penalties for errors of foresight, great as they are now, will be enormously increased as automization comes
into full use".
Question (Harold Mortazavian, UCLA): I concur with you that the problem is, of course, in coordination between
humans and machines rather than just with either of the two components. It's good that you ended with a quote from a
mathematician, Norbert Weiner. I'd like to know your opinion on the idea to attempt mathematical or formal models of
these interactions, otherwise trying to analyze the coordination problem will sort of get out of hand.
David Woods: I think an empirical approach is going to be part of this. That's what we heard about in CTAS where
people set up a context in which they could get data, not just about the algorithms, but about how people coordinate with
those algorithms. Second, it is it is possible to try analytical methods. The analytical methods may not be the kind of
mathematical models that we are accustomed to in other aspects of aviation, but are kinds of simulations of distributed
systems that include people. There have been a variety of projects in other domains where people have put together so-
called cognitive models where you set up the computer as an information processing system to simulate a set of
interacting computers and people. It's possible to set up those analytical systems: one of the groups that is doing that is
here at Ames in the MIDAS project.
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How to Make Automated Systems and People Team
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Charles Billings
David Woods and Nadine Sarter
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Figure 1.
c
Cognitive Systems Engineering Laboratory
Aviation (NASA Ames/FAA):
• Pilot Interaction with Cockpit Automation
(Sarter/Woods)
• Cooperative Strategic Planning for Air Traffic
Management (Smith, McCoy, Orasanu)
• Guidance for Human-Centered Automation (Billings)
Space (NASA JSC):
• How to Make Intelligent Systems Team Players
Medicine:
• Clumsy Automation in the Operating Room
• Critiquing Systems for Error Identification in
Immunohematology
Figure 2.
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Clumsy Automation
• lowers workload when the task was already
easy (lower tempo, lower criticiality, lower
workload periods)
• increases workload at hi tempo, hi
criticality periods
• a kind of human-machine coordination
fa i lu re
• penalties occur at hi tempo, hi criticality
periods
Figure 3.
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Strong, Silent, and Difficult to Direct:
Why Advanced (Cockpit) Automation is not a Team Player
Converging Studies on Pilot Interaction with Cockpit Automation
Nadine B. Sarter and David D. Woods
Cognitive Systems Engineering Laboratory
The Ohio State University
Figure 4.
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c Converging Studies on Pilot-Automation Interaction
Early Generation of
Cockpit Automation
on B-737-300/400 Cockpit Automation
Most Advanced
on Airbus A-320
1 - Corpus on 'Automation Surprises'
2 - Observations of Transition Training 4 ' CorPus on Experiences with Training
For and Operation of A-320 Automation
3 - Simulator Study of Mode Error and
Mode Awareness 5 - Observations of Transition Training
6 - Completed A-320 Pilot Training at
Participating Airline
7 - Simulator Study of the Effects of
Changes in Authority, Autonomy,
and Observability of Automation
Figure 5.
Anatomy of Automation Surprises
• Mismatch occurs (misassessment)
~ pilot's and automation's view of the world
differ
• Detection
~ generally not from displays about
automation
~ only later when the aircraft's behavior does
not match crew's expectations
• Recovery?
Figure 6.
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Anatomy of Automation Surprises
• breakdown in coordination between
automated subsystems and crew
• side effects of actions/instructions are
missed (mode reversions, indirect mode
changes)
• weak feedback about the activities of
automated systems
Figure 7.
ACCIDENTS AND INCIDENTS
MISHAP FACTORS
DC-10 landing in CWS
B747 upset over Pacific
DC-10 land ing at JFK
B747 uncommanded roll incidents
B737 wet runway landings
B757 climbout incident
A320 Habsheim
A320 Strasbourg
A300 Nagoya
A330 Toulouse
A320 Bangalore
A320 Hong Kong
A320 Warsaw
A310Orly
mode error, mode awareness
awareness of autopilot functioning
trust in ATS functioning
trust in automation behavior
system coupling
system coupling
trust in protection functions
mode awareness
awareness of autopilot functioning
mode awareness; system complexity
awareness of autopilot functioning
system coupling
system coupling
mode awareness, system coupling
Incidents similar to these have hcen reporletl (o ASRS and CHIRP over the past decade.
Figure 8.
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COMMON THREADS
Pilot errors "The pilot did it"
Complex systems "The automation did it"
Tightly-coupled systems "A mind of its own"
Authoritarian systems "Who's in charge here?"
Inadequate feedback "What's it doing now?"
"Why's it doing that?"
"What's it going to do next?"
"How did we get in that mode?"
Figure 9.
WHAT IS THE PROBLEM?
"Strong, silent, harcl-to-direct automation is not a team player"
"Strong" Highly capable (and complex)
"Silent" Non-transparent
"Hard to direct" Clumsy interaction
"Team player" Cooperative, trustworthy human-
machine system
Result: predictable errors
but not simply human errors, or machine errors; system errors.
Figure 10.
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Human-Centered Automation
which people?
dispatcher centered; crew centered;
controller centered
cooperative, distributed traffic management
a more complex version of CRM
failures are of communication and coordination
Figure 11.
c
Behind the label "human factors" or "human error"
• Human - human coordination mediated by
technology
• Human - automation coordination
• Human - human - automation - automation
coordination
Figure 12.
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Behind the label "human factors" or "human error"
• knowledge factors:
~ shared understanding
• mind set and awareness
~ complexity without transparency creates error
• double binds and dilemmas
~ multiple goals and constraints
Figure 13.
c
Predicted lines from future NTSB accident report
"all of the necessary data and knowledge was
available in the system but no one of the
multiple people was able to integrate the
different pieces, see all of the implications and
recognize the problem."
Figure 14.
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It is of the highest importance in the art of detetction
to be able to recognize, out of a number of facts,
which are incidental and which are vital.
Sherlock Holmes
Figure 15.
C
Benefits of flexible ATM require investments in
distributed, cooperative human-machine system
• knowledge: cross-training? cross-simulation?
• awareness: innovation on new forms of feedback
• dilemmas: coordination and advice strategies
Figure 16.
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Transparency, Observability, Feedback
• big picture, status at a glance
• future oriented, intent communication
• show automation activities, events and
transitions
• highlight departures from expectations
• highlight the side effects of activities and
changes
 Figure17.
... in that designing we must foresee all
steps of the process for which it is
designed, instead of exercising a tentative
foresight which goes up to a certain point,
and can be continued from that point on
as new difficulties arise.
The penalties for errors of foresight, great as
they are now, will be enormously
increased as automatization comes into
full use.
Norbert Wiener, 1964, p. 63
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Lessons Learned from Rail Traffic Management
Dr. Milt Adams has been with the Charles Stark Draper Laboratory since 1972. In January of this year he
assumed responsibility as the Associate Director of Applied Information and Automation Systems. Prior to that
he was Manager of the Control and Decision Systems Division from 1992 to 1994. Dr. Adams spent the
academic year of 91/92 visiting at the MIT Department of Aeronautics and Astronautics where he taught
courses in multi-variable control and large scale systems control and optimization. Over the past several years
Dr. Adams has been involved in the design, development and implementation of real-time automated mission
planning and mission management systems for air, land, and undersea vehicles, the analysis and design of
algorithms for evaluating the performance, reliability and survivability of fault tolerant systems in their
operational environment and the design of traffic flow planning and control for large-scale rail traffic systems.
Milt Adams: I had originally entitled my talk "Lessons Learned from Rail Traffic Management", but given what I've
heard here over the last day and a half, I should have entitled it "A Reminder of Lessons You've Already Learned in Air
Traffic Management from the Perspective of Rail Traffic Management." So, perhaps you should consider this talk a
reinforcement of much of what we've already heard. In rail traffic or rail transportation management, the two principal
objectives in designing systems to incorporate automation are (1) improving safety and (2) operational efficiency -just
as they are objectives for air traffic flow management. There are also auxiliary objectives of increasing service
reliability, to get things where they're supposed to be on time, and of knowing where goods are if they're not there on
time.
Draper got its start in the rail traffic management business in 1986 or so with the industry group AAR, the Association of
American Railroads, and with one of the major U.S. railroads performing safety analyses of advanced train control
system concepts (here, "train control" refers to rail traffic management.) We were called upon to do this work based on
some of the work we'd done previously with NASA in reliability and safety analysis of fault tolerant systems for the F-8,
space shuttle, and space station. The railroads were interested in bringing in automation, and they knew that they had the
kind of problems we've heard about here in the workshop in being able to determine whether there was some value to be
gained and in making sure those systems are safe. So we were called in to analyze the performability - the fault
tolerance and performance - of automated systems for rail traffic management.
As the air traffic system has the airline guide, railroads have schedules of planned rail traffic. The yards in the rail
system are analogous to airports in the air transportation system. Trains come into yards and their cars are removed and
broken up into groups for outbound trains. Thus, the cars in the rail system are similar to the passengers in a hub and
spoke air system. A car in the rail traffic system sits in the yard and waits for another train to take it to its next
destination. Sectors are analogous to lines, which are the track and sidings between the yards. One of the problems rail
traffic folks don't have is the terminal area airspace congestion problem: congestion problems can occur anywhere along
a line, especially for single track lines. There, the problem is that in order for a faster train to overtake a slower train or
for two trains going in opposite directions along the line to pass each other, one of the trains must pull off on the side and
allow the overtaker the pass.
A major difference between the rail and air systems is that the railroads control virtually everything in the rail
transportation business. They own and maintain the track and yards; they direct all yard and line operations; and, thus,
they are responsible for both efficiency and safety. In contrast, in the air traffic business the FAA and the airlines work
together to perform those functions. The FRA (Federal Railroad Administration) has an oversight and policy
responsibility, but no operational duties. From this perspective, controlling all aspects of operations, you would think
that the railroads would find it much easier to solve and implement solutions to traffic management problems.
Controlling the entire system, should make it much easier to design and incorporate automation into their operations. It
may be easier, in comparison to air transportation, but like for any other highly complex system, infusing automation in a
way that produces the maximum system-wide benefits in terms of both safety and efficiency is (and has been) a
significant challenge. The railroads have been using a system called Centralized Train Control (CTC), introduced in the
30s, which allows them to align their switches and signals remotely from a dispatchers station. Originally that was done
by a board where the dispatcher would flip switches to set tracks switches and train signaling lights so the trains could go
through on a specified route. There have been some improvements in the implementation of the system such as touch-
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sensitive screens over the years, and only lately have there been some steps toward incorporating decision support to
help the dispatcher do that job better.
In the early 80s the FRA began to apply pressure on the railroads to incorporate more advanced technology to help
reduce the number of rail traffic accidents (collisions). Basically, the FRA decided that the railroads ought to be more
attuned to improving safety than they had been and that they ought to be taking advantage of advanced communications
and computation to help them improve safety. Two initiatives were started about that time; one by the AAR. The AAR
began the development of what is referred to as the Advanced Train Control System (ATCS). In parallel with the ATCS
effort, the Burlington Northern Railroad started working on ARES: the Advanced Railroad Electronic System, which
differed from the ATCS system in two significant ways: (1) it espoused the use of GPS to provide train location
information and (2) it had planned for a more integrated approach to dispatcher decision support. Although conceptually
a good idea, ARES collapsed under the weight of the software that would have been required for its implementation -
other advances originally proposed under the ARES system have seen their way into practice, however. The ATCS
system also had a significant software burden associated with its implementation and has been reborn into what's called
the positive train separation system, which is backing off a little bit from a lot of the complexity that was built into the
ATCS system. It's now been stripped down: the positive train separation system has its focus on safety, whereas ATCS
addressed efficiency issues as well.
One of the things that we learned in looking at the rail traffic problem, like any complex problem, is that you have to
decompose it in order to get a handle on how solve it. As with any decomposition of a large-scale system, the objective
is to break it into manageable parts in order to optimize the whole system. Even when you formally decompose a large
scale system, there are interactions among the parts that must be attended to. Even before automation and before thought
was given to attempting to optimize the function of large-scale systems, they were decomposed through an historic,
evolutionary process. Again, this allowed the operators to manage them. Unfortunately, historic decompositions, often
resulted in sacrificing or overlooking system-wide objectives.
We can take a more analytical approach and do two things. One is to decompose in a completely different way than the
one arrived at historically. But, if you're familiar with the large-scale optimization literature, analytic decompositions
are not unique, so why not start with the one that has been created historically? And that's pretty much the approach that
we took for the railroads. We started with the system as it exists but look at it from a completely new light, i.e., a more
formal, analytical view. From that view, there are prescribed approaches for optimizing the individual pieces as well as
for coordinating the interactions among the pieces. This results in a hierarchical approach to system optimization, where
higher levels solve problems that optimally coordinate the lower level solutions.
Each problem level of the rail traffic hierarchy, off line scheduling, network traffic control, has some automation that is
being developed or applied to solving the problems at these levels. One point that is very important and often
overlooked, is that as you break these problems down to try to create a decision support system, an optimal solution, or
an algorithm to help perform the functions at each of these levels, you must make sure that you attend to the interactions
among the levels, and this is what a properly designed and implemented hierarchical decomposition insures.
An example of these interactions in the rail flow control problem follows. Railroads typically have single track, with
trains coming from two different directions, some slow, some fast. To get by each other, one has to go off on a siding.
This meet-pass problem is a very difficult combinatorial optimization problem to determine the best order of passage and
when. The solution to the meet-pass problem on the lines must be coordinated with operations being planned and
implemented within yards since each affects the other.
We looked at the how the railroads were addressing some of these problems from a historical perspective. The first
examples of automation were brought in at the line level for the dispatchers, because they're responsible both for safety
and for the efficiency of the operation of the trains on line. Typically they were told that their objective was to get high
priority trains through first and lower priority second and so forth. They were given a prioritization: Amtrak is the
highest priority, UPS trains are the next highest priority, then the contractual obligations that the companies have with
the various users of the track, then their own containerized intermodal traffic, and so on. If you strictly go by priority,
whenever an Amtrak train comes through, everyone else gets off on a siding: the Amtrak train gets to go through. This
sort of strict prioritization approach is the easiest to solve in one's head but it's not the most efficient use of track when
all these trains have schedules. You have to look at the value of each train, the schedule of each train, and how it relates
to the whole system and the system performance. Thus, an algorithm had to be developed to solve the problem from a
value perspective and to integrate that solutions into the overall operation of the railroad.
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The lesson is not to solve the individual problems in a vacuum; look at how they interact with the rest of the system and
make sure that you have some tools that help evaluate that. The message is that just because a system is complex you
shouldn't throw up your hands and not attempt to bring some analytical tools to bear to evaluate its safety and
performance.
I'll wrap up with a few major lessons learned. The first is system transparency; there needs to be a view of the system
that's simple enough for the safety regulators to understand how it's going to perform and to understand the modeling
that goes behind the evaluation of that system. You ought to be able to deploy the system incrementally: a phased
implementation that can be put in place in parallel with the existing system operation and existing equipped trains. You
must have an overall system plan that aims for the end state. While you don't have to know the details of exactly what
technologies are going to be applied to every part of the problem, you need to know what are the parts of the problem
that need to be solved and how those solutions fit together as a whole. Everyone doesn't have the same equipment on
board; the system must be interoperable and must be able to operate over all phases with all kinds of equipment.
To reiterate, don't work on the pieces until you know how they all fit together. Don't put a lot of money into upgrading
one part of the system until you have in mind the bigger picture of knowing how it's going to fit into the larger system.
Don't invest a lot of money, time, or effort into something if you're not sure how it will interact with and influence the
rest of the system. And finally, in every phase, even during development, keep the users involved .
Question (Gary Seng, NASA Lewis): In the past the rail traffic system was very distributed with operators at each
station. The dispatchers always had a fail-safe mechanism for getting out of a problem, which was to call up the
operator at home, and get them down to the station to stop the train. Now that function is to be centralized. And I think
the changes that you're seeing result from this centralization.
Milt Adams: Centralization is really accommodated by the increases and advances in communication technology. In the
past operations and dispatching were performed locally, with communications over telephones and local radio links.
Now with digital communications there is higher bandwidth over longer distances that allows more centralized
dispatching and operations control at a distance.
Railroads are very careful to accommodate safety by means of their dispatching systems. You could say that they
allocate track resources to the trains ensure that two trains aren't on the same piece of track at the same time. Depending
on the railroad and the kind of equipment available, there are different modes and mechanisms for doing that. That's
another thing we learned about phasing in this system: in order to be broadly applicable, a system has to accommodate
the different approaches used by each railroad.
Question (Bob Simpson, MIT): The classic difference between air traffic systems and railroad systems is an inversion.
The capacity limits are on the single track with bypasses in the railroad system. In air traffic we have unlimited airspace
between from A and B. When you get to a rail yard, you suddenly have 50 tracks to put the trains on. Our inversion of
that is everything goes back onto one runway at the end. So our capacity problems are all associated with the yards and
the railroad capacity problems are associated with the track between the yards.
Milt Adams: That's true, but it also turns out that for the railroads the major delays are in the yards due partly to
inefficient yard operations planning and partly due to lack of coordination among yards and between yards and their
adjacent lines.
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Rail Traffic Management Objectives
O Improve safety
o Enforce train separation
o Enforce adherence to speed limits
O Improve operational efficiency
o Generate more optimal traffic plans
o Keep trains moving according to plan
o Make better use of track, yard, locomotive
and car resources
G Increase service reliability
Accidents occur too often:
November 1993 fatal accident
between Burlington Northern and
Union Pacific in the state of
Washington
Current rail traffic
management systems are
based on a paradigm first
developed in the 1930s:
Centralized Traffic Control
G Provide real-time information to enhance customer service
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Draper Lab Railroad Background
O ARES/ATCS safety analyses (AAR and BNRR)
CJ Hierarchical rail traffic flow management (BNRR)
O Application of inertia! instruments to track geometry measurement
O Investigations of on-train instrumentation for broken rail detection
O Rail Garrison precision tachometer development
O Design and implementation of algorithms for real-time traffic
planning in the ARES project
O Internally funded activities:
o Optimal line planning algorithms (PLATO)
o Integrated Line Information and Dispatching system (ILIAD)
Applied Information and Automation Systems
Figure 3.
Analogies
Air Traffic System
OAG
Airports
Sectors
Aircraft
Passengers
Rail Traffic System
OffLine Schedule
Yards
Lines
Trains
Cars
Applied Information and Automation Systems
Figure 4.
167
Recent Rail Traffic Management Initiatives
1982 1994
Centralized Train Control (CTC)
ARES
ATCS PTS
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Decompositions: Historic vs. Analytical
O Break a complex problem into a set of smaller subproblems
O Solutions to subproblems are manageable with respect to:
o Capabilities of human operators
o Currently available, cost-effective computational systems
o Natural physical/geographic partitioning or grouping
Historic
O Over time, the decomposition of a large scale problem often evolves
naturally into smaller subproblems
o System-wide objectives are often over-looked or sacrificed \r\ order to
obtain a manageable solution
Analytical
O Analytical approaches to decomposition can be employed to insure
that system-wide objectives and constraints are honored
G Analytical decompositions are not unique and often an analytical
approach can be used to modify elements of an existing historic
decomposition:
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Typical Decomposition of Rail Traffic Management
Line - Yard
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Integrated Line
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Dispatching
Line Planning
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Control
Yard
Control
Train
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Hierarchical Coordination
O Corridor operations coordinated at the Network level
O Line and Yard operations coordinated at the Corridor level
O Train and Wayside control coordinated at the Line level
Off-Line
Scheduling
Network
Traffic Flow Control
Corridor
Traffic Flow Control
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Rail Traffic Flow Control Safety Analysis
Burlington Northern Railroad ARES System
Trains Wayside
Interface Units
pwave L-J L
Comm Dispatcher Stations
O Evaluation of Safety, Reliability and Availability
o End-to-end system level evaluation
o Humans in the loop
o Quantified improvements that were accrued from the application of
advances in communications, computation and decision-support
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Critical System Design Considerations
D Simplicity
o The safety critical part must lend itself to workable regulation
o The details must be easily understood by regulatory personnel
O Deployability
o It must be deployable in manageable, affordable increments
o Each increment must provide observable benefit
O Interoperability
o It must operate in conjunction with existing systems (mixed-mode),
o It must accommodate "foreign" traffic with minimal operational impact
O Adaptability
o It must allow alternative technological implementations of each function
o It must be able to support the formats and procedures of various
railroads
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Lessons Learned
O Don't start work on the pieces before you know how they will fit/
work together
G Develop tools to help evaluate alternative system configurations at
all levels of abstraction
o Analysis
o Simulation
G Don't design a system that requires overnight conversion
o Phased migration
o Unequipped clients
G Work closely with users at every step of every phase
Applied Information and Automation Systems
Figure 11.
ATM Simulation Testbed
G Explore practical, implementable solutions to the air traffic
flow control problem
G With emphasis on free flight, focus will shift to algorithms for
optimal ground-hold planning and ground traffic management
o Terminal area is the capacitated element of the system
G Draper has created an Air Traffic System Flow Management
Testbed containing:
o A regional network of major airports that is scalable to national scope
o Ground holding assignment algorithms
o Weather, capacity, delay, schedule, and information flow models
o Database capabilities
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Lessons Learned from Automation in the Canadian Nuclear Industry—The Critical Role of
Feedback
Dr. Kim Vicente received a Ph.D. in Mechanical Engineering from the University of Illinois at Urbana-
Champaign in 1991. He spent 1987 to 1988 as a visiting scientist in the section for informatics and cognitive
science of the Riso National Laboratory in Roskilde, Denmark. During 1991-1992 he was on the faculty of the
School of Industrial and Systems Engineering at the Georgia Institute of Technology. Currently he is an
Assistant Professor in the Department of Industrial Engineering at the University of Toronto and Director of the
Cognitive Engineering Laboratory there. Kim is interested in the design of interfaces for complex human
machine systems, the study of expertise, and more broadly in the design and analysis of complex work
environments.
Kim Vicente: First, I know nothing absolutely at all about air traffic control, but actually that's why I'm here. Second, I
was pleasantly surprised yesterday to hear what I take to be non human factors people say human factors is really
important. Historically, human factors has been the Rodney Dangerfield of engineering disciplines.
I'm going to talk about one critical lesson we've learned from the Canadian nuclear industry: the critical role of
feedback. Control rooms differ quite extensively, but what is typical are banks of controls, displays, annunciators; most
control rooms have analog instrumentation although there are a few CRTs. Any time I've been in a control room there
have always been several lights lit up; no one seems to worry about it too much. I don't know if that happens in
cockpits.
It's a pretty complex job with a lot of information. Actually there is a lot of data; whether all that data gets turned into
information is a different issue. Like all other process control systems, the job has been characterized as 99% boredom
and 1% sheer terror. Training in the simulators deals with generic crew issues, at least for fault situations; there are
several people involved, several acting on the panels and another reading out procedures. The main change in the
industry is that advanced control and designs are changing from primarily analog instrumentation to CRT-based,
although with the exception of EOF (Electricity de France) all of the new proposed designs are hybrid.
Digital technology in the Canadian nuclear control industry in the sense of automatic control systems was introduced in
the mid 1960s. It wasn't because human factors research had been conducted indicating that this is a good thing, because
as we know, that research still has not been done. The main reason was due to stability problems in the chosen nuclear
process. So automation was introduced much earlier than it was introduced in the U.S. nuclear industry. Experience
over the years has shown that digital hardware technology is dramatically more reliable than the analog controls and
instrumentation. There are fewer spurious trips and failures than with the analog counterparts. So in that sense you
could say that the decision to go with digital automation starting in the 60s was a very insightful and successful one.
But that's only one perspective. Another perspective from a human-machine systems point of view is that there are
problems that still exist and that people are trying to overcome. I just want to address one that the AECB, the Canadian
regulatory body equivalent to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, has chosen to focus on recently. And the
problem is that occasionally, not very often but once in a while, there have been documented cases in which plants
slowly drift away from where they should be; no one really notices for a long time. There are two reasons for concern.
One is the concern that the plant could be operating less efficiently than it otherwise might be, depending on where the
plant has drifted to. The other, possibly less tangible concern, is that if the plant is not at the state where it should be and
another event takes place, the consequences of that triggering event can be much more severe than it would have been.
It is very difficult to assess the probability of this happening. In Figure 4,1 show trajectories away from the dot which is
the desired state. I've identified two boundaries. One is the alarm threshold, the point at which the alarms will go off
and action will be taken. That's not being terribly proactive but it's certainly the most salient source of feedback in the
system with flashing lights and noises. The point I just made is that if you're drifting away from the desired state and
something else occurs, you might not just touch the alarm boundary, but plow right through it; you don't know
beforehand whether that's the case or not.
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So even though we haven't had any serious incidents in the Canadian Nuclear Industry, the regulatory body is concerned
with these periodic reports of this state drift. Now, what's causing this? Figure 5 is a simple conceptual model for the
system. There's a simple negative feedback loop where humans are involved in controlling a plant, whether it be a
nuclear power plant or ATM. The comparator synthesizes the error, the difference between the goal state and the current
state of the system. To state the problem in a very simplistic way, how obvious is it that the plant is where it should be?
Apparently it's not terribly obvious, or these problems wouldn't come up.
This is an important question; when I look at an indicator, can I tell at a glance that the situation is normal? How can I
tell? You can ask that question about the current state of the plant, about the goal state, or about the error. The questions
are similar regardless of which you observe. For the goal state, for example; is it easily visible in the interface? Can I
see where the goal state is? If it's not easily visible, is it visible at all? Maybe all I have to do is go look at ten different
instruments. At each point it's locally visible. Do I have to compute the goal state from information that's available from
the interface? Do I have to use a steam table and calculate a result? That's obviously not as good as the others. Does a
result have to be mentally generated? In other words, do I have to carry around a wealth of information in my head to
compute the state?
These difficulties are associated with the role of feedback. In summary, direct diagnostic feedback is absolutely critical.
And by feedback, I mean people being able to pick up on relevant information and turn data into information. Just
because an instrument is there, was in digital form, and was in pretty colors, it's not feedback. When feedback is not
direct, people have to compensate.
So what should you do about it? We've developed a framework that has been evaluated to some extent in our lab and is
being used by people in the nuclear industry in Japan. The basic idea is to identify the different layers of constraints in
your work domain to understand what people have to work within, and then try and make those constraints in some
sense directly visible on the surface of the interface to enhance direct perception as much as possible.
I still haven't used the term "free flight." It seems to me that free flight is the creation of degrees of freedom (or
inversely the relaxation of constraints) where none existed before. Another thing is you're introducing degrees of
freedom that have to be dealt with in real time. That means you can't write procedures to determine how a person will
deal with those degrees of freedom because that can't be predicted. It also means you can't build a complex
computerized analytical model, because you can't predict the weather, for instance. What I would suggest is that the role
of feedback under those circumstances is much more critical than even what I've pointed out here.
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CANADIAN CONTEXT
Early introduction of automation based
on digital technology (mid-1960's)
Digital technology dramatically more
reliable than analogue instrumentation
Nevertheless, human-machine system
problems still exist
ex. occasionally, plant slowly drifts away
from where it should be without
operators noticing
Consequences
- inefficient operation
- can lead to bigger problems when
abnormalities occurs
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• Critical role of feedback
Is it obvious that plant is where it should be?
• Example - goal state
a) is it easily visible in the interface?
b) is it directly visible at all?
c) does it have to be computed from
information available from the interface?
d) does it have to be mentally generated?
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LESSONS LEARNED
• Direct, diagnostic feedback is critical
• When feedback is not direct, operators
must compensate by:
a) collecting data from different places
b) mentally compute information from data
c) look up information in procedures
d) memorize information
e) other mental gymnastics
• All of this takes time, effort, and knowledge
and can lead to errors
• Designers should:
a) identify multiple layers of goal-relevant
constraint in the work domain
b) make those constraints directly visible on the
surface of the interface
Figure 6.
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Situational Awareness in the Cockpit—The Role of Offboard Data
Robert Landy has worked at McDonnell Douglas for over 25 years in the areas of flight control, flight
management, integrated flight propulsion control and integrated flight fire control. He was Program Manager
of the United States Air Force Integrated Control and Avionics for Air Superiority and NASA's highly
integrated digital electronic control programs. He has a doctorate in Systems Science from Washington
University in St. Louis and a Masters Degree in Aeronautics and Astronautics from Stanford University.
Robert Landy: My talk today is not so much along the lines of lessons learned but about the technologies that are
available for ATM. During this conference I've seen perhaps a half dozen different areas that we have worked on over
the past decade or so in a military context. I'll present some of them from some air-to-air and air-to-ground programs
we've worked on. In recent years we've been bringing offboard data to supplement onboard information.
A Wright Lab program, Integrated Control in Avionics for Air Superiority, featured a lot of simulation and limited flight
tests. It started in the Cold War years when we were worried about few versus the many air combat problems. To aid
the pilot in offensive and defensive decision making, we proposed a system of several segments. First, there is an attack
management system, that managed the sensors and correlated the onboard and offboard data. This information was then
used by several other decision aiding algorithms: automatic target assignments; attack steering; defensive assets. In
addition, there were other elements such as flight path generation, flight path control, and automatic coupling.
The idea behind this attack management system was to gather data from multiple sources, and present a unified display
to all members of the attack team. Today, in a flight of four aircraft each aircraft would see a somewhat different picture
of the air-to-air situation. Radio talk was necessary to sort out the situation. Tomorrow there will be interflight data
links. We gathered that data and presented it in a single common display, so that each pilot has the same situational
knowledge. One of the challenges was to combine data that has different accuracies, latencies, and update rates and put
that all together. That was the job of the attack management system which managed onboard sensors (e.g. radar and IR)
with offboard sensors such as data from the wingman and the AW ACS and combining that information on one display.
We modified an F15 and installed a 10" square color display flanked by two six-inch color displays, on which we
presented situation awareness and situation assessment information that would draw some conclusions for the pilot about
potential offensive and defensive actions.
I can see several applications to the air traffic control problem. The ICAAS program developed an airborne onboard-
offboard data fusion algorithm along with the large multi-purpose displays, formats, and decision aids for the pilot.
From offboard communication programs like Talon-Sword-Bravo and OBTEX (Offboard Targeting Experiments), we're
looking at using commercial protocols: asynchronous transfer mode (ATM) to avoid the necessity of an expensive
network of military satellites in favor of commercial satellites.
Question (Joe Jackson, Honeywell): Tell us about ICAAS reversionary modes. What is lost in situation awareness if
failures occur?
Robert Landy: There's graceful degradation because of several information sources: onboard sensors, wingman sensors,
and AW ACS. Even if you lose one of those you still have the rest of the system.
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TALON SWORD
Customer: U.S. Air Force Space Command
Objective: Investigate, Evaluate and Demonstrate
the Utility of Off-Board Data as a
Compliment to On-Board
Sensor Capabilities
Need: • Improved Situation Awareness
• Affordable Sensor Integration
• Flexible Aircraft Operations
• Survivability & Effectiveness
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Potential Application
to Air Traffic Control
ICAAS
• Airborne Onboard/Off board Data Fusion
• Large Color Multipurpose Displays
Talon Sword/OBTEX
• Commercial SATCOM Protocol
• Imagery in the Crew Station
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TECHNOLOGIES FOR ATM
Chair: Sally Johnson
NASA Langley Research Center
Hampton, VA
Summary
This session focuses upon selected enabling technologies for ATM. Dick Pitts leads off with a broad discussion of CNS
technologies. Charles Raquet discusses satellite communications technology. Jack Ball discusses applying advanced
military-developed cockpit technology to ATM. Glen Gilyard discusses aircraft performance optimization. In a
different vein, Bob Simpson's message is that the technologies have already been selected (by ICAO); the problem is to
use them effectively in the design of a global ATM system. Robert Stengel concludes the session with a discussion of
the design issues for intelligent aircraft/airspace systems.
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GNSS and Data Link System for Future NAS
Dick Pitts is Vice President and Chief Scientist of the Harris Corporation, Air Traffic Control Systems Division.
He has served with the Harris Corporation for 29 years. He was the principal architect of the Voice Switching
and Control System program on which his division was established. Under his direction, it has developed,
demonstrated, and implemented products and services for application in local and wide area DGPS (Differential
GPS) augmentation, oceanic flight data processing and display, voice and data switching, satellite
communications, integrated airport management and network management and control.
Dick Pitts: I'm going to share some of the things we're doing at Harris in our IR&D (Independent Research and
Development) program related to ADS (Automatic Dependent Surveillance) and the data link. Harris is one of the
FAA's largest contractors. We have the contract for the Voice Switching and Control System (VSCS) for air-to-ground
and ground-to-ground communications at all the en route centers. VSCS is modular and capable of handling from 50 to
430 air traffic controller workstations, 570 trunks, 350 radios; it is fault-tolerant. The system will not drop any calls and
will always connect to a radio if it's available. The system has complete automatic fault mitigation that reports failures
to the card level.
We have done a lot of work in weather systems; the MWP (Meteorological Weather Processor) program furnishes
weather products for use by the center air traffic controller. The NADIN (National Airspace Data Interchange Network)
program is the latest, state-of-the-art X.25 packet switching system; it will probably form the ATN (Aeronautical
Telecommunications Network) backbone in the United States. Our Nighthawk real-time computer is used in Raytheon's
terminal Doppler radar weather radar system and we are currently implementing a satellite communication system
(Alaskan NAS Interfacility Communication system, [ANICS]) for the Alaskan region that will replace the terrestrial
circuits and microwave links that have been somewhat unreliable because of the terrain and environment. ANICS will
be the first satellite system for voice and data used a region for all air traffic control communications.
We've instigated R&D programs that address the five global initiatives. By that, I mean that whatever we develop in the
United States, must be compatible with systems in other countries and vice versa. As stated earlier, some countries are
now moving ahead of the United States in air traffic control technology. VSCS, for instance, is replacing a 20-year-old
communication system. There are countries that have already installed all digital communications systems. ADS is one
of the initiatives. Our division's core competency is based on communications and information processing. This is a
good match for our R&D, given the relationship of data link and ADS as part of ATM.
Harris has formed alliances with two aeronautical universities: Florida Tech and Embry-Riddle. We equipped 36 of
their planes with differential GPS and two-way data links so that we can track the aircraft, send pilot-controller messages
and receive those messages back at our plant. We wanted to show that VSCS and NADIN could meet the initial ATN
requirements for receipt of pilot-controller messages in the center-now. It's easy to run data link experiments with one
aircraft, but it's a little more difficult to design a robust data link for 20 aircraft at different altitudes and under various
weather conditions. We have a DGPS reference station at the Melbourne Airport and also one at Daytona. Using these
reference stations, we have performed special category 1 (Cat-1) landings. We've since moved on to experiments
involving precision landings with a wide area augmentation system.
The wide area system we are currently using, was developed for surveying applications in the Gulf of Mexico for oil
exploration. There are ten reference stations with significant coverage over the continental United States. We developed
equipment with Trimble's help and have been performing special Cat-1 precision landings. This system is similar to
what the FAA is proposing for the Wide Area Augmentation System (WAAS) in that the reference stations are
networked back to a central station and correction signals are transmitted to the aircraft via satellite. To test the
precision of our wide area augmented landing system, we are using the category 1 ILS system at Melbourne Airport;
we've had good results to date. We have also plotted and performed curved approaches into Valkaria, a non-
instrumented airport south of Melbourne. Fifty to 75 of these approaches have been performed using various pilots. We
also instrumented some Melbourne Airport vehicles for tracking and collision detection.
Harris has been incorporating some of the things that we've learned from the existing VSCS system into an integrated
tracking/communication function; in the future, you'll be able to "point and click" on a flight (being tracked on a Plan
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View Display [PVD]) and a Communication (COM) channel will automatically open up. If the controller is to be given
more information, he needs help controlling it. We're working with the FAA Tech Center and Lincoln Labs in some of
these areas to be sure that we don't overload the controller.
As part of a future scenario, assuming that mode S is the data link of choice, an air traffic controller wanting to reach a
specific flight may speak the flight number, and the COM channel would automatically open up. In this case it's a digital
message, so the computer would look up the address for that flight number, since we know the physical aircraft changes
day-to-day. The computer would cross-reference that into a mode S address. Based on the location of the aircraft and
receipt of the ADS position messages, the system would know which communication link and path is required to
communicate with the aircraft. If it's over the ocean, the system would use SATCOM; over land, possibly VHP; in a
terminal area, mode S.
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Advanced Satellite Communications Technology and ATM
Dr. Charles Raquet is Chief of the Antenna Systems Technology Branch at NASA's Lewis Research Center.
He has a Bachelors, Masters and Ph.D. in Physics from Carnegie Melon University. He manages a program
developing K and Ka band MMIC arrays and related MMIC integration technologies for future commercial
space communication and NASA mission applications. This includes MMIC packaging technology, printed
circuit element technology, system level integrated circuit development and photonic technology for control and
RF signal distribution and arrays. He also manages a program for developing and demonstrating MMIC array
antenna systems in aircraft and mobile ground terminals linked to the advanced communications technology
satellite.
Charles Raquet: My goal today is to show you how satellite communications and other advanced systems and
technologies being developed may play a small part in the broader subject of ATM. Satellite communications above all
is connectivity, and I emphasize commercial COM because our role in satellite COM is much like NASA's role relative
to aeronautics: brokering some of the higher risk technologies ultimately leading to a strengthened U.S. industry. The
system of interest to this group would be the link from an aircraft to a ground terminal via satellite. Satellite
communication becomes a way for aircraft and their functions to be tied in on a global scale with control centers and
other activities.
I'm going to be talking mostly about systems in the Ka band: commercial frequency of 30 gigahertz uplink, 20 gigahertz
downlink. The military is 44 up and 20 down; the commonality of the 20 down has resulted in some very nice sharing.
Some of its capabilities, the allowance for the user's high mobility and high data rate capability complements and
expands the utility of existing communication networks. It permits simultaneous distribution of information, which is
very relevant to aircraft: imagine distribution of weather information.
I'll discuss two satellite systems, not because they're endorsed by NASA, but simply because these are types of systems
now being considered. This Hughes Ka band Spaceway System is planned to be operational in three years. Data rates
range from 16 kilobytes per second, compatible with excellent voice quality, to Tl rates, full-frame video. Full
continental United States coverage is possible in multiple spot beams with large bandwidth. This is a geostationary
satellite in orbit about three earth diameters out. Another type of satellite system was developed by the Teledesic
Network consortium. This is a very ambitious system consisting of over 800 low earth orbit satellites, a few hundred
miles above the earth. It's also Ka band with wide bandwidth, 16 kilobytes to 2 megabyte standard service, up to 1.2
gigabits for emergencies or other situations.
The advanced communication technology satellite, managed and operated by the Lewis Research Center is an
experimental satellite at 30 and 20 gigahertz. The satellite was used to link up an aircraft via the satellite to a ground
terminal. One of the experiments involves high data rate transfer of banking data from Columbus, Ohio to Cleveland.
So how could Lewis participate in ATM work? We could provide frequency spectrum allocation advocacy for ATM
communication links, whether satellite or other. We can perform system studies concerning to aircraft to satellite
communication applications. We can provide technology assessment in the areas of our expertise and demonstrate
selected technology. In any event, we will continue to participate in ATM vision definition activities such as I've
described. This will allow us to serve as a resource in areas relative to the space COM technology domain. And finally,
based on an awareness of the ATM requirements, we can look for opportunities to exploit existing and future space
COM technology capabilities and hardware for ATM.
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How might NASA LeRC participate?
NASA LeRC will:
• Continue to participate in ATM vision definition activities:
- to increase LeRC awareness of ATM requirements
- to serve as a resource relative to the space communication
technology domain
• Based on an awareness of ATM requirements, look for opportunities:
- to exploit existing and future space communication technology
capabilities and hardware for ATM
- to influence the direction of future space communication technology
development to maximize the benefit to ATM systems
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Free Flight Capability through Technology Transfer
Jack Ball is responsible for new business development at the Lockheed Aeronautical Systems Company. He
holds a BSAE Degree in Aeronautical Engineering from Embry-Riddle. He served as the lead engineer of the
system status subsystem on the ARPA Sponsor Pilots Associates Program during phase 2. He has nine years of
wind tunnel and aircraft component testing experience; three years of experience in test equipment design,
development and fabrication; seven years of experience in expert system design and development and ten years
in industrial mechanical system sales. He also holds FAA licenses both as an instrument-rated commercial pilot
and as airplane and instrument instructor and ground school instructor.
Jack Ball: I would like to hypothesize what the future system might be like using and borrowing technology from the
military side of the aircraft industry. Today we're faced with a reduction in capabilities, but yet in the near future some
significant increases in demand. The real challenge ahead of us is how to meet these demands; the only way we can do it
is with an ATC infrastructure that accommodates this type of growth.
We're faced with a technology gap between current avionics available in the cockpit and those that are on the ground.
We have very capable systems in the cockpit and yet they're having to interact with World War II-era ground
technology. There's the increasing traffic density enroute as well as in intermediate areas and terminals. Our upgraded
programs are well behind schedule. So this is creating a compounded problem that's impacting the growth of the
industry, the capability to meet passenger needs, as well as causing rapid reductions in manufacturing capability.
I'm going to talk about how to leverage dual-use technologies developed under the ARPA Pilots Associate Program to
the next generation air traffic management and free flight capabilities. When we started the Pilots Associate Program we
were focusing strictly on the hostile environment of the single seat fighter pilot. We had no knowledge of the needs and
the requirements outside this world. The program was founded on the concept of distributed decision-making. We
believe that people have the capability to do reasoning but need to be supported by what is best supplied by is the
computer: data collection and prioritizing. The computer can support the reasoning process; the human will always be
able to make connections that are not obvious to the computer.
The $43 million Pilots Associate Program was funded by ARPA and managed by the U.S. Air Force between 1986 and
1992. In the first phase we investigated whether multiple expert systems could add value to the pilot. This phase
seemed to be just a futuristic simulation until there was a demonstration. One of the customer pilots flying in a
wingman's position fired a missile at the lead PA aircraft, which actually recommended and took evasive action.
Suddenly there was realization that this was real. We were asked continue another phase, during which we investigated
whether the hardware could run in real time and be fielded on an aircraft-type processor.
When we started the program we used thirty-some computers tied together operating about six times real time: we had to
stop and redesign. How could you have multiple expert systems running on multiple processors communicating and
working in real time? One of the things we did that was different from today's approach to automation was to dictate
that the pilot be in charge; he flies the aircraft and the computer monitors him rather than the pilot monitoring the
computer. The other thing was that the pilot had total freedom; whether he chose to follow the directions and
recommendations of the system, the system would always follow the pilot. We also required by design that the effort
saved by the pilot had to be more than the effort required to control the system; the pilot had the authority to perform
actions; the system had to be predictable to the pilot and unpredictable to his opponent.
Associate technology goes beyond information management; it provides the right information in the right format in the
right context based on what the pilot or the operator is doing at that time. During the Vietnam era there would be two
people in the cockpit. Since then we've gone to a single seat fighter and tried to add capability by putting more boxes in
there; this resulted in a massive work overload. A lot of available information was just turned off because it couldn't be
put to good use. So the important thing was to bring that information forward in a way and at a time when it was critical
to be used for making decisions, and not just displaying it in the cockpit.
But more importantly, we had to find out whether the pilot was following the recommendations. What was the pilot's
intent, recognizing that the pilot might be doing something different from what the system was recommending? In that
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case we provided feedback to the system so that the planners and the system status and the situation assessment modules
understood the pilot's needs based on his actions.
This type of functionality can be used in civilian applications. In the current situation the controller is actually providing
the eyes and ears for the pilot. And as we move towards data link, a lot of the cues that the pilot gets from regular two-
way radio transmissions and verbal communications go away. We have to determine how to replace those cues and put
that situation awareness back in front of the .pilot. We see tying associate technology, data links, and GPS navigation
and GPS-based transponders together as an inexpensive way to address data requirements in the commercial
environment. And the functionality of the system can be increased over the next 15 years. There are real benefits to be
derived from this: best trajectory routing; reduced operating costs; optimum flight plans; conflict alerting. The overall
technology is generic and it can meet both civilian and military needs.
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Figure 1.
The Problem
Current air traffic infrastructure is insufficient.
Scheduled air service operations - 98% increase by 2010.
Passenger demand to increase by 140 %.
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Current Situation
Technology Gap - Avionics vs. Ground
- Current - FMS, INS, IRS
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Purpose
To discuss how to leverage dual-use associate
technology developed under the ARPA Pilot's
Associate program and transition this technology
into the next-generation Air Traffic Management
System to provide free flight capabilities.
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I Vision I
"Instead of concentrating on the best way to automate flight
data, everyone seems locked into traditional ways of
thinking."
| "In the 21st century, data transfer
between user and provider will be
transparent, accomplished in a
split second, and free-flowing."
I "The future ATM will be charac-
terized by integrated decisions
from distributed decision
makers."
Joseph Del Balzo, IATA Review,
April/May 93, "The 21st century
ATC confidence game," p. 13
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Associate Technology
Automation Distinctions
The pilot is in charge. The pilot directs the aircraft
while the computer monitors.
The pilot has total freedom and can override any
proposal or action.
The pilot sets the authority given to perform actions.
The effort saved by the associate is more than effort
required to control.
Associate technology is more than information
management
Associate systems provide:
- the right information - at the right time
- in the right format - in the right context
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Figure 11.
Benefits
Provide best trajectory routing
Reduce operating costs
Monitor aircraft locations
Optimize flight and route
profiles
Data link flight profiles and
supporting information
Perform conflict alert
Increase ATM capacity
Improve flight safety through
enhanced situational
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Conclusion
Associate technology
addresses information
automation and functions in
complex environments
Associate technology is
generic and can be adapted
to meet this civilian and
military application
Aircraft avionics must be
integrated systems
Market forces are driving the
airlines and general aviation
to find new automation
solutions
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Adaptive Performance Optimization — An Advanced Traffic Management Technology
Glenn Gilyard is from the NASA Dryden Flight Research Center. Glenn has a Bachelors Degree in
Aeronautical Engineering, a Masters in Mechanical Engineering, and 30 years of experience at NASA Dryden.
He is currently directing internal exploratory research directed at the application of adaptive optimization
techniques to performance improvement of subsonic transport aircraft. He was the NASA principal investigator
of the F15 performance seeking control program. He previously developed flight control laws for use in
emergency situations using only thrust modulation for flight path control; was the Chief Engineer on the
oblique wing research aircraft program; principal investigator on the drones for aerodynamic and structural test
program which demonstrated active flutter control, and he was responsible for development and flight test of
improved auto pilot modes on the YF-12/SR-71 series aircraft.
Glenn Gilyard: Yesterday the question was asked many times, "What is NASA's role in ATM?". I'd like to suggest at
least one technology area in which I feel NASA can make a significant contribution to improved aircraft efficiency and
airline revenue. This really builds on two major flight research programs that were conducted at Dryden over the past
ten years. The global objective is to improve the efficiency of the ATC system. Efficiency can mean many things. And
over the last two days, we have heard how it relates to traffic density; how much traffic can move through the system at a
given time.
However, I want to address issues related to improving the fuel efficiency of the aircraft. First, optimal aerodynamics
are never achieved for a fixed geometry configuration. What I'm saying is that aircraft are really not using the full
capabilities they currently have. Second, aircraft seldom, if ever, fly at optimal conditions. Although this subject has
been addressed with respect to free flight today, there will always be situations where restrictions cause the aircraft not to
operate where it was not designed to operate most efficiently. Last, FMS systems basically are "optimizing" trajectories
based on predictions, and predictions are generally not representative of the actual aircraft.
As such, we believe there is significant potential to reduce drag through use of redundant controls in a pseudo- variable-
camber operation. The benefits achievable using this general technology are in the 1 % to 3% range. To put this in
perspective, a 1 % increase in L/D is equivalent to $100 million a year for the U.S. fleet of wide body fleet aircraft; as
fuel costs go up, so do the potential savings.
The program we are proposing has the following objectives. First developing a minimum drag controller using
conventional control services. The variable camber operation would involve using ailerons in a symmetric mode looking
for a minimum drag tradeoff between aileron deflection and stab/elevator. Of course, throttle is also in the loop in order
to minimize fuel flow. Second is to address system constraints as dictated by air traffic control or ATM. Last we can
clearly address the free flight optimization issue.
The approach we are recommending is a direct adaptive-optimization technique. We feel it's ideally suited to the drag
minimization problem, primarily since performance objectives are reasonably well defined and measurable. The
approach we're suggesting avoids problems brought up in other examples, in that it avoids modeling errors and
measurement bias issues. This is totally complementary to current FMS systems as an outer loop of FMS operation.
For background that led us to this particular technology, the first program was the joint NASA/Air Force/Boeing
mission-adaptive wing program, which was flown about ten years ago. A modified F-l 1 1 had a completely smooth
variable-camber wing. The leading edge was one segment, the trailing edge was three segments; the idea is to optimally
camber the wing to achieve load control, minimum cruise drag, or whatever other objective is desired. This proved the
concept of variable camber, although some of the automatic systems didn't operate as well as desired. The second
program that contributed to the proposed adaptive performance optimization program is the relatively recent work we've
done on the performance seeking control program, a joint NASA/McDonnell Douglas program that concluded about a
year ago. An F-15 was modified to incorporate systems to perform online real-time adaptive-optimization, receiving
inputs from the engine, the inlet, and the aircraft. The system process consisted of identification, system integration, and
optimization.
The F- 1 1 1 mission adaptive wing clearly demonstrated the drag reduction potential of the variable camber concept. The
caveat is that the mission adaptive wing algorithms are not well suited to the low levels of drag improvement that we
PAG6
221
NOT FILMED tttt«llNltt)NALa fltttf
were looking for on transport type aircraft; roughly in the 1 %-2% range. Online optimization was very successful in the
F15 program with benefits in the range of 5%- 10%. However, that was a fighter where the potential for improvement
was fairly large, and the question remains of how this technology applies to transports. That algorithm methodology
technically resulted in less than true optimality, primarily because measurement biases and modeling errors did creep
into the problem.
We conclude that additional benefits can accrue with adaptive optimization based on performance measurements and
that the technology is basically ready for application to transports now. For longitudinal drag minimization the controls
are aileron, potentially flaps, horizontal stabilizer, elevator, and thrust. Technically one could include center of gravity
as well. In the lateral directional axes there's the problem of minimizing drag due to sideslip angle, again a difficult
problem. This concept could conceivably address the sideslip problem with the use of conventional aileron, rudder, and
differential thrust. The MBB German wind tunnel work illustrates the variable camber concept and how the benefits
accrue.
Airbus/MBB has conducted extensive studies on the application of variable camber to transports. Statements from their
chief aerodynamicist indicate that the new large or ultra large aircraft are going to incorporate this technology.
Furthermore, airlines have indicated general interest. 727s are being modified with winglets and complete trailing edge
re-rigging to minimize drag.
The proposed program is to first validate a drag minimization algorithm incorporating symmetric ailerons in cruise
conditions; this is the real challenge. A flight test is required to develop and validate this technology. We feel we're
ready to attack the problem based on the experience and the related flight programs we've performed; we're ready to
apply this experience to transport aircraft.
Question (Jimmy Krozel, Hughes Information Sciences Lab). To relate this to the air traffic control problem, could you
relate the amount of savings that you would get from the fuel efficient trajectories that you're talking about versus the
losses resulting from flying around before you're allowed to land.
Glenn Gilyard: I really haven't gotten into that. The losses you're talking about are inherent in the current ATM system;
these benefits I've discussed today accrue independent of improvements in the ATM system. For instance, even with
speed and altitude constraints, variable camber optimization will result in less fuel burned. The air traffic control
problem is the same, both with and without variable camber performance optimization.
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Adaptive Performance Optimization
An Advanced Air Traffic Management Technology
Glenn Gilyard
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Figure 1.
Advanced Air Traffic Management
Global objective: Improve the efficiency of the ATC system
Specific issues related to fuel efficiency:
Optimal aerodynamics are never achieved for a
fixed-geometry configuration
Aircraft seldom if ever fly at their optimal condition
- different missions, air traffic control restrictions, etc.
FMS based trajectories are based on models
Efficiency improvement potential:
Capacity does exist to reduce drag using redundant controls
- 1 to 3% drag reduction is achievable
Benefits for U.S. wide-body aircraft fleet:
A 1% increase in L/D saves -$100 million/year
- each 10$ per/gal saves an additional -$20 million/year
Figure 2.
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Adaptive Performance Optimization
Program objectives:
Develop a minimum drag controller using control surfaces
- variable camber type technology
- constrained optimization: ATC dictated constraints(i.e. speed, altitude, time-of-arrival > speed en route)
- "free-flight" optimization
Approach:
Direct adaptive optimization techniques
- ideally suited to drag minimization
- performance objectives are well-defined and measurable
- avoids modeling error and measurement bias issues
Outer-loop optimization of FMS trajectory control
Figure 3.
F-111 Mission Adaptive Wing (MAW)
3-segment variable-
camber TE system
single-segment
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LE system
Second-generation
advanced technology
airfoil
Figure 4.
224
Variable Camber vs Fixed Camber
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Performance Seeking Control (PSC)
On-board, adaptive real-time optimization of performance
Aircraft &
Flight control
parameters
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Summary of flight experience
F-111 Mission Adaptive Wing:
Demonstrated drag reduction using camber variations
Algorithms not suited for low levels of drag improvements
F-15 Performance Seeking Control:
Demonstrated concept of on-line optimization
Algorithm methodology resulted in less than true optimaiity
- measurement biases, model errors
Conclusions:
Additional benefits can be accrued with adaptive
optimization based on performance measurements
Technology is ready for application to transport aircraft
Figure 7.
Aircraft Performance Optimization Potential
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Center-of-gravity
Elevators
Figure 8.
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Benefits of Variable Camber For an
Advanced Subsonic Transport
MBB wind tunnel data
Cruise Range
, ^Fixed Win
Simple adaptation of proven flap system
Maximum variable camber.
Main wing. Fixed wing
Lift Coefficient
Variable camber
- provides the capability
Adaptive optimization
- provides the means
Figure 9.
WIDE-BODY TRANSPORT
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ADAPTIVE PERFORMANCE OPTIMIZATION
• FMS provides model based trajectory control
• APO provides minimum drag/fuel outer-loop optimization
- ATM dictates time of arrival thus Mach/Vcas constraint
minimize fuel flow
1
constant altitude and Mach
minimize II \| maximize
rate-of-descent; // II rate-of-climb;
start descent // li get to altitude
sooner // II quicker
constant M/V|AS constant V,AS/M(idle thrust) (climb thrust)
stair step vs. cruise climb costs
up to =0.5% in reduced UD
landing \ for a fixed configuration \ take-off
Figure 11.
Customer Interest
MD-11, MD-80, C-17
- rerigging of I.E. surfaces to reduce drag
B747-400, B777
- rerigging of T.E. surfaces to reduce drag
- climb to cruise, buffet margin
Airbus/MBB (Daimler-Benz Aerospace)
- studied application of variable camber to transports
Various airlines; general interest
- B727 winglets and rerigging
- drag due-to-sideslip
Figure f2.
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Potential APO Benefits
Reduced fuel burn in the range of 1 - 3%
Aerodynamic optimality not achieved
Off-optimal-design flight
- aircraft configuration
- ATC restrictions
Figure 13.
Proposed APO Program
Objectives:
Flight validation of a drag minimization algorithm
- symmetric outboard-aileron
- cruise
- drag minimization at levels less than 1%
Outboard-aileron and -flap optimization
ATC constrained optimization
- all flight segments
"Free-flight"/cruise climb optimization
Related Objectives:
• Integrated ATM/FMS/APO system
"Joint'Vaircraft-to-aircraft optimization
Figure 14.
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Summary
Adaptive Performance Optimization (APO) technology
enables optimal aircraft performance at all points/times
in "free-flight" and constrained airspace
- APO provides compensation for all operational and
off-design factors which produce performance reductions
- aircraft-to-aircraft trades
Flight test is required to develop and validate this technology
Extensive experience with related flight programs
Ready to apply APO technology and experience to transports
Figure 15.
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The Technologies Chosen by ICAO for the Global ATM System
Robert Simpson is Professor of Aeronautics and Astronautics at MTT and Director of the Flight Transportation
Laboratory. He currently teaches courses in flight transportation, air traffic control, airport planning, airline
management and economics and air transport operations research in the graduate program in flight
transportation at MIT. He's involved with a wide variety of research areas in the Flight Transportation
Laboratory at MIT, which he co-founded in 1965. His published research covers air traffic control theory and
analysis and simulation, computerized schedule planning models for airlines, airline economic theory, airline
revenue management systems, human factors of real time decision support systems for pilots, ATC controllers
and airline schedulers, aircraft navigation and guidance, airport noise and air transport planning methodology.
He was a jet fighter pilot in the RCAF and RAF and currently maintains proficiency as a general aviation
private pilot.
Robert Simpson: What I'm here to tell you is that, in a sense, we've fixed the technology. Our problem really is to go
ahead with chosen technologies and design and engineer a new global air traffic management system. I want to make
the point that civil aviation is an international activity; this isn't often recognized by U.S. citizens. In most countries
around the world airplanes mean flying to another country. In this country 90% of our activities are domestic; only 10%
are international. It's just the other way around for the rest of the world. We're building a global air traffic management
system, which means there are 182 nations in the world belonging to ICAO which are interested in what that global air
traffic management systems going to look like. So one of my messages is that NASA and the FAA are not going to be
the final arbiter on what our new global air traffic management system is going to look like.
ICAO is a specialized agency of the United Nations that's 50 years old this year. The U.S. paid 50 and 60% of its budget
in the early years. We dominated it and exercised world leadership in civil aviation through ICAO until about 15 or 20
years ago. We have lost influence there because it's been neglected by Washington in recent years. But it's going to
have to be rehabilitated and revitalized if we're going to go ahead and build the new system.
Since I'm assessing technology, let me go back over what has been decided by ICAO for world use, since any
automation has to be consistent around the world and acceptable to the rest of the world. Let me discuss some
definitions from ICAO. What is air traffic management? Why don't we call it air traffic control anymore? You can talk
about air traffic control. What NASA's interested in is some of the services that are included in the umbrella of services
defined by ICAO as air traffic management system.
Air traffic flow management is not something we would like to do, but have to do because of capacity restrictions in air
traffic control systems in Europe and United States. These capacity deficiencies are on approach to landing because we
don't have enough runways or airports where we want them. In the past 30 years we've built one new airport in Europe
and one in the United States. In Asia right now there are seven new world class airports under construction. But we
have not been able to build them because communities around proposed new airports sites will not allow them to be built
because jet subsonic transport airplane makes too much noise on approach and departure. So we have problems caused
by airplane noise and the lack of airports.
There's an ICAO treaty, signed by 183 nations that's caused every nation of the world to have a civil aviation department
and a Director-General of civil aviation. That treaty specifies that every nation is obliged to provide air traffic services.
The sovereignty of the airspace belongs to that nation; it has the obligation to meet a set of standards and recommended
practices published by ICAO. However, there's no way to enforce those; countries can and do take exception to it. We
would like a lot more rigor and discipline in some of the systems around the world, but some countries very primitive air
traffic management systems and with people who are not interested in spending a lot of money on technologies to handle
the problems raised by foreign airlines. It's a very interesting political problem as you come to engineer new systems
and make improvements around the world.
One of our problems is to provide leadership, which means some revitalization in Washington. We had an interesting
occurrence yesterday as the FAA came to tell NASA what they thought it should be doing. NASA wants to do research,
and there is lots of room in research for NASA to do. FAA has responsibilities in this country and their response is
interesting: "NASA may be coming into our turf". And so we got a message yesterday to get off our turf. I think
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advanced concepts in top-down engineering can be done by NASA. It doesn't have the responsibility for implementing
those concepts; neither does the FAA. But to define the research you've got to have some concept alternatives for the
future system.
ICAO spent eight years on FANS: Future Air Navigation System, which wasn't an air navigation system at all. Air
navigation is really air traffic control and air traffic management in ICAO terminology. What they did was give us tools,
the technologies in communication, navigation, and surveillance that will be used in ATM, procedures, practices,
separation criteria, etc. as we decide what the new systems going to look like. You should be aware that FAA may not
!be here next year. Since last November's elections, the chance is something like 99% that the Congress and the
Administration will change the structure of the FAA in the next year.
In the last several years the Western European countries have started to put sizable money through their equivalents of
NASA into air traffic management research. That's a new development. In the past, the fact that we did the research and
provided answers in the ICAO forum meant that the Western European countries folded up in front of us and went along
with TCAS or whatever. In the absence of FAA leadership in ICAO, that's not going to happen in the future. There will
be competing proposals for the form of a new air traffic management system using European technologies; there will be
European consortia which will try to sell and operate the global air traffic management system. So this country has a
problem. What research will NASA do in ATM; how are we going to regain our leadership in this area? I think there is
a role for NASA; some people have already started to identify topics.
We don't know how to do operations analysis, systems engineering, generation of operation specifications, automation,
human factors. There are large areas in which we have not been doing research or generating new knowledge for air
traffic management systems. The FAA is not a research organization. There aren't many people in the FAA who know
the difference between research and development. The culture and the people in NASA may not know much about
ATM, but I think they do know how to do research. Given time and money they can do a lot of good things for us over
the next several years. So I hope that somehow we can get the FAA-NASA talks going and that a relationship will
ensue.
Let me show you what progress ICAO has made towards a global ATM system. It took eight years for these decisions to
be made. The idea behind ICAO is to prevent duplication or unnecessarily redundant systems onboard aircraft. It took
about 15 years after World War II to reach an agreement and into commercial use. The idea is that we don't want to fly
to Ethiopia and have an Ethiopian set of avionics onboard the airplane, another set for Japan, and another set for
Australia. There are some anomalies around the world where the world standard systems are not used for domestic
aviation inside the country.
Next month in Montreal I think the FAA is going to be unpleasantly surprised to find that the world is going to go with
MLS; that ILS is not going to be discontinued; and that GPS approaches for landing approaches are going to be accepted
as well. That means we now have three choices. If you're an airport or ATC operator, you'll have to implement all three
if you want at an international airport. An airline may find that there's no ILS anymore at Frankfurt, and there will have
to be MLS onboard to do all-weather landings. That's what ICAO was set up to eliminate. We would like one common
system with standard procedures based on it around the world. This produces familiarity for pilots and controllers. We
should have an international air traffic controllers' profession where controllers from Australia can do air traffic control
on a sabbatical kind of visit to the United States.
VHP radio will continue to exist. Aeronautical mobile satellite service (AMSS) will be introduced. HF radio will
hopefully be discontinued for oceanic use in favor of satellites for voice. There will be satellite and VHP data link
service. In high density areas we have Mode S surveillance system. It's really a data link communication system that
gives us position, identity and altitude. Mode S gives us a lot of capability in transmitting information to and from the
airplane. These are the standards that we want to use as we try to engineer the new system. We would like to have a
system that is flexible, adaptable, evolutionary and can be useful to various countries around the world.
RNAV is here. Required navigation performance (RNP) is something new and allows an operator to put anything
onboard as long as it meets navigation performance requirements in certain classes of airspace. There will be arguments
about whether American Airlines meets RNP-1 according to German standards for German airspace, unless ICAO can
establish what Germany defines or what the U.S. defines as classes for required navigation performance. We are going
to introduce GNSS, global navigation satellite service. That's not GPS, but has yet to be defined. Here's an important
point: VOR, NDB and DME will be discontinued. That's an important economic point to the 183 nations around the
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world, including this one as well. In China, Russia, and the former Iron Curtain countries the problem is whether to put
those in or improve existing ones or to go directly to satellite systems. This means that in certain parts of the world and
the oceans, new systems may come online faster than they can be implemented in some of the developed areas of the
world.
Some of you may know there are plans in upper airspace where we've been using 2,000 to 4,000 foot separations to cut
those separations in half up to FL 390. The new surveillance system, ADS Automatic Dependent Surveillance, goes
through the satellites. For domestic enroute airspace and on the airport surface we're going to have ADS. ICAO calls
for ACAS, aircraft collision avoidance system. Even though TCAS has been forced on the world by Washington,
ICAO's still making up its mind about what ACAS really is.
With ACAS good pictures of the surrounding traffic will be put onboard for the pilot. But what does he do with that
information? How does that impact the air traffic controller? What are the procedures and separation requirements?
That's the area where we don't seem to know exactly what we're doing. We don't need new technologies for ATM; we've
got everything we need. The problem is implementation design, which is where the benefits come from, in the form of
reduced separation criteria and improved procedures.
Not getting rid of the ILS is a disbenefit. The bottleneck at the airports is the approach capacity, as defined by
deficiencies in the ILS system. We start 10 and 15 miles back; we do an acquisition of the localizer; an acquisition of
the glide slope; we hold constant speeds. Landing capacity is determined right there. Descents with more flexible
approach procedures can only be done if the ILS procedures disappear. Otherwise the MLS and GPS airplanes will be
doing an imitation ILS approach.
This activity in the United States is several years behind that in Europe for various political reasons; there are studies
around the rest of the world trying to do this same thing. FEATS is the future European air traffic control system.
PHARE is Eurocontrol's program for harmonized air traffic control research in Europe. ATLAS is the European
commission. In Brussels there are two directorates now battling to spend European money on air traffic control. Then
there are various ICAO and RTCA working groups.
233
Air Traffic Management Services
1. Air Traffic Control (ATC)
2. Air Traffic Flow Management (ATFM)] i:
J.
3. Airspace Management ( ASM)
[•4. Flight Information Service (FIS)
5. Navigation Services (NAV)
6. Search and Rescue Service (SAR)
Figure 1.
Technologies Chosen for the Global ATM System
Communications
Air-Ground Voice
Domestic Oceanic
continue VHP radio discontinue HF radio
introduce AMSS introduce MASS
Air-Ground Data Link
Domestic Enroute Oceanic
introduce AMSS introduce AMSS
introduce new VHP service
High Density Areas
ModeS
Ground- Ground and Air-Ground Protocol
ATN - Aeronautical Telecommunications Network with OSI
Figure 2.
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Technologies Chosen for the Global ATM System
Aircraft Navigation
Domestic Airspace
Enroute, Terminal Area,
and Airport Surface
introduce RNAV/RNP
introduce GNSS
discontinue standard systems
(VOR, DME, NDB)
continue barometric altimetry
Approach to Landing
MLS to be world standard
ELS to be discontinued
Oceanic Airspace
introduce RNAV/RNP
introduce GNSS
discontinue standard systems
continue barometric altimetry
Figure 3.
Technologies Chosen for the Global ATM System
Aircraft Surveillance
Ground-Based Surveillance
Domestic Airspace
Enroute
Airport Surface
ADS
ADS
Oceanic Airspace
ADS
Terminal Area Mode S
Primary Radar to be used for weather only
Aircraft-Based Surveillance
Domestic Airspace
ACAS
Oceanic Airspace
ACAS
Figure 4.
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ATM Research and System Studies
1. FEATS - European 1CAO
2. PHARE - Eurocontrol
3. ATLAS - European Commission
4. Various ICAO Working Groups
Figure 5.
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Intelligent Aircraft/Airspace Systems
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Robert Stengel: I think there's one aspect that not only hasn't been discussed too much but, in fact, has been pointed out
as an area of particular concern: how to get systems to play together. Future aircraft will be equipped for flight
management systems in a way that we haven't seen before, but not all aircraft will be equipped with state-of-the-art
systems. So while the possibilities of free flight navigation systems for future air traffic control systems are going to be
with us, it won't be there for all kinds of airplanes. There's going to have to be a central agency to integrate those factors
for the unequipped airplanes as well as to represent the overall requirements for air traffic. At the same time ground-
based systems will have the opportunity to compute and communicate orders of magnitude more information than those
onboard the airplanes.
But ground control by itself is not enough. As was quipped yesterday, if I had the responsibility of getting everybody to
leave this room without bumping into anybody else, it would be one thing for me to explain to each person how to do it
and have everyone close their eyes and do it; it would be quite another for each of you to leave the room with open eyes
taking care of your own destiny. So we need a combination of both air traffic and ground-based systems. And we have
to do it for yet another reason: airplanes and ground-based systems have different objectives. The airplanes, while
trying to maintain safety, are also trying to make schedules and make a profit; the ground-based system is primarily
trying to make sure that nobody bumps into another aircraft.
My Ph.D. student, John Wangermann, and I have been trying to identify ways of minimizing the potential for conflict
that is unavoidable with all these smart systems in the airplanes and on the ground trying to solve the problem with an
objective of enhancing system performance. There are roughly 100,000 IFR flight operations being handled today, and
we've got a growing number of them - a few percent per year by FAA estimates. The U.S. is 3,000 miles wide and 2,000
miles north and south; the usable atmosphere is about seven miles deep. We've got about ten million cubic miles of air
that we might use for 100,000 flight operations a day, about 100 cubic miles per airplane. It takes about one cubic mile
of space for one airplane to fly from one coast to the other.
What's the problem? The problem is that everybody wants the same 100 cubic miles, and they want it right now.
Clearly there's an increased demand for airspace. We want to improve safety. We've heard that the very high levels of
safety that we have right now really aren't good enough. We want to get down to zero accidents if at all feasible. And
then there is this issue of the degree of cooperation between the smart plane and smart ground control. There is a
potential for conflict whenever we've got two smart entities dealing with each other. Then there are issues of autonomy,
the cost of the system, the benefits to the airlines and to society. We're concerned about standardization of architectures
as well as the architectures themselves.
Many people have mentioned this issue: How do we get there from here? It's one thing to talk about the ideal system,
but really we have to worry about establishing a road map. Fault tolerance is something we'd like to build into these
systems. And how might we do that? A summary of much of what I'm going to say today is in an ICAS paper, given in
Anaheim in September, called "Principle Negotiation Between Intelligent Agents - A Model for Air Traffic
Management".
Let's think about what the airspace might look like in, for example, the year 2025. It's far enough out that we're not
talking about a five- or ten-year plan. I like to think of it as an "Internet in the sky." What we'd like to do is get the same
sort of high-bandwidth communications into the air that we have on the ground. I think that satellite-based technology is
the key to solving most of those problems. We're going to be using satellites not only for navigation but also for
communication. I'll go out on a limb and suggest that we really want to have very high bandwidth communication
between airplanes; as a result we're going to be forced to higher and higher frequencies, not only microwave but possibly
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optical frequencies. You could basically have optical links between aircraft at cruise altitude a high percentage of the
time. The idea then is to think of these high bandwidth channels as being opportunistic channels; you use them when
they're available. Most people who can use them do use them, and that allows you to free up the VHP frequencies for
those who cannot. Also, fiber optic ground lines will link the ground-based system.
Now, why do we need this high bandwidth? There are lots of things that we'd like to do. Certainly knowing position
and velocity is an important thing for us; GPS allows us to do that. But there is other information we'd like to share with
our fellows in the sky. While I've actually taken what might appear to be a bold step in suggesting byte rates for these
things, I suspect these byte rates are very low. Still, I'd like you to think about the uplink and downlink possibilities that
we might have: 104 bytes per second, like a 9600 baud modem. This leads me to think we could do that right away if
we put a modem on the FMS and got somebody in first class to let us use the "air phone." We could be doing this
tomorrow.
'So, what would we like to uplink and downlink? We like to think of every airplane as being a sensor as well as a
receiver, sending information into the net, that would tell us not only its location, but about meteorological conditions
that it's experiencing. By the same token we'd like to get some information back; that information would represent the
processing of the downlinked information from the airplane as well as what has been obtained in other ways to give the
crew a better notion of what's going on. Furthermore there is a data relay possibility along with this notion of an
"Internet in the sky." The idea would be to make sure that every airplane has a high bandwidth track communication
channel, which might mean having line-of-sight communications with other airplanes.
Now let's consider the organizations involved in this. A loose hierarchy from ICAO to individual aircraft suggests that
there are lines of communication that either could or should be implemented between these various entities. These
organizations, of course, are made up of people. They are made up of intelligent people; let's think of them as
"intelligent agents." Indeed many of them are in "agencies." The whole concept of an intelligent agent is important to
our expanding the capabilities of the airspace system. There are a whole range of traffic management functions being
handled both for flow management, and for aircraft separation. There are lots of airplanes in the sky—many of them
reporting to airlines' operations centers. There are other agents, including service vendors third-party suppliers, weather
forecasters, etc. Each of these can be viewed as an agent in the parlance that we're using. An agent could be a computer,
a person, a combination of computers and people. We certainly want the computers to be serving people, but at the level
of abstraction I'm using today we're looking for a model that works; a model that works for people is people.
Another paper I wrote about a year ago-called "Toward Intelligent Flight Control in the Transactions on Systems, Man,
and Cybernetics" defined a model of an intelligent agent as one that has declarative, procedural, and reflexive functions.
These represent outer, middle, inner loops control systems. Figure 10 contains some possible listings for declarative,
procedural, and reflexive functions of traffic control and aircraft agents.
Now, we want to model these agents in some sort of "humanoid" way. Humans do deals. And indeed we would like to
figure out how these agents can deal with each other in a fair way, how they can actually perform negotiation. This
brings us into the notions of negotiation and of conflict resolution, the idea of option spaces or negotiation sets. Figure
12 contains classic examples of negotiation sets overlapping for two agents. Very often the assumption is made that
when you negotiate, it's a zero sum game; that's not the case in air traffic control. We should be trying to satisfy as many
objectives as possible. Now, when an aircraft is dealing with the air traffic system, the negotiation is an exchange of
information. We basically are satisfying constraints while at the same time trying to maximize a utility function.
Consider what would happen if you were using principled negotiation between two airlines, each of which had two
airplanes that had been delayed getting into Denver. If you did what is normally done today, juggling schedules within
the airline itself, everybody would still be missing their flights.
In this case we've swapped the two Continental flights in such a way that it improves things for Continental, but not
overall. If we had the opportunity to swap between airlines, then we would reduce the number of missed flights
dramatically. If we had done the swap between Continental and United, one of the two might feel that he got the short
end of the stick. The idea then is that these negotiations should be done with public information, so each airline can
decide whether it had been treated fairly. Everybody knows the situation in principle because it was on this "Internet in
the sky."
Let me summarize by repeating that the answer in some sense is to use decision trees, negotiating expert systems. You
can induce knowledge in those trees using various algorithms, one of which is called "IDS." There is a program
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structure for doing this, using the C language on a Silicon Graphics machine. The if-then rules are implemented with an
integrated expert system shell called Clips, developed at the Johnson Space Center. We are running a simulation with
which we're currently trying to investigate situations in which airplanes are interfering with each other.
In conclusion, by 2025 there are going to be significant increases in technology, order of magnitude increases or more in
computation and communication, and as a result there is potential for conflict. But we think that we can come up with
negotiation procedures that will prevent chaos from occurring.
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BOEING ESTIMATES OF AIRLINE TRAFFIC
AND FLEET DISTRIBUTION
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AIR TRAFFIC MANAGEMENT
FUNCTIONAL AREAS SYSTEMS
Aircraft Operations Ground Control Centers
Communication Ground Surveillance Radar
Navigation Ground Radio Navigation Aids
Surveillance Global Positioning Satellites
Weather Information Airborne Flight Management
Enroute Flow Control Systems
Terminal Area Operations Traffic/Collision Alert Systems
Airport Control Weather/Wind Shear Radar
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ISSUES IN AIR TRAFFIC MANAGEMENT AND CONTROL
Increased Demand for Airspace
Improved Safety
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Potential for Conflict Between Ground and Airborne Systems
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SATELLITE-BASED COMMUNICATION,
NAVIGATION, & SURVEILLANCE
GPS
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AIRCRAFT PROVIDE INFORMATION AS WELL AS RECEIVE IT
DOWNLINK (~ 104 bps/aircraft, average)
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Own light intensity
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Airborne hazard status monitoring and alerts
Desired alternate flight plans
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A HIERARCHICAL AIRCRAFT/AIRSPACE SYSTEM
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EXAMPLES OF AGENT FUNCTIONS IN AN IAAS
TRAFFIC CONTROL AGENT
Declarative Functions
Traffic monitoring
Conflict detection/prediction
Constraint monitoring
Hazard detection
Weather monitoring/prediction
Route assignment
Procedural Functions
Conflict resolution
Might path adaptation
Propagation of alternate scenarios
Networking
Assessment of pilot requests
Mow control
Reflexive Functions
Display update
Communications
State vector processing
Aircraft handover
[AlltCKAI-T AGENT
Dccliiriilivc Functions
System monitoring
Goal planning
System/scenario identification
Conflict resolution
Choice of operating mode
Procedural Functions
Adaptation
Propagation of alternate scenarios
Guidance and Navigation
Intimation and Control
Crew coordination
Communication
Reflexive Functions
Measurement
Actuation
Inner-loop regulation
Figure 10.
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DEALS AND THE NEGOTIATION SET*
Utility.
Individual Rational Deal:
I'areto-Optimal Deai.
Negotiation Set, NS:
Cooperative Situation:
Compromise Situation:
Conflict Situation:
Difference in cost of achieving goal alone and cost of achieving it jointly
U t i l i t y is positive for both negotiators (Nash, 1950)
No other deal is belter for one and not worse for the other (Nash, 1950)
The set of all deals that are individual rational and parelo-oplimal (Nash, 1950)
A deal in MS' is preferred by both agents to achieving goals alone
A deal in MS is not preferred by either agent to achieving goal alone
No deals are acceptable to either agent, i.e., no deals are in NS
Cooperative Situation Compromise Situation
Initial
State InitialState,
1\
Gb
Ga
Conflict Situation
Initial
State
Zlolkin, G., and Kosenschein, J. S.. "Cooperation and Conllicl Resolution via Negotiation Among Autonomous Agents in
Nontooperative Domains," IEEE Trans. Sy.v., Man. Cyber., 21 (6), Nuv/Dec 1991, pp. 1317-1324.
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TYPICAL UNDERLYING ASSUMPTIONS FOR NEGOTIATION*
Maximum Ut i l i ty :
Complete Knowledge:
No History:
Fixed Goals:
Bilateral Negotiation:
Symmetric Abilities:
Deterministic World:
Suitability for IAAS
Each agent wants lo maximize own
expected u t i l i t y
Each agent knows all relevant
information
No consideration is given lo past or Low
future actions
Goals don't change during negotiation Medium
In multi-agent situation, negotiations Medium
occur sequentially in pairs
All agents can perform the same set of Low
operations
No uncertainly about environment or Low
effects of agent actions
Zlolkin, G., and Kosenschein, J. S., "Cooperation and Conllicl Resolution via Negotiation Among Autonomous Agents in
Noncooperaiive Domains." lEEETrans. Sys.. Man, Cyber.. 21 (6), Nov/Dec 1991, pp. 1317-1324.
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NEGOTIATION ISSUES
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TYPES OF NEGOTIATION
Option Space
(Trajectories)
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Maximizer (A/C1) vs. Maximizer (A/C2)
• In conflict: negotiate a solution that removes conflict,
then increases utility (Mutual Gain).
- Maximum utility option will probably not be
possible for both
- Possible need for arbitration
• No conflict, but one agent wants to select an option that
will bring them into conflict
- Search for Options for Mutual Gain
A/C2 Maximizer
A/C1 - Maximizer
Princeton University
Laboratory for Control and Automation
Maximizer (A/C) vs. Satisficer (ATC)
8
Figure 16.
• Maximizer wants maximum utility option given
constraints set by Satisficer
• Negotiation required because Satisficer constraints
not known exactly to Maximizer
• Negotiation is an exchange of information
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PRINCIPLED NEGOTIATION*
FOCUS ON INTERESTS, NOT POSITIONS
IDENTIFY COMMON AND SEPARATE INTERESTS
INVENT OPTIONS FOR MUTUAL GAIN
ASSESS OPTIONS USING OBJECTIVE CRITERIA
' Fisher R., a:td Dry W., Celling lo Yes, Penguin Books, New York, 1981.
FOUR STEPS IN PRINCIPLED NEGOTIATION
AGENT 1 /. INITIATION
2. INVENT OPTIONS
FOR MUTUAL GAIN
FORMULATE AND TRANSMIT PROPOSAL
3. ASSESS OPTIONS
AGAINST
OBJECTIVE CRITERIA*
' Negotiated at a higher level of the IAAS
Figure 18.
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Scenario 1: Slut Negotiation
Description
A snow storm comes over Denver around midday. All flighls into DIA that afternoon are delayed by
hours. To make the scenario simple consider just two airlines, two flights per airline.
to 3
AL
and #
CO31
C042
UA66
UA82
Ac
Type
DC10
737
767
737
Dep
Airport
EWR
SFO
LAX
SEA
Original
Arrival
Time
3.10
2.45
3.55
2.10
New
Scheduled
Arrival
5.20
4.00
6.15
3.20
Total
Pax
300
120
240
120
Connecting
Pax
180
40
180
35
Case2: Cancel and Substi tution within airline
CO cancels 42 and substitutes 31 into its slot. UA does not as UA66 could not make a 3.20 arrival time.
(Assume that a passenger on a cancelled flight suffers a 5 hour delay).
Because each flight is still more than 50 minutes late all passengers miss connections.
Flight
CO31
CO42
UA66
UA82
Orig Time
3.10
2.45
3.55
2.10
New Sched
Time
4.00
CANCELLED
6.15
3.20
Delay (mins)
50
Equivalent 300
140
70
Figure 20.
Casc3: Subst i tu t ion between airlines after negotiation
liacli airl ine wants to get its big aircraft in early. So C03I swaps into UA82's slot, and UA66 swaps into CO42's
swap. (Again, assume that a passenger on a cancelled flight suffers a 5 hour delay). Connecting pax on flights
CO31 and UA66 now make their connections.
Flight
CO31
CO42
UA66
UA82
Orig Time
3.10
2.45
3.55
2.10
New Sched Time
3.20
6.15
4.00
5.20
Delay (mins)
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5
130
Results
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3
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Delay/
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cancel
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(115)
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(86)
61
Av Ac
Delay
103
87
89
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ections
435
435
75
Cancel-
lations
0
1
0
Continental
D/Pax
114
121
67
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103
50
(+1
Xel)
110
Missed
cons
220
220
40
United
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117
117
46
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105
105
70
Missed
Cons
215
215
35
Figure 21.
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THE USE OF DECISION TREES IN THE IAAS
AGENT 1
I. INITIATION
IMPROVEMENT
SOUGHT OVER
CURRENT
PLANS
EMERGENCY
SITUATION
/
2. INVENT
OPTIONS FOR
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FORMULATE AND
TRANSMIT PROPOSAL
AGENT 2 3. ASSESSMENT
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4. RESPONSE
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Slate vector processing
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INDUCTIVE LEARNING
• Induce a set of rules for classifying examples from a
large training set.
• Examples
- Chess End Games (IDS Quintan)
— Navigation System Performance (IDS +ANOVA
Belkin and Stengel)
- Medical Diagnosis (IDS, CSADT Mangasarian)
X ^v
DQ D
LJ
u u
0 0
^
Attribute 1
Attribute 2
Attribute 3
Classification
^___j^ Test 1
*^^^ ^^Class 1
 Tes( 2a Tes( 2b
^ \ /N^Jr \ p ^<
Class 1 Class 2 Class 1 Class 2 /
Figure 23.
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TEST SCENARIO
Random Variables
Starling Points
Velocities
Hearings
Maneuver Type
Maneuver Start Time
I'reclieled Maneuver Start Time
Maneuver Rate
Maneuver Duration
Attributes lixiiinined
Init ial Al t i tude Separation
Ini t ia l horizontal separation
Ini t ia l bearing
Range rate
Bearing rale
A/C I maneuver
A/C 2 maneuver
A/C1 predicted start lime
A/C 2 predicted start lime (9)
Climb/Descend
Accelerate/Decelerate
Scenario Classifications
A Pass within 300 m al t i tude, 5 km
laterally in less than 5 mins
I) Puss wi th in 300m and 5km
S Other
Addit ional Attr ibutes
A/C 1 maneuver rale
A/C 2 maneuver rale (11)
A/C I maneuver duration
A/C 2 maneuver duration (13)
Princeton University
Figure 25.
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COMPUTER MODEL REQUIREMENTS
The application must model
• principled negotiation
• decision-making distributed between agents
• option generation and assessment
The application should
• allow different scenarios to be tested
• display the state of the agents and the progress of
negotiations
• allow negotiation behavior to be varied.
• Princeton University
Figure 26.
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Program Structure
En-route scenario
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TrMAs
- Sectors
- Airport
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OBJECT-ORIENTED PROGRAMMING
• "World" consists of objects
• Objects are instances of a class and inherit properties
through the class hierarchy
• Objects encapsulate all the data
• Objects have methods or message-handlers to
manipulate their data
• Objects execute methods in response to messages
received
• Objects can send messages to other objects
• Princeton University
Figure 28.
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OOP AND IAAS
Objects = agents
Class hierarchy AGENT
MAXIMIZER
AIRCRAFT OPERATORS
FULLY PARTIALLY UNEQUIPPED
EQUIPPED EQUIPPED AIRPORT
AIRLINE PRIVATE
OWNER
SATIS:
TrMA
'ICER
SECTOR
TRACON
REGIONAL
AREA
GLOBAL
CONTINENTAL
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PROGRAM STRUCTURE
Controlling C Program
Window
Displays
User
Interlace
Programme
Control
CLIPS Program i
i
Agent
Objects
Declarative Functions
Agent
Expert
System
C Functions for CLIPS \
i
Hybrid EKF
Utility Calculations
Procedural and Reflexive Functions
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CLIPS (C Language Integrated Production System)
• Expert System building tool
• Allows rule-based, procedural, and object-oriented
programming
• Data is stored in slots defined for each class
(defclass AIRCRAFT (is-a MAXIMIZER) (role abstract)
;; When an instance of an aircraft is created, it's name is the aircraft reg.
(slot flight-no (create-accessor read-write) (default AL001))
(slot operator (create-accessor read-write))
(multislot position (create-accessor read-write) (default 0 0 0))
(slot speed (create-accessor read-write) (default 0))
(slot heading (create-accessor read-write) (default 0))
(slot climb-rate (create-accessor read-write) (default 0))
(slot flight-phase (create-accessor read-write) (default at-gate))
;; Allowable values are at-gate, taxi-out, runway-hold,
;; take-off, climb, cruise, descent, landing, taxi-in
(multislot planned-trajectory (create-accessor read-write))
(slot aircraft-type (create-accessor read) (default 8727))
(slot in-sector (create-accessor read-write))
;; Says which sector the aircraft is in
(multislot other-ac (create-accessor read-write))
;; This keeps a record of all the other aircraft that an aircraft is aware of.
• Princeton University 9
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NEGOTIATING EXPERT SYSTEM
• Princeton University 10
Figure 32.
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IAAS Test Bed
Forms Library ^GUI-based user input
C Wrapper
Silicon
Graphics
Indy
Program Control Graphics Routine
Simulation Inputs
Display
Data Inputs
to Clips
Clips 6.0
Retrieval of
inlormation lor C
display
Objects Rule Base
- High-level decision-making
- Search lor options lor mutual gain
- Negotiation
- Functions called as side-effects
Functions
- create maneuvers
- assess options .
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CONCLUSION
SIGNIFICANT INCREASES IN AlR TRAFFIC DliMAND AND DENSITY
ORDER-OF-MAGNITUDE INCREASES IN COMPUTATION AND COMMUNICATION
POTENTIAL FOR CONFLICT BETWEEN AIRBORNE AND GROUND-BASED SYSTEMS
INTEGRATED SYSTEM OF INTELLIGENT (HUMAN AND COMPUTATIONAL) AGENTS
AGENT-SPECIFIC DECLARATIVE, PROCEDURAL, AND REFLEXIVE FUNCTIONS
AIRBORNE ("AUTOCREW") AND GROUND-BASED EXPERT SYSTEMS
"INTERNET IN THE SKY"
PRINCIPLED NEGOTIATION FOR CONFLICT RESOLUTION AND OPTIMAL PERFORMANCE
OBJECT-ORIENTED ANALYSIS, DESIGN, AND IMPLEMENTATION
INDUCTIVE LEARNING FOR DESIGN AND SYSTEM MAINTENANCE
Figure 35.
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PANEL I
PRIORITIES FOR ATM
Chairperson: Mr. Duane McRuer (Consultant)
Panelists: Dr. Richard Pew (Bolt, Beranek and Neuman)
Mr. Jack Ryan (Air Transport Association)
Mr. Robert Schwab (Boeing)
Len Tobias: This panel is "Priorities for ATM," chaired by Duane McRuer. Duane McRuer is an independent
consultant and Chairman of Systems Technology Incorporated. He's the author of over 100 technical papers and has
been involved with applications to over 50 aerospace and land vehicles. His past service on various government and
professional society activities include the following: President of the American Automatic Control Council; Chairman
of the AIAA Technical Committee on Guidance and Control; White House Blue Ribbon Panel on the Space Station
Redesign. He's currently on the NASA Advisory Council and the NCR Aeronautics and Space Engineering Board. He
is a Fellow of AIAA, IEEE, AS, AAS and HFES, and is a member of the National Academy of Engineering.
Duane McRuer: There are a number of key functions for a panel chairman. The first one is to define the theme; the
theme for this particular panel is quite straightforward: ideas on what the key priorities are for advanced air traffic
management systems. Another function of a panel chair is to select panel members to make good that theme. I've been
very fortunate in having three outstanding people coming from three different places with three different perspectives.
Two of them have already been introduced and they've given past remarks. Jack Ryan has a long career background in
both the FAA and now with the ATA; he brings a lot of experience and perspective in what's happened in the past and
hopes for the future. Bob Schwab from Boeing will give us a perspective based upon the airframe manufacturers who
have to fit into this system, and thus have an enormous impact upon it. Dr. Richard Pew is a research psychologist with
many years of experience in dealing with large-scale systems, including air traffic management systems.
There are two fundamental requirements for advanced ATM or air traffic management systems. The first is simply to
accommodate the fleets; the second is to enhance system safety. As to the accommodation of the fleets, let's put some
quantitative notes on that. The current international commercial fleet of jet transports was about 9,000 in 1991. In ten
years it's forecast to be on the order of 14,000; in another 15 years about 20,000, with traffic growth projected at up to
about a trillion per decade. So that would mean about 2 trillion in 2000 and 4 trillion by 2020. These numbers stem
primarily from hope, generally from the aircraft manufacturers.
There will be all varieties of airplanes: the commercial fleet, GA, rotorcraft and military, all of which have to be
accommodated simultaneously. There is a somewhat limited common airspace, but an enormously and highly
constrained and capacity-limited terminal area. Even within the terminal area there is extremely limited ground space,
slots at terminals and so on, plus the airport constraints themselves, such as alighting areas. I use that term so as not to
forget that one of the possible ways of expanding existing air terminals is to not use runways; there are vehicles that
don't use runways; for example, rotorcraft. All of this has to be done within the international constraints. So much for
just accommodating those fleets. That's problem number one and a very fundamental requirement.
The second problem is enhancement of system safety. From a user's perspective, safety tends to be measured in absolute
terms; for instance, numbers of accidents or numbers of deaths. Yet as the passenger miles flown each year tend to
double, the accident and incident rate on the passenger mile basis has to be thoroughly modified just because of that
general perception in absolute terms. Now, I'd like to focus on the aspect of system safety that's associated with human
error. I've been in this business for a long time and I cannot recall the number of systems, ideas, and wonderful new bits
of technology that someone was attempting to peddle on the basis that it would improve the pilot's workload or improve
system safety. And in spite of all these things we put on airplanes and into ground systems, the proportion of accidents
and incidents that are ultimately attributed to "human error" has remained constant. It has to be improved.
In enhancing system safety we have to be able to adapt constantly to the installation of new technology systems,
somehow or other keeping the proportion of human errors down. I sometimes support that some systems are designed to
maximize human error rather than to minimize, when considering human error at all phases of the life-cycle: from initial
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design of the software through the user's application. There is the constant problem of human automation interaction;
the training; the level of currency; the fact that were fundamentally often operating on the margins, yet training more for
the nominal. There's not a whole lot of attention paid to that most important set of events which happens when human
error is manifested, i.e., when the human is coping with the unexpected or the unanticipated.
These two problems introduce a couple of challenges. The first one is the seamless improvement of overall ATM
performance within an ever-changing system. The second is determining what functions are likely to be needed to come
close to accommodating any of these needs. We certainly must have a very high degree of detection of collision
potential; conflict detection, avoidance and resolution; surveillance; and blunder detection and resolution. And then
there are details like automated digital data and voice communications. By virtue of the fundamental need to enhance
safety and performance, there is the need for a multi-redundant system in which all components degrade gracefully; that
is, degrade in such a way that absolute safety is preserved. Most of the visions for these systems tend to a globally-
distributed joint space- and ground-based system. In the future these inevitably will appear as revolutionary, but will
have to be accomplished in relatively small quantum jumps with careful demonstrations and pilot programs graduating
into a graceful introduction into the system.
There are going to be some major technology-driven shifts, such as introduction of GPS applications, where the whole
set of functions or subsystems can be dropped pretty gracefully into place. These might be fairly easy. Some of the
more profound ones, like overall system changes involving a distributed combined space- and ground-based system
where everything has to work at once will be much more difficult to effect. It will place an enormous emphasis upon the
system architecture which will have to be extraordinarily flexible and permissive of the seamless introduction of new
subsystems which right now may not be capable of any current definition. We'll never get to the place where we can list
all of the requirements in complete detail as has been called for once or twice at this conference.
Jack Ryan: The first and absolutely foremost priority is to resolve the roles of NASA and FAA with regards to ATM. If
we all leave this conference with a large list of projects and tasks to do, arguably some which we think FAA should do
and some which NASA should do, and some which have some overlap, we cannot proceed with the assumption that
NASA has the key role in ATM. It will then be screwed up, not because NASA is doing it, but because there are two
entities, who will believe that it's their responsibility. That is not going to work. It is not a case of whether FAA can do
it better or whether NASA can do it better.
Let me read you a definition: air traffic control refers to the tactical safety separation service that prevents collisions
between aircraft and between aircraft and obstructions. The term traffic flow management refers to the process that
allocates traffic flows to scarce capacity resources. The term air traffic management is the composite process ensuring
the safe, efficient and expeditious movement of aircraft. Air traffic control and traffic flow management are components
of the air traffic management process. Given those definitions, it is without a doubt that all of those responsibilities fall
within the purview of the FAA, unless a new law is passed pretty soon. Now the FAA may not know what it doesn't
know, but I know that this is the FAA's responsibility.
Now, does that mean that NASA has no role in this? If you listened to me the other day you know that that's not true.
This is not a case of taking sides on my part, but a case of delineating responsibility so the job gets done. Human nature
being what it is, NASA can write reports, all of which will be wonderful, to the point, and suggest the best priorities,
techniques and procedures. But the implementor is the FAA, whose job is implementing both air traffic control, flow
management, certification of avionics, and the actual acceptance of what the ATM system will be in the United States,
and if they do not accept NASA's work in this area, then it's all for naught. I want the ATM system to move forward; it
cannot move forward in this divided state that I believe it is in now.
So I suggest that this afternoon a NASA official address this issue and how they intend to deal with it. I'm making these
remarks as a government outsider from the user community who knows that we cannot leave here with the possibility of
NASA and the FAA working on ATM in separate directions. So, as I said yesterday, if we are to move forward in this
time of diminishing government budgets and tight fiscal policy, we must encourage NASA and FAA to pool their
resources both fiscally, and more important, intellectually. FAA must be the manager of the overall ATM project. FAA
and NASA have to agree on their relationship and roles and get on with the work. It seems to me that if there is some
concern about FAA's ability to manage large systems, of which ATM is one, then perhaps we should ask that there be an
oversight group to ensure that all the various projects be pulled together in a meaningful way.
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Bob Schwab: I would like to address what I think are priorities for ATM. The first one relates to what Duane said: the
demand-driven notion of ATM in the future. Demand fundamentally drives the capacity, productivity and safety of the
system that we're talking about. We must focus on how we will support that level of operation. Duane talked about the
safety implications of a lot more operations; there's a capacity implication as well. We need to shift our thinking from
demand management, which has been the way we've approached system growth for a long time, toward the generation of
more real new capacity in the system. That involves a lot of tough technical problems, involving a number of airports
that we talked about; the amount of concrete that there is; physics of wake vortices.
One of the things we haven't talked about is the notion of getting visual type separations under instrument conditions, an
area to which NASA could contribute. The other question is the issue of productivity as it relates to demand. If we
think of productivity in terms of an airplane and how long it takes an airplane to achieve a flight, it's startling because we
really have not gotten any more productive in this industry. If you look at an OAG schedule, you'll see that a flight
between Seattle and San Francisco has taken something like 20% longer in ten years. We put a lot of technology onto
new airplanes, but we haven't realized any productivity gains from the investment. That drives utilization and the cost of
ownership, which is a dominant issue for the carriers. We need to take the approach that technology is pushing us in a
lot of directions, but we need to focus on the technology with the most leverage. We need to move from what we call a
technology push to a requirements pull research environment in which we can sort out and prioritize the technology that
gives us the most leverage.
We need to identify new operational concepts. We tend to work in terms of what I call replacement technology which
doesn't give us full leverage or productivity gains. I was startled at a FANS-2 meeting when an argument erupted over
whether an ADS controller is a radar controller or a procedural controller. This issue has not been worked out to this
day: we're still arguing about whether ADS reporting will generate distance base or time base separation. Those kind of
issues need to be worked early if we're going to get the benefit out of the technology that we're investing in.
We need to establish what I'll call value engineering in the system. I know this is in the strategic plan of the FAA, and I
think it's very important that we establish stable operational metrics to tell us how well we're doing. Capacity is an
example of such a measure. What is the capacity of our system or of an individual airport? We have a national program
to limit flows when we exceed capacity. How well does that program work and how much of the time? We don't have
the visibility or the feedback to know how well it's working. Delay is another example. We have NASCOM-reported
delay: 15 minutes delay against schedule. The problem is that it's not a stable measure. Delay measure has in itself
delay built into it; the yardstick is changing with delay in the system. It's not a stable measure. Free flight is important,
but we need to identify a metric to let us know whether we have success or not. If the current system has circuitry or
excess routing of 2%, we need to set a target and a measure of progress to the goal. I would maintain that metrics like
these also lead us toward developing the requirements for the future system.
Next is better integration of airborne and ground capabilities. We need to fully exploit what the airplane can do. We
need to make use of the fact that the airplane has different kinds of information than the ground system has. We talked
about ADS and reporting intervals. What we need to remember both ADS strengths and weaknesses compared to radar.
One of the strengths is intent or interloop information about what's happening in the onboard system, not only position
but velocity and acceleration. This gives you a lead on what's going to happen to that airplane over what you can see off
a radar screen which is differencing successive position fixes. You can do a lot of things with that kind of information.
We're moving into this world of GPS and ADS; where's the operational concept and what are we going to get out of this
technology? Part of the beauty of GPS is that everybody can afford to have it in the system. But what are we going to
realize with that? What operational concept is driving us toward that conclusion?
Systems engineering is facing some difficult problems; for example, AAS; a failure-critical distributed system with the
need for provable software and a good human interface.
The last area is separation standards and methods. We need to have a better understanding of how we separate and what
is safe separation in the system. We need to understand the differences between IFR and VFR, radar and procedural
control, and we need to develop ways to predict what that separation needs to be. The problem now is to know how long
will it take to realize the benefit of new technology on the airplane or on the ground. A" excellent area with high
leverage that NASA could address is the understanding of the cues, information, and displays that the pilot has when
flying visual separation, and what allows that operation to be safe at 1,000 feet or less in VMC versus the much larger
separation in IMC.
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Richard Pew: I want to pick up where Bob left off. It's a good thing that human factors have been getting good press at
this meeting. You can tell vehicles to stop on a railroad or on highways, but in the air there is no stopping and so you
have to have positive control. It's very important to design controllers' workstations so that they're easy to use and so
that the controller's workload is manageable. It's also very important to design the cockpit and to introduce automation
in a way that preserves situation awareness and manages workload realistically.
We need to address alternative concepts of operations early. We often say that if you get human factors into the process
early, you can make orders of magnitude changes in effectiveness, whereas if you get in late and only are looking at the
display layout and the human-computer interaction component of the systems, you can only make small percentage
improvements. We need to impact this system early, at the stage of concept of operation. The concept of operations
must bring together the hardware, software, and people. Controllers, air crew, passengers, dispatchers, meteorologists,
training pilots and training controllers, control center management, and airline management all have a stake and thus
have a role in influencing the concept of operations that will be adopted.
The air traffic management system is certainly not unique, but it involves an unusual amount of time-constrained,
distributed information transfer. Geographical distribution makes the need for communication extensive. Real-time
operation produces constraints, both from the point of view of the controllers and from the point of view of maximizing
the efficiency and the performance of flights. And ATM deals with information, not data. I think of information as data
that is placed in a knowledge context. We want to design in order to maximize the information transfer to the
operational personnel.
When it comes to evaluating alternative concepts, I think of analysis, modeling, simulation and field trials. Bob
emphasized the notion that we need econometric analysis and models; we also need models that help optimize the goals
of the air traffic system from the point of view of the operator. I believe that high level models typically do not treat
people realistically, but as black boxes with postulated nominal performance. But you cannot get realistic views of the
impact of a particular concept of operations without considering human performance capacities and limitations in
considerable detail.
Then at the next level, we should consider using simulation to evaluate operability. The Army's SIMNET is no longer
only a training system for personnel; it is also a system development strategy by which they postulate new designs and
try them out in a networked simulation environment involving large numbers simulated vehicles. There certainly are a
lot of aircraft simulators around the country as well as air traffic control center simulations. It should be possible to add
a box to those simulations that would allow them to be networked, and thus conduct experiments that would support
validation of alternative concepts of operations.
We've talked about improving the system reliability, but I want to highlight graceful degradation from the point of view
not only of the systems components but also of the human components. When controllers are in the position of system
monitor rather than active controller, the job changes. Since they will still provide backup in case of system difficulties,
they need to be given the necessary information and they need to be comfortable with the backup job. This may also
mean that we need to use more training based on simulation rather than on on-the-job performance. That isn't quite so
important in a fully operational mode, but in a surveillance and monitoring mode, it becomes more important to be able
to train for the events that happen so infrequently that skills are lost; that is, skill maintenance training. In concepts of
operations, it's not enough just to study the nominal, the off nominal needs to be studied as well.
Duane McRuer: These systems are in many ways among the most non-linear systems that have ever come to be
developed. My late colleague, Dunson Graham, and I once propounded a law: given a non-linear system, there is an
input or set of circumstances that will screw it up.
Bob Simpson: I'm hoping that NASA and FAA combine resources and work the way they have worked in the past. I
agree that the implementation responsibility lies with the FAA. What I'd love to see is researchers who can look at
alternatives without getting involved in the politics whether something is a real proposal or concept. In the end the FAA
will have to pick it up and NASA people have to fade away. What we do need to do is make sure that there is a meeting
of the minds as to what the two agencies are going to do and how they're going to have some oversight steering
committee that allows them to work together. If there's anything that raises hackles on a NASA researcher, it's an FAA
guy telling him what he should be researching and what he shouldn't. And if there's anything that would raise hackles in
FAA headquarters it's NASA trying to tell the FAA what concept it should be implementing. We don't want them in
those roles.
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Duane McRuer: I think in many ways any inter-agency conflicts will turn out to be a tempest in a tea pot. We'll see how
big the tea pot is.
Question (Howard Mortazavian, UCLA): Other issues aside, purely technical problems are quite significant. The
fundamental theoretical problems that exist in coordinating concurrent processes are real and some of them are unsolved.
In other words, theoretically we don't really know how to do real time distributed control, coordination, and
communication. Formal mathematical modeling beyond econometrics, and definition of the new controlled and
coordination concepts that are needed, will remain research problems of great significance and great interest to us in
academia, independent of which particular system would be adopted.
Question (Dick Taylor, Boeing Company): I think there's a great need for improved displays. These affect both
improved safety and increased capacity. For example, in today's system, each morning a determination is made on how
many airplanes can be accepted at each airport due to weather. When the weather is CAVU throughout the United States
there are no limitations on acceptance rates. Then when a pilot flies to an airport, he can see the runway and alerted
traffic, and he's cleared for the visual. What difference does it make in IFR conditions? We have the ability today to
create a data base to allow the pilot to see the runway in 3-D with a suitable display. Likewise we could show the other
airplane, whose location is known by TCAS today, ADS tomorrow. He could be cleared for the "visual". So I think we
ought to strive for a concept of operation that emulate today's VFR system. It would go a long way toward improving
capacity, and good displays would go a long way toward improving safety. There are many organizations doing work on
3D displays; I know there's active work going on at Stanford. But I haven't seen any NASA or FAA programs with 3D
displays as one of the important elements. I would encourage that in the research agenda.
Today you can buy a CD ROM from the Defense Mapping Agency which defines the terrain in the North American
continent at 90 meter centers. A cockpit doesn't have to know that precisely in most of the flight regime, but you can
certainly portray what's above the timberline and show it brown, decide what in the winter time has snow on it, and put a
snow cap on the mountains. And you can show on a TV tube today what the terrain looks like outside the cockpit.
When you look at the display from this one CD ROM and the accompanying software, you're startled with the realism.
So it's not difficult for me to see in our cockpits a display of where the airport is, where the other traffic is, and where the
ground is.
Controlled flight into terrain (CFIT) accidents still are the predominant killer of people world-wide. GPS is going help
that, because there's more information than with NDB or VOR/DME. But when terrain is brought into the picture, all
the elements are in the cockpit for solving the CFIT problem. Now, I didn't mean to describe a solution to this problem,
but to say that it's easy to visualize this making a big difference in how we construct the system.
Remark: Russ Parish's group at Langley is doing some work on 3D large-panel stereo displays; he's looking at both 3D
and non-3D alternatives for just this kind of application.
Duane McRuer: Similarly there's helicopter nap-of-the-earth work here at Ames in which the digital map has been used
effectively.
Question (Barry Scott, FAA at NASA Ames): Jack, given your experience with ATC system, do you consider the
concept of free flight as we've talked about here as a revolutionary change or an evolutionary change in the way the FAA
would do business?
Jack Ryan: As the RTCA committee defined it, free flight is a contract-free process with no ATC clearance other than to
takeoff, and to land; the ability to climb, descend, and turn are generally unhampered. You don't need an ATC
clearance. I would say that is pretty revolutionary. One of the things NASA should look is how often ATC would need
to intervene due to an overlapping hockey puck as a function of dynamic density. Would that happen so often so as to
cause one wish to return to the previous system, in which changes in flight were cleared with ATC? The ultimate in free
flight is pretty revolutionary.
Question (John O'Brien, Airline Pilots Association): I was certainly glad to hear the comment concerning improved
display. There are some significant holes that need to be corrected prior to getting into, for example, free flight in which
cockpit display of traffic will be an important instrument. Today targets frequently drop out and the system is not usable
with foreign aircraft and certain domestic cargo aircraft that are exempt from TCAS.
One of the things that continues to worry me is a lack of an effective research plan within this country related to the next
ATM system. Within the ATA, within SAE, and now within RTCA, there is an effort to focus further research. But
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there isn't a plan that I'm aware of how to get from A to B. We can't do business as we have done up until now. We
can't bring in human factors at the end of a program and sprinkle it like salt over a program and expect to have either an
effective or inexpensive result. And that goes back to a very basic thing: we need to change the way engineering is
taught in this country so that human factors studies are effectively incorporated into engineering.
I think the funding system needs to be changed in this country. In Japan everyone knows that 50 years is short-term
planning. Here our planning is basically day-to-day. That's a bit of an exaggeration, but it seems to me almost true.
Until we change the way our research is funded I think we're going to spend more money on research than would
otherwise be necessary, and we'll perhaps get a less effective product. In the free flight area, we're really concerned
about getting a CDTI or equivalent and adequate information that will help us participate in the program. In 1982
NASA basically closed down its CDTI efforts. I hope that work will perhaps be dusted off and completed.
All of us involved in commercial aviation are well aware of the blood that our companies are losing, and we are trying to
find an way to make the system more effective; certainly free flight may be a way to do that. But we need clear
responsibilities and explicit guidance concerning where ground responsibilities stop and where flight deck
responsibilities start.
Duane McRuer: Long observation at meetings like this indicate that there are two issues that come up in human factors.
The first thing that occurs most commonly is: what the hell is it? The second thing is: we ought to have more of it and
engineers ought to know more about it. I think it's an interesting point that one of former Professor Pew's, early doctoral
students worked on a very elegant and fundamental dissertation on predictive displays. That doctoral student until about
two years ago just happened to be the Chief Engineer of Boeing. So I think that human factors training among engineers
has certainly been improved.
Question (Milt Adams, Draper Lab): Anyone who looks at the OAG knows that there are probably more flights at
certain times of the day for certain airports than can be accommodated by this system when the weather degrades even
marginally. The FAA is in the unenviable position of allocating this scarce resource, the landing slots at airports. I think
that perhaps in an effort to avoid problems among the airlines, the FAA allows this overscheduling or overbooking at the
airports which in the end can produce built-in system delays. I would suggest that someone look into following what
Rob Stengel was talking about, some kind of a negotiation or auction process. Although I know this has been tried in a
strategic sense and not been accepted before, it's not to say that it can't be done better and/or applied tactically, in real
time. That's part of the long-term problem. There's a near-term problem, ground-hold planning. Is this sort of research a
priority to anyone?
Remark: I think what you're getting at is that we ought to have a higher level strategic view. The military has plans 24
hours ahead and then they turn over their plan to the operations folk. The operations folk change that plan as needed in
order to accommodate the specifics of the operation. So when we get more global information available about the ACT
system as well as better communication among the organizations, you could look at the weather and make modification
to the plans for the day. Some of this is done today, but we could do it on a more formal and strategic basis.
Remark: You guys are beginning to get me scared. We think that the FAA does entirely too much strategic planning
with regards to the movement of every airplane in the system today. You know that users of the air traffic control
system are probably the most regulated in the world; the wheel cannot turn a tenth of an inch without getting approval
from the federal government, whether it's air traffic control or flight standards. This is the second time in the last two
days that somebody mentioned the number of scheduled departures at an airport, terminal airspace being a scarce
commodity and creating delays. The statistics that the FAA publishes indicate that 67% of delays are a result of weather.
Some other portion of those delays have to do with terminal and enroute capacity.
There's a higher crossover between weather and terminal capacity. It's the difference between, for instance, scheduling
100 airplanes into O'Hare at five o'clock when in VMC conditions you can land 105. There's no problem. That's
because you're using visual separation and you're landing on three runways. You cannot do that when it's 200 feet
ceiling and a half mile visibility; you can only use two runways and so the capacity is 78. The rightful FAA action in
that situation is a ground delay program that will immediately delay 27 airplanes in the first hour. If there are another
100 in the next hour, there will be a backlog of 49 airplanes.
I think we certainly recognize that if, in fact, there is an overcommitment airport resources for departures, we're not
going to lay blame on the FAA for a delay in the queue. I don't think it's as big a dilemma as one would think, and it's
certainly not one that I want the FAA to get more strategic on. I certainly don't want any federal air regulations added to
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the four high density airports where we actually do have slot allocation programs: LaGuardia, Washington National,
Kennedy, and O'Hare. I don't think the ATC system is in any kind of trouble that would dictate that needs to be done.
The most important thing to remember is that the FAA's air traffic flow management system always operates with safety
in mind; it will never overload the system.
Remark: The thrust of the remark was efficiency. If the airlines are interested in reducing costs by reducing the amount
of time people sit on the ground, then they can look at planning in a slightly different way. That's all.
Remark: The people who do the cost benefit analysis at airlines, a separate department from marketing, have obviously
figured out that if you taxi 20 airplanes when you can only move 10 or 12, and that results in a 10 or 12-minute delay, it's
more efficient for the airline to do that than to reschedule along with their competitors.
Remark: The Europeans have a lot less capacity than we do. They have a meeting once every 90 days or so to allocate
slots throughout their system. Still, when things heat up in their system as it did a couple years ago, the whole system
almost comes to a grinding halt with enormous delays. The capacity is used up. You can only employ that strategy for
so long. That's not the answer for the long term when you consider the growth rates we're predicting. The answer has to
be more capacity in the system or people are going to leave airplanes and start taking trains.
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PANEL n
POTENTIAL CONTRIBUTIONS OF NASA TO ATM
Chairperson: Dr. J. Victor Lebacqz (NASA Ames)
Panelists: Dr. Clyde Miller (FAA)
Dr. Herman Rediess (Consultant)
Dr. Victor Riley (Honeywell)
Dr. Phil Smith (The Ohio State University)
Vic Lebacqz: I am the Deputy Chief of the Flight Management and Human Factors Division at Ames. I'm going to talk
a little bit about that division as part of my opening remarks. I'm also Greg Condon's Deputy on an interagency
integrated product team to develop the requirements for new research and technology developments by NASA for next
generation air transportation management systems. At the moment the FAA membership has not been defined for a
variety of reasons.
This division at NASA Ames is part of the reorganization that was directed by our new Center Director, Dr. Ken
Munechika. That took place officially in October with a new Director of Aeronautics, Mr. John Burks. The division is
basically a combination of two previous divisions at NASA Ames. One was the Flight Systems and Simulation
Research Division. It was combined with the Aerospace Human Factors Research Division. The purpose of the
combination was to provide a focus and a stronger ability to concentrate on airspace operation systems research. Air
transportation management is one such kind of research. The thought is that bringing human factors disciplines into
conjunction with the engineering and systems disciplines that existed in the Flight Systems Division would provide us
with a lot more leverage and strength in that arena.
There really is no question about NASA's role in human factors. John O'Brien gave a really good talk yesterday about
the goal of a new ATM system being to enhance safety and spoke about the importance of human factors, indicating that
no organization is better equipped to perform human factors research than NASA. This was seconded by my panel
colleague, Dr. Miller. So I don't think there's too much of an issue there.
I do want to address something Clyde's colleague, Neil Planzer, said or at least implied. There was an implication
yesterday - and I would not want you to leave believing that implication - that NASA consists of a bunch of Ph.D.s, "a
bunch of Ph.D.s sitting in their offices or laboratories," the implication being that there is no connection to the real
world. That is inaccurate and inappropriate, especially in the area of human factors. People who have done applied
operational human factors research at NASA Ames, in particular, have been hired into important positions in the
operational community, which may be one measure by which one would judge that sort of thing. The people who are
here now doing operational human factors research are intimately linked with all the operational communities. I would
not want you to go away thinking that there are within NASA a bunch of academics who sit in their ivory tower
unconnected to the real world.
I want you to understand that at this NASA research center in this area of work we are extremely concerned with the
operational community; that's the way we do our work. The next step is to sort out whether, in fact, we are trying to start
with a "clean sheet of paper" here. I would like you to remember that the FAA and NASA have been working together
in civil aviation for a long time. Almost a quarter of a century ago there was a joint DOT-NASA study on civil aviation
research and development policy. We were trying to develop policy then to sort out the critical research agendas for
both agencies. That is in a sense what we are trying to do now again. We are not starting from a blank sheet of paper;
we're not starting as if neither agency knows how to work together. We've been doing it for a long time. We just have to
work through some minor roadblocks.
The purpose of this IPT and this workshop is to help develop a road map to get from where we are to requirements in a
way that's appropriate for the two agencies as well as the industry that we work with. You might consider the ATM
system as a market-driven system. Problems in the markets or new needs of the market produce requirements. Those
requirements produce the need to look at alternate concepts. The critical emphasis is alternate concepts or options to
meet those requirements. Each alternate concept requires technologies and human factors assessment of those
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technologies. With those technologies one can then produce new systems. The technologies and the human factors
assessments can be turned into new systems that have new capabilities, which then produce market increases. The
market then tells us if more problems have developed. Of course, the capabilities have a cost as well as a benefit to the
market. The issue is what the benefit/cost benefit ratio is.
Now I want to use this model, which is, in fact, the basis for how we will do studies of what a new ATM system should
look like, to indicate one way that we might consider appropriate roles for the three major blocks of players. You might
consider that in the arena of the markets and the requirements, the critical players are the operators and the industry that
supports them. This is the part you're worrying about if you are Boeing or United Airlines; you're discovering problems
and you're trying to define requirements to solve those problems. Those requirements have a variety of conceptual
solutions to them; there is not necessarily one best solution. That's what NASA does. That's what our charter is: to
develop technologies and to assess technologies. We do not build systems. We develop technologies, assess them, and
then hand them over to whoever the customer is. In the case of an aeronautical technology it might go right back to the
industry. In the case of an airspace operations system technology it goes to the FAA and they decide whether they want
to build and operate that system. There is no question about the fact that the FAA builds the airspace operation systems,
the air transportation management systems, and operates air transportation management systems. NASA doesn't do that.
But we develop the technologies from which they can select.
We've got four perfect panelists to address this problem. We have Dr. Clyde Miller, who represents the FAA and can
give the FAA's perspective on what NASA ought to be doing. We have an industry person in Dr. Vic Riley. We have
an academic person in Dr. Phil Smith. And then we have consultant Dr. Herm Rediess, who has something like 25 years
of experience with NASA.
Clyde Miller has an undergraduate degree from Cornell and a Ph.D. from State University of New York at Buffalo.
Clyde is the Manager of the Research Division in the Aviation Research Service of the Federal Aviation Administration.
He is responsible for the strategic management of the FAA R&D program, including fostering collaboration with
industry, with universities, with us and with other government agencies. Clyde managed the development and
implementation of TCAS for a number of years .
Clyde Miller: Let me provide a perspective on how we're thinking in FAA these days. A good benchmark for that is a
book that George Donahue suggested we read when he came to town: "Third Generation Research and Development"
by Roussel. This book addresses the management of the research and development investment. First generation R&D is
a matter of giving researchers resources and waiting until they produce something. That is an early form of managing
research. The second generation research and development management approach is holding R&D people responsible
for something. You require a plan describing what they're going to do by which you know whether or not they're
making progress. There's nothing that requires the plan to be relevant to anything, but the plan gives the bean counters a
better feeling that the researchers are being held responsible. Third generation research and development is a matter of
rationally managing your research and development investment in accordance with your strategic plan, your business
plan, and your customer's requirements. It requires you to be deliberate in making your R&D investments. It requires
you to hold yourself responsible for managing the scarce dollars that are available. And it requires you to think of these
investments as though you were investing your own money, hoping to get it back in the employee profit sharing program
from the terrific new products that will be generated as a result of the research.
The context of third generation research and development investment management is that resources are scarce. We live
in a resource-poor environment. If we're losing our leadership in aviation, as some have complained we have, it may be
because we haven't used our resources wisely. In FAA today we are putting a lot of emphasis on managing our research
and development investments. And believe me resources are scarce. We all need to recognize that we're in a very tough
resource environment and it's very important how we make our research and development investments. Investments that
don't make sense aren't going to survive, even if we agree that it would be swell to go off and do the work.
Let's address the notion that NASA would spend several hundred million dollars over, say, five years on a next
generation air traffic management system. Is that a good research and development investment? The answer is no: it is
not a good research and development investment. If there are several hundred million dollars available, and they are not
in FAA, I assure you, we need them for the current generation air traffic management system, not for the next. We don't
need to go off and think up a lot of new technologies for air traffic management. Technology is falling on us like bricks
in the air traffic management business today, and we're challenged to pick them up and make something out of them that
meets the user requirement.
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What's needed? Free flight. It's that easy. We don't need to form a national partnership to find out. The national
partnership has met, it's working actively and it's very clear on what's wanted; there's very little disagreement about it.
The international community has been working for a decade on the bases of free flight: GPS, data link, automatic
dependent surveillance, and the new technologies for precision approaches, GPS or MLS. So where's the challenge? It's
in automation. Free flight is about automation. It's about this flying hockey puck. It's the details of automation that will
let aircraft fly when and where they want without having their hands tied by the air traffic control system.
We just need to figure out how to do it, a matter of having a robust automation capability. We, as a research community,
do not understand automation well. We've made a few things automatic in aircraft, which is clever, but it hasn't been
very useful in terms of being compatible with the air traffic management system. Flight crews certainly are not
unanimous in their support of the automation they find in their cockpits. And we haven't really begun to automate things
on the ground.
I'm very pleased and proud of the work that Heinz Erzberger and Dallas Denery and the other folks at Ames have done
on CTAS. The CTAS warriors here at Ames and their confederates in the FAA have achieved results that we've never
achieved before. But be objective about it. The fact is we've accomplished very little. CTAS is not in operation. And
that's not because the FAA can't get a contract out the door. It's not finished. We've had it in the lab for eight years. We
have some initial operational capability at Denver, which is good. But eight years for a little bit of operational capability
at Denver doesn't show us that we're making great progress in learning how to automate the ground system.
We can't go about free flight this way. I expect that the automation that is required for free flight will be head and
shoulders above the arrival planning tools that we're implementing in CTAS. The flying hockey pucks that let the
aircraft do what they would do will be much more difficult to implement than CTAS. It's hopeless to expect to build this
capability using what Dallas described as a "build a little, test a little" approach in the operational environment. We'll
never get there. That's the only way we know to automate the air traffic control system. It's not going to work. We'll be
here 30 years from now talking about free flight.
We need to learn how to design, integrate, and validate air traffic management automation across the cockpit, the FAA
air traffic management facility and the airline operational control capability. We haven't demonstrated that we know
how to automate in a timely way, and we're not going to go very far in free flight until we do. One barrier to our success
is we've never been successful. We don't know what success looks like. We don't know what it takes. I think that very
few of us have tried to think it through to understand what it takes so that we can plan for it and carry it out in a timely
way. I suspect that part of what it takes is a large-scale air traffic management simulation facility about the size of this
room, perhaps larger, that none of us has. Human factors is certainly a prerequisite for achieving automation. I'm very
happy to see that all human factors work has been pulled together into one organization at Ames.
Being a leader in research is a matter of doing good work, doing it well, publishing and applying the results, and having
the discipline to put aside low yield, low priority initiatives like ATMX. We have our plates full with more than any of
us can do with things that dearly need to be done. Let us get on with them.
Vic Lebacqz: Herman Rediess has a Ph.D. from MIT. Herman has 25 years of experience with NASA, five of it in
NASA Headquarters. While he was at Headquarters he was Manager of the Controls in Human Factors Program. He
has 12 years in industry. He is now a consultant providing test and evaluation support, aerospace technology
assessments and systems concept definition, including air transportation systems concepts.
Herman Rediess: I'd like to comment on three areas: some general comments on NASA research and technology role,
some suggestions of research areas, and a few comments on the NASA/FAA relationship. First of all, in a general
context, I believe that NASA should emphasize research and technology options. NASA has excellent research and
technology capabilities: people, facilities, analysis tools, and simulations. Particular technical strengths are: human
factors; guidance and controls (from a systems application standpoint, not from a device standpoint); automation
technologies; and, most importantly, the coupling of all of those disciplines. Some excellent examples of NASA
research and technology are: research into human errors in the aviation systems, metrics for evaluating technology
options and applications and effectiveness analyses of such candidate applications. I think the CTAS was a particularly
good example of a project performed in concert with FAA and the aviation community, and being carried out to a field
testing state.
If there is high priority need for a systems engineering approach to the whole ATM system and an operational concept
definition, I don't think that's an area where NASA should take the lead. Contributing to that would be fine, but the part
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of NASA performing ATM research and technology is not into large scale systems analysis and engineering. Research
and technology options should be explored by NASA in partnership with FAA, industry, the aviation community
representatives, and the universities. My observations are that NASA does this very well.
In regards to suggested research are,as, I'd like to start with a set of recommendations that were made in a study a couple
of years ago and published in a document called "Aeronautical Technologies for the 21st Century." This was a year-long
study sponsored by the National Research Council Aeronautics Space and Engineering Board. The document is
available from the National Academy Press, 2101 Constitution Ave., N.W. Washington, D.C. 20418. It covers all the
disciplines of aeronautics, but I'd like to focus on the section dealing with cognitive engineering and mention some of the
challenges that were put forth in there.
First of all, NASA should analyze all available data on aircraft accidents and incidents to determine the history and trend
of human errors, contributing factors, the type of equipment involved, and other relevant matters. NASA should conduct
broad-based interdisciplinary research into the causes, nature, and alleviation of human error with specific reference to
airborne and ATM environments. The most promising theories and experiments, dealing with human error, should then
be pursued as part of a continuing long-range effort aimed at near perfection in the accident reduction. NASA's research
in accident reduction should include systems that can detect developing critical situations independent of the crew's
alertness and can inform and assist the crew regarding appropriate corrective measures. NASA should develop
prototypes of massively smart interfaces, both in the simulator and in the air to gain experience within the industry and
to demonstrate the technology to the industry. And lastly, NASA should work with FAA to address the total human
system concept and develop valid and reliable systems operations. NASA should extend its investigations of highly
reliable avionics to total system concepts applicable to ATM automation with FAA involvement. NASA should
contribute to the coordination of the multi-agency effort, such as the high performance computing initiative with the
overall objective of improving the reliability of software for very large systems.
With respect to the "free flight" concept or the "user preferred routes", research into the protected and alert zones is an
important area of NASA contribution, because of NASA's tools, simulations, and modeling capability.
From the attendance at this workshop, it would appear that air transports are the only users of the national airspace. I
understand that AOPA (Aircraft Owners and Pilots Association) representatives were invited to participate, but they
could not make it. I know NASA has worked closely with the General Aviation and Commuter industry in the past and
has addressed their important issues as well as those of the airline industry. I encourage NASA to include all elements of
aviation in their research and technology planning. It is unfortunate that the U.S. does not have a commuter aircraft
manufacturing industry that can advocate research and technology for their unique problems. I understand that the lack
of such advocacy makes it difficult for NASA to get funding to support Commuter and General Aviation research and
technology. I hope that NASA will address the needs of all users of the national airspace when formulating an expanded
ATM research and technology program, particularly when it comes to safety issues.
One final comment on the NASA/FAA rift we have seen at this workshop. If the relationship between NASA and FAA
is broken, I suspect it's primarily at the headquarters level, fix it! This area is too important to the flying public and it's
too resource-limited for there to be dissension between the two most important agencies. Certainly Congress is not
going to approve some new ATMX program that NASA might sponsor if FAA isn't an integral part of developing the
vision of what that should be. The loser will be the whole aviation community if that goes in that direction.
Vic Lebacqz: Dr. Vic Riley from Honeywell has a Ph.D. in Experimental Psychology from the University of Minnesota.
He's worked at Honeywell Technology Center for ten years and specializes in human interaction with automation and in
analytic models for system design. He recently chaired a working group under the ATA Human Factors Task Force to
define a research agenda and human factors requirements for data link. I thought it would be useful for him to try to do
the same thing on a somewhat broader scale for us in ATM.
Vic Riley: I'd like first to say a few controversial things about the term "human centered." Then I'd like to say a few
controversial things about the role of the human operator in the system. And finally I'd like to end with a challenge to
NASA.
I'm very concerned about the status of the term "human centered". We've heard it quite a bit in the last couple of days,
and I'm sure you've seen it around quite a bit in reports and presentations. The reason I'm concerned about it is that I'm
afraid it's becoming a buzz word. I'm afraid that it's turning into the 1990s term for human factors. Human factors was
great for a while, then it kind of went downhill for a while. So now we've got a new term for it. I'm concerned because I
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think "human centered" actually has a very specific, important technical meaning. In order to define it, I want to talk
about how we develop systems now, or at least how we have developed them up until now.
Boiling down a system development process into its bare essentials, the first thing we do is figure out what the
operational objectives of the system are and what kinds of operational constraints are posed by the environment in which
it operates. That leads us to a set of operational requirements. From the operational requirements, we develop a set of
functional requirements. This is how the system is actually going to meet the objectives and satisfy the constraints.
From functional objectives, we develop the list of functions that the system is going to perform. That's the actual logical
operation of the system. And from there, finally, we develop the user interface.
Note the role of technology in these steps. The process is essentially a technology-centered one. What that means is that
when it comes time to find human operators to work the system, we first of all end up with a fairly limited population of
people who have the skills and capabilities that initially qualify them for success in operating the system. So our first
task is to find those people who are likely to be good fits within the system. To do this, we've had to devise personnel
selection tools to knock out all those who are not likely to be good fits and keep those who are. But we're not done.
Because a candidate isn't actually qualified to operate the system yet. We still have to shape this person to operate
successfully within the requirements of the system. This is what we call training. If you think of it, training is
essentially the process of shaping the human operator to meet the requirements of the system. The system's been
defined, it has a certain set of needs that the human operator has to satisfy, so we have to shape the operator to meet
those requirements. That's why a technology-centered development process often produces lots of user errors and
imposes all the expense and the time-consuming process of training. And even after you train someone to fit within the
requirements of the system, this person may still revert to old habits and produce operational errors.
Nonetheless, this is really the only way we could develop systems, because until recently the human operator has been
much more flexible and much more adaptable than the technology. I think that's changed. Now we have large screen
visual displays that can support virtually any kind of visual format you'd care to design. We have speech recognition and
speech output devices. We have gesture recognition. We have associate technologies that can potentially recognize user
intentions, recognize user errors, provide assistance in a context sensitive manner. And now I think we're at a stage
where the technology is perhaps more adaptable than the human operator.
So now we can start talking seriously about a human centered design process. Rather than beginning with the functional
requirements and what the technology provides, we can start thinking about, first of all, what are the operators roles and
responsibilities in the system? I want to take a short detour here and say the controversial thing about that, because it
may have occurred to you that we can eliminate human error if we eliminate the human operator. It's a logical step. But
I think the reason we'll never take that is that as long as we feel a need for somebody to blame when things go wrong,
we'll always have a human operator in the system. It's a glib way of putting it, but I think there's some substance behind
it. After all, we can assign fiduciary responsibility for system safety to a human operator, but we can't assign that same
fiduciary responsibility to a machine. The human operator has an intrinsic interest in safety and will do whatever it takes
to maintain it, but a machine won't. And we also recognize that we can never anticipate all the possible failures that
might occur in a system or all the possible conditions under which a system is going to have to be operated; because of
the intrinsic adaptability of a human operator, that person is always going to be there.
So, what is the proper role for that operator? Well, if the operator has fiduciary responsibility for safety, then we should
grant that operator the level of authority over system functions required to satisfy that responsibility. In other words, the
operator must be in charge. As Charlie Billings put it in the "Human-Centered Aviation Automation: Principles and
Guidelines" that he produced here at NASA Ames in 1991, humans must remain in command of flight in air traffic
operations. And the reason for that is to satisfy the operator's fiduciary responsibility toward system safety.
The second guideline is that human operators must remain involved. The reason is that we know from long experience
in human machine studies that people are much better at controlling things than they are at monitoring them. It's very
difficult for a person to sit back and watch a system operate and then jump in from a standing start when things go bad,
because, first of all, it's difficult to anticipate what the dynamic behaviors of the system are going to be. Second, it's
difficult to maintain awareness of everything that's going on when they're not actively involved in the process. So if we
talk about using automation to the fullest extent possible and demoting the human operator to the role of a backup, a
safety valve, that's giving the operator in the worst possible role.
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If we accept the premise that the operator must remain involved in the system, then human operators must be better
informed. That leads me back to the human centered design process.
The process of keeping the human operator informed is essentially one of making sure that the system is designed to
operate logically in the way that best meets the operators expectations. When a pilot, for example, tries to do something
that he hasn't done for several years on a flight management system, it may only take a few keystrokes to accomplish the
function, but it can take a long time to figure out how to do it because he has to go through a trial and error process. It's
not intuitive because the system wasn't designed to operate logically the way the pilot thinks about flying the airplane.
That's why I suggested that the human centered process begins with the operators roles and responsibilities; we then
determine what decisions the operator has to make in operating the system and what tasks the operator has to perform.
From those we develop system functionality, not from operational requirements and functional requirements, but rather
from how the operator has to think about his or her job. And from there, we develop a user interface. Such a system is
likely to operate logically the way the user thinks about his or her responsibilities. .
This is the central point that I want to make about human centered systems and why I think it's different from human
factors. We talk about human factors a lot in terms of displays and controls: making displays intuitive, making control
dynamics easy to apply, all the good ergonomic kinds of things that have to do with the physical relationship between
the operator and the equipment. But human centered goes much deeper. It goes to functionality, to the logical operation
of the system. If we do this right, I think we can greatly reduce training and greatly reduce operational errors. If we
really do it right, we might even be able to eliminate training and eliminate operational errors. That might not seem
realistic - and I'm not sure I believe it is myself- but I think we need to strive for it.
Imagine a console where a new controller sits down for the first time. This person knows how to manage traffic but he
or she does not know how to operate the console. And let's say this person gets maybe five minutes worth of structured
introduction to the functions that are available in the system and how to access them, and then spends maybe two hours
playing with the system in a structured simulation to exercise the capabilities of the system and get acquainted with its
logic. After the end of the two hours, that person is fully qualified to operate the system in the operational environment.
That, to me, is zero training. And I think that's achievable with modern technology.
So the challenge that I would like to pose to NASA is, first of all, to adopt the human centered automation guidelines
that were produced at Ames in 1991, as well as the human centered design philosophy currently being developed by
NASA Langley, and apply them to the development of a truly human centered system concept. One that begins from the
operator's requirements rather than from the system's requirements. One where the system is fit to the operator rather
than, as in current times, where the operator is fit to the system.
I'd like to suggest the following objectives. First, that we adopt a goal that the operator is given the amount of authority
and involvement in system functions that's commensurate with the level of responsibility for safety. And second, that
we aim for zero training and zero operational errors. Again, I don't know whether this is realistic or not; people are
always going to make errors. But as Duane McRuer said a little while ago, the rate of human error in the system has
remained roughly constant. And as the Secretary of Transportation has said, we need to aim for zero accidents, and the
only way we're going to get there is to aim for this. I think we do ourselves a disservice if we do anything less.
Vic Lebacqz: Dr. Phil Smith, is a Professor in the Systems Engineering Department at Ohio State University. He's co-
director of the Cognitive Systems Engineering Laboratory. His research focuses on the design of tools to support
distributed cooperative problem solving and on the human factors issues associated with the design and use of these
tools. In studying these questions in collaboration with people here at Ames, he's been looking at the interactions of
airline dispatchers and airline ATC coordinators with the ATC system.
Phil Smith: I want to say a little bit about the perspective from which we've been approaching this. What we've been
looking at are problems with the existing air traffic management (ATM) from the airline operations control center
perspective, that is the dispatchers, the air traffic control coordinators and other staff from the airlines who deal with the
ATC system and with the flight crews in trying to both efficiently and safely run their airlines. First of all, although
we've talked about the need to be user centered, and there have been a number of good efforts in that direction, the
airline operations control community has been largely left out of much of this process. I'd like to suggest that this is one
of the user communities that is critical to involve more than we have in the past as we move toward concepts such as free
flight.
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As an illustration of this, our last focus group was on November 15th, the date that the FAA announced the new phased
in expansion of the NRP. The people who are most directly affected by that in an operational sense, the controllers and
other people within the ATC system, the flight crews and the operations control people at the airlines, were for the most
part we're unaware that this was coming. We have to be careful. We've been leaving out an important part of the
community in terms of some of these types of planning activities, and we need their input as well as that of other system
users.
Second, we heard about the CTAS system and its potential for reducing separation minima and automated sequencing
and spacing, producing higher capacities in low visibility. Clearly that's a critical component in terms of improving the
system. But we also have to be worried about policies and procedures. Free flight is an example of what amounts to a
policy and procedure change. Much traditional human factors work has been looking at the interactions of one
individual with technology. In contrast, within the ATM system we have a distributed cooperative system, in which a
number of people have to work in cooperation and coordination. That's really a new human factors challenge, one that
the research community has only begun to address. CRM research, for instance, is one example of this type of research,
but has traditionally looked at the relevant on a much smaller scale in terms of the numbers and distribution of
participants. This notion of having a number of agents, some of which may be computer systems in the future, and
managing that interaction to allow smooth and safe system operation is really an important view of human factors that
hasn't been emphasized as much in past research.
In terms of looking at this from a broad systems perspective, a third area is the whole question of defining the problem
we're looking at. The ATC system as it is now includes both an air traffic control, which is a tactical planning
component, and flow management, which is a strategic planning perspective. A lot of emphasis has been put on tactical
planning. As we go toward free flight, the strategic planning issues don't go away. There are still questions for the
airlines to address in terms of safe and efficient operation, but there may be new questions about who is making these
strategic planning decisions and the tools and procedures necessary to support these decision-making activities. If we're
shifting more of the focus of control in the direction of the airlines, how do we ensure that they have the information that
will allow them to deal with both tactical and strategic planning effectively?
Let me give you a simple example of this kind of issue that an ATC coordinator from one of the airlines gave me last
week. Suppose that there's a flight headed into Dallas/Fort Worth somewhere west of White Sands. Operations Control
and the flight crew has to decide whether they would prefer to go south over J4 or north over J74. A computerized
planning program indicates that the most efficient path and flight profile takes it along J74 because of the winds that day.
As the flight gets closer to Dallas/Fort Worth it is discovered that, because of various bottlenecks, the flight can't actually
come in from the northwest. Consequently, it's rerouted to land on another runway and has to come in over the
southwest (or put in a holding pattern or given a series of S-turns to delay arrival, etc.). From the airlines perspective
this was bad planning. From the perspective of the air traffic system as a whole this was bad planning. Thus, while
optimizing the enroute portion of the flight looked like a good tactical decision, it turned out to be a bad strategic
decision.
In other words, in considering advanced ATM environments, we have to look at a mix of tactical and strategic issues.
Even though we may move in the direction of less flow management, we still have to address the question of how to
ensure that strategic planning is being done by appropriate people, and that they have the tools and information to do this
planning.
In addition, we need to recognize that the ATM system has a number of important characteristics. One such
characteristic is the need to support group problem solving, involving multiple agents with different goals and priorities.
A second is that we have multiple competing and complimentary goals. A third is that we've got geographically
distributed agents. These characteristics raise interesting questions about how and where technology can assist in
improving these interactions. How can we design tools that support all of these different agents? And also, how do we
ensure that the individuals, both in terms of the organization and in terms of the procedures and policies, are placed
appropriately within the system so that they can do their work? This is clearly a system that we would not feel
comfortable totally automating. We need to have humans engaged in the various tasks because of the kinds of tradeoffs
that must be dealt with and the kinds of very complex reasoning issues that are involved.
The flip side is that there are also a number of subtasks that people are not good at and where technology offers
opportunities to significantly improve the performance of the system. But we need to take a human factors perspective
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that concerns itself with the design of tools so that the people are involved at the right times in the system, and so that
people can use these tools effectively.
Another critical question deals with the most effective process for effecting change. Part of that concern at this stage is
the relationship between NASA and the FAA when engaging in planning changes. It's not enough to have designed a
system which in principle would do a good job of solving the problems. That system has to be implemented and be
accepted. We have to look at how are we going about this research and development process as well as looking at the
details of the solutions. In many respects that is a human factors problem, a cooperative problem solving problem, just
as the day-to-day operation of the airlines and of the air traffic system is. We have to think deliberately about the
process we're going through as well as the solutions we're exploring within that process.
Finally, another area of thought is the broader perspective on what we are doing. We are not producing software that
we'll shrink-wrap and sell to people. Even if there are some revolutionary changes initiated, we're clearly looking at a
system that's going to evolve. Therefore, another component of this process is how to ensure that there is adequate
evaluation and process control. We have to explicitly plan to collect data to inform us of what's working, and of where
the problems are. We have to think about system architectures in a global human and technological sense and ask how it
can be designed for evolution as we begin to find out what works and what doesn't.
In summary, there are three important research questions. One is the issue of human factors, not just from the
perspective of an individual's performance, but also from the perspective of group performance (the idea of distributed
cooperative problem solving). A second is making sure we really have identified and involved all the users throughout
this process. The third is scope. Although we may be shifting responsibilities, we have the challenge of taking
advantage of new technologies to reduce some of the bottlenecks, while also considering changes in policies and
procedures, which may increase our options. New policies and procedures may allow the airlines to be opportunistic in
their planning activities, but at the same time they need predictability. To support such opportunism, we therefore need
to take a broad systems perspective considering both tactical and strategic planning issues, as well as looking at the
appropriate roles of people and advanced technologies.
Question (Jim Boone): I've heard a lot of comment defining the users. I haven't heard anybody state that the Chief
Financial Officer of an airline is another user. They're the ones making the decisions. Clyde just said there was no need
for new technology. He's absolutely correct: we've got more technology than we know what to do with. The problem is
we can't decide which technologies to adapt and use. The reason we can't is because we can't grasp the total
ramifications of what we're trying to do. I know we can show the standard systems approaches to define requirements or
do all of our verification and validation. Sounds to me very much like the old software lifecycle; it never works that
way. It's an iterative process.
We need to face the fact that we don't know exactly where we're going. We have a general idea. What should we do?
For one thing: build a little, test a lot. I think that's got to be one of our fundamental ground rules. After that, we've got
to pick a migration path. We're not going to do it all at once. We're going to do it a little bit at a time. Build a little, test
a lot. And furthermore the migration path won't be correct; but it provides a starting point. Every so often you're going
to have to review the path and make mid-course corrections. How do you get started? Herman said he was disappointed
that only the long hauls were represented. That's fine because that's where the most immediate payoff is; that takes care
of a lot of users, the Chief Financial Officers. We can build a little success and credibility there before taking the next
step. Also, there are international connections; that's where the FAA has to play their biggest role.
Question (Dick Pitts, Harris Corporation): Does anybody know what COTS (commercial-off-the-shelf) means? I don't
see how you're going to do all this with a COTS mandate. With the dollars coming out of Congress to the FAA, it's
COTS; I don't think there's going to be any more large-scale implementations like VSCS. We've implemented over a
million lines of code getting into the field and operational in Seattle. I don't think there will be any more of those in my
lifetime because it's probably career limiting to those in the FAA and in Congress.
So, clean sheets of paper aren't the way to go. VSCS requirements were written by NASA; we got the contract, began
implementation, and found out that NASA didn't address all the human factor problems. They didn't talk to all the FAA
customers. And it gets me a little upset when I hear that NASA has done a lot of good work. They have, but I think it's
front end work, and mainly in the cockpit. I've talked to air traffic controllers in every region, and they all have a
different perspective. How did NASA take care of maintenance, logistics, and documentation in their human factors
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work? Those are all customers that we ended up having to deal with one at a time; every time we dealt with these people
new requirements were added to the system.
I worry a little bit about CTAS. What is industry going to inherit from NASA when it's time to really implement that
system? How much documentation will have to be redone? How much code? Is NASA SEI Level 3 rated? I know
when we get the job we're going to get all that scrutiny plus about ten helpers that will come along with the FAA to
review whatever we do. That's a problem you have to take into consideration if you're going to keep these programs in
the lab for eight years and then give them to industry and say all the problems are over. I hope they are. I hope this
one's different.
I understand where the FAA is coming from. I understand why Neil Planzer made some of the statements he did. A lot
of the work that's going on here is in the cockpit, not at the controller end of the business. There's some 750 options that
an air traffic controller can sit down and perform through VSCS at those touch entry displays, and a lot of human factors
work went into making those foolproof and easy to use. So the cockpit's certainly important, but the air traffic
controller's job is not going to get any easier. It isn't the FAA that I take issue with, but I do think that NASA needs to
be sensitive to these other customers.
Question (Dallas Denery): I would like to address this question to Clyde Miller. It has to do with the need for field
testing. I certainly understand the desire to do as much in simulation as you possibly can. The problem, which I think
has been borne out with the CTAS experience, is that you just cannot anticipate the types of problems that will come up
in the operational system. You can always design automation to handle known problems. The question is whether it has
the flexibility and the robustness to handle unexpected problems. That is some of the benefit that we've gotten from field
testing. I think that has been validated by the air traffic customer and the TATCA program office. Field testing has been
almost a requirement to proceed. There's no question that automation in the ATC system is a very difficult and complex
process; that's obvious because of its notable absence today. The question is how to get there in a fast way.
I'd like to trace the history of CTAS a little, because I think the history bore out that experience. We started about eight
years ago. But eight years ago it was really a NASA research program without direct FAA involvement. At that time
we laid out a process to try to get field data. We viewed it as essential to our success at that time. Between 1988 and
1992 the program would have to be viewed as an alternative concept, as opposed to a mainline FAA program. During
that period we were restricted to simulation. And so we built up as high a fidelity simulation capability as we could,
including on the order of 30 workstations, networks to NOAA for weather data, links to full piloted simulators both at
Langley and at Ames. We demonstrated to FAA Air Traffic that it was a viable concept based on simulation only. It
was in 1991 that Jack Ryan finally signed an agreement to allow us to get live data. We would not have been able to
proceed without access to this data. And so I would caution you against relying exclusively on simulation in the absence
of field tests. Our experience is that it's been very valuable.
One of the points I made this morning was to emphasize the benefits of taking a parallel approach in developing an
operational system versus what I referred to as the traditional approach. The point I did not make is that our
procurement system today is not compatible with that paradigm. During the first two years of the official program we
were trying to match the effort to the existing procurement structure. When I say we I mean the FAA. Recently new
FAA leadership has accepted a multi-build option. But current procurement regulations even make this is a tough
process. And there's a couple of issues associated with them. One is the idea that you have to have the system totally
defined in all aspects before you can go to a procurement; the way the program is handling that is for NASA to hand off
the prototype code to the FAA and the FAA then has responsibility for hardening it through its contractors, Lincoln Labs
and Martin Marietta. It's my understanding that CTAS will be government furnished equipment to the particular
contractor. I'm not yet sure whether that's the most expedient process .
Clyde Miller: I think I agree with you, Dallas. I am not critical of CTAS. I said and believe that CTAS is as good a job
as we've done. I think nobody has ever come this far, and we should all be proud of what's been accomplished, both on
the NASA and the FAA sides. I would not propose that we do no operational testing; you have to do operational field
testing. Most of us would agree with that. But that's an edge that one has to walk. If the automation development
process requires long hours of testing in the operational environment with many design iterations, progress will be too
slow. Ideally, most of the design iterations can be accomplished in a comprehensive simulation environment with
operational testing confined largely to validating the design.
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My motto for the FAA R&D program is that you've got to do it all. It's easy to think of air traffic management as
technology, but you've got to consider all the different perspectives, all the different stakeholders, all the different users,
including the General Aviation and the chief financial officers of the airlines, if you expect it to work in the real world.
You've got to consider all these perspectives, because if you leave one of them out, it will stop you, and then you will
spend a lot of time fixing it. That's'what makes it very difficult.
One other thing I would address is the procurement specification. It may be as thick as you like; the people that wrote it
may be clear in their own minds that they know exactly what they want; they've written it down and described it clearly.
The responders who read it, write the proposal, answer all the Qs and As, and go through negotiations may be clear that
they know exactly what's required and that they've got a plan for delivering it. More realistically, the people who wrote
the specification don't know exactly what they want, and the people that wrote the proposal don't really know exactly
what they're going to deliver. But our procurement processes don't take this into account. We go at these things on a
fixed price basis as though everybody knows exactly what's to be delivered. I think this is much of Dallas' point. It's a
problem with the procurement process. We need a more flexible procurement environment so we can make sense of
these things.
Question (Bob Curtis, Dynamic Simulation Group). Dr. Miller, you ended your statement earlier by mentioning the
development of the simulation facility as large as this room. Could you elaborate on that?
Clyde Miller: Well, it may or may not be a good idea. I have a mental picture of having a comprehensive simulation
capability of the air traffic management process where you could have the right number of consoles. I don't know how
many positions you need to validate a CTAS design, but to have comprehensive traffic scenarios, you need to have an
enroute arrival sector to interface with TRACON approach and departures, an overlying traffic management system, the
TRACON TMU as well as a center TMU, and whatever the full tool set is that you need to run as an integrated set.
You can get Denver data and generate targets. If you need 400 targets, you can generate 400 targets. You can get 30 or
40 pseudo pilots if you need them. You can take a team of controllers into a 1998 Denver control scenario. You can
train the controllers on how they're expected to run the traffic. You can close the door, run the traffic, and see what
happens. And it's not a PC on a tabletop or two Sun Workstations, it's a comprehensive representation of how you
expect this system to operate. And you have the capability to stop, take everything apart, and come back tomorrow
morning to start over when it's necessary. You're not in an operational facility, but you can represent the operation of the
automation capability in the operational environment with high fidelity. At some point you're going to have to take it to
the real facility. But with simulation you can go a long way towards developing and validating the design. If we don't
corporately have that capability these things will take a long time.
Question (Len Tobias, NASA Ames): The idea of a quick process to get automation in the field is an excellent one.
When you bring in the issue of free flight, the problem is that you don't have a way of doing something in the kind of
five-year period that you're talking about. What you do have is CTAS as a model of something that looks promising and
a means of getting automation in the field successfully. So why not take that paradigm, work it with free flight, and try
to get something in the field fairly soon and test it there in a way that you can build upon. That is really, I think, what
Heinz was getting at in his earlier talk. As Lane Speck was describing it, the problem is that if you start going down just
by altitudes in terms of being able to use free flight, you're going to reach a natural limit pretty soon. Without any kind
of automation you're not going to get down in a five-month period to 31,000 feet; at least with the CTAS paradigm, not
with CTAS but with a paradigm like it, you may be able to get there in a reasonable period of time.
Clyde Miller: I don't disagree with you. I think what Lane Speck talked about is something we'll do initially, and of
course it's procedural. And if there are opportunities for CTAS to help us with free flight then certainly we should
explore them.
Question (Vic Riley): You brought up a couple of important issues that have the potential for significant
misunderstanding among the group. The first one is the issue of whether NASA is developing a system or developing
technologies that give the FAA the opportunity to adopt specific design solutions into a system. I think it's the latter. I
don't think NASA's thinking about developing a completely new system, scrapping the old and bringing in the new in the
dead of night when nobody's looking.
That brings me to the other issue, the clean sheet of paper. To me, a clean sheet of paper means that you give yourself
the opportunity to revisit design decisions that were made a long time ago when technology was very different. If you
come up with a better way of doing something, it increases the options you have available when it comes time to
276
implement. It doesn't have to do with implementation. It has to do with technology development. Now, different
people are going to mean different things by that phrase, but to the extent that it becomes a point of contention, I think
the first thing various parties need to do is to define exactly what they mean by the phrase and how they hear it when
somebody else says it. When I say it, I mean opening up the design or solution space. I don't mean scrapping the old and
bringing in the new overnight; I don't mean system implementation. I think there is significant potential for
misunderstanding about that phrase as well as significant potential for misunderstanding the role of NASA. Both those
issues imply a great deal for the rest of the dialogue.
Question (Kim Vicente, University of Toronto): Earlier I commented on your bubble diagram. Several people have
remarked it would be nice if that's the way design actually works in organizations. The point is that that's not how
design works; we all know that. I've heard countless stories about human factors people who do a really good job, think
things out, test them, evaluate them, pass them on to somebody who has virtually no awareness of the context under
which that process took place. They then go and implement it, and because they're not knowledgeable of that context,
they totally miss the boat and make design changes that are intended to be insignificant or just implementation details,
but wind up being strong violations of the concepts and the principles that were intended to be embedded in that process.
This needs to be taken into account, because if this is going to be the way how things work, NASA might be blamed.
Question (Alan Campbell, Airline Pilots Association): I was a little bit concerned about Len's comment, and that leads
to some concerns about the present NRP that is underway. Tomorrow it'll drop down to 37,000 and then in another
month or so to 350, then on down to 29,000 feet. This has come not only pretty aggressively but pretty quickly. I just
want to be sure from a flight deck point of view that what is being implemented is thoroughly tested prior to being
fielded. I don't want the fielding to be the test platform as it appears to me it was with TCAS. With the NRP I'm not
really clear about what conflict detection has been implemented since it has gone into effect. Is anything more than the
present snitch machine and my TCAS being used? I hope that there is. And I know that while NRP hasn't been
implemented at my company, the controllers I've talked to certainly don't seem to be very knowledgeable about the
program.
Question (Howard Mortazavian, UCLA): It is clear that there is significant amount of knowledge available and
theoretical research being done in universities. However, there is not always an adequate amount of coordination or
communication on these things. NASA could provide quite a bit of leadership in coordinating that sort of effort. I
wonder what thoughts you have on forums like this?
Vic Lebacqz: NASA has reaffirmed recently the importance of our academic partners to us. This workshop and similar
panels have, in fact, been specifically geared to take advantage of academia. Research at Ames is done with our industry
and our academic partners.
Let me make a couple of closing comments. We have, as I mentioned, a meeting during the rest of this week to try to
digest the results of this forum. I would like to try to get back to all interested parties here with our FAA partners once
we understand what that means. We need to work this issue very hard; it's critical that we resolve the issue. I think the
issue may be semantics rather than substance in many cases, although I don't know whether Clyde would agree with that.
There's a continuing promise that NASA and the FAA are going to find a way to do something useful together.
Let me just close the conference by thanking the speakers and the session chairmen for helping with this. I hope that you
feel that you heard some new material in addition to the same old material. We appreciate your coming. Thank you all
very much.
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Human Centered Automation Guidelines
(NASA: Billings, 1991)
1. Humans must remain in command of flight and air traffic operations
2. Human operators must remain involved
3. Human operators must be better informed
Riley Figure 6.
283
What should NASA do?
NASA
ARC'
NASA
LaRC
Human
Centered
Automation
Guidelines
Human Illl "~
Centered
Design
Philosophy
cilll
Human Centered
System Concept
Operator authority and involvement => responsibility
Zero training
Zero errors
Riley Figure 7.
284
Cooperative Problem-Solving
in
Strategic Planning
for
Air Traffic Management
Philip J. Smith*
Elaine McCoy'*
Judith Orasanu***
Michelle Rodvold***
Charles Billings*
h
 Cognitive Systems Engineering Laboratory
The Ohio State University
** Department of Aviation
Ohio University
***NASA Ames Research Center
Smith Figure J.
Focus Groups
* Interactions of Dispatchers with ATCSCC
- 7 Airlines (Dispatchers, ATC Coordinators, Chief
Dispatchers, Pilots)
- 2 ATCSCC Specialists
- 4 FAA System Development Staff Members
* Interactions of Dispatchers with Flight Crews
- 8 Airlines (8 Pilots and 8 Dispatchers or Chief
Dispatchers)
* Interactions of Dispatchers, ATCSCC, TMUs and
Right Crews
- 8 Airlines (Dispatchers, ATC Coordinators, Chief
Dispatchers, Pilots)
- ATCSCC
- 5 TMUs
Smith Figure 2.
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"Prediction accuracy is the prerequisite for efficient
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Task Characteristics
* Multiple Agents with Different Goals and Priorities
* Multiple Competing and Complementary Goals
* Geographically Distributed Agents
* Distributed and Cooperative Problem-Solving
* Information and Data Rich
* Computationally Demanding Tasks
* Knowledge Rich
* Complex and Changing Constraints
* Highly Stochastic
* Large Solution Space
Smith Figure 7.
Broad Questions
* What are the major bottlenecks in the current system?
* How do we increase airspace utilization and airport
capacity?
* How do we improve strategic planning to support and
take advantage of such increases in capacity, while
allowing the airlines to make decisions based on
economic considerations?
* How do we improve the sharing of data and
information?
* How do we improve the sharing of knowledge?
* How do we improve communications and cooperative
problem-solving?
* What can we learn from current successes in the Non-
Preferred Route Request program and the Slot-Swap
program?
* How do we distribute responsibilities and workload?
* In what areas can technological advances improve
performance?
* In what areas can procedural changes improve
performance?
Smith Figure 8.
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Broad Questions
* In what areas can training improve performance?
* How will these changes affect the responsibilities and
workload of Dispatchers, ATC Coordinators, TMOs,
Controllers and ATCSCC Specialists?
* What is the most effective process for effecting
change?
Smith Figure 9.
Design from a Systems Perspective
* Design Process
* Design Components
* Problem Definition
* Evaluation /Process Control
- Design for Data Collection
- Design for Evolution
Smith Figure 10.
Design from a Systems Perspective
1. Human Factors
- Individual Performance
- Group Performance (Distributed/Cooperative
Problem Solving)
2. Users
- Pilots
- Controllers
- Passengers
- Dispatchers
3. Scope
- Interaction of Strategic and Tactical Planning
Smith Figure 1 1.
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ACRONYMS - ATM WORKSHOP
AAR Association of American Railroads
AAS Advanced Automation System
AATT Advanced Air Transportation Technologies
ACAS Airborne Collision Avoidance System
ADF Automatic Direction Finder
ADS Automatic Dependent Surveillance
AECB Atomic Energy Control Board
AERA Automated Enroute ATC
AGATE Advanced General Aviation Transport Experiments
AHRS Attitude Heading Reference System
ALPA Airline Pilots Association
AM Amplitude Modulation
AMSS Aeronautical Mobile Satellite Service
AOPA Aircraft Owners and Pilots Association
APA Allied Pilots Association
ARPA Advanced Research Projects Agency
ARTS Automated Radar Terminal System
ATC Air Traffic Control
ATCS Advanced Train Control Systems
ATIS Automatic Terminal Information Service
ATM Air Transportation Management
ATN Aeronautical Telecommunications Network
AW ACS Airborne Warning And Control System
AW AS Automated Weather Advisory Station
CAA Civil Aviation Authority
CAAC Civil Aviation Authority of China
CAT-1 Category 1
CDTI Cockpit Display of Traffic Information
CENA Centre d'Etudes de la Navigation Aerienne (France)
CFTT Controlled Flight Into Terrain
CNS Communications Navigations and Surveillance
COM Communications
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COTR Contracting Officer's Technical Representative
COTS Commercial Off The Shelf
CPDLC Controller Pilot Datalink Communications
CRITTER Civil Rotorcraft IFR Terminal-Area Technology Enhancement Research
CRM Crew Research Management
CRT Cathode Ray Tube
CTAS Center TRACON Automation System
CTC Centralized Train Central
CTR Civil Tilt Rotor
CVSRF Crew Vehicle Systems Research Facility
DA Descent Advisor
DFW Dallas Fort Worth International Airport
DGPS Differential GPS
DLR German Aerospace Research Establishment
DME Distance Measuring Equipment
DOD Department of Defense
DOT Department of Transportation
EDF Electricite de France
EFIS Electronic Flight Information System
EMS Emergency Medical Services
FAA Federal Aviation Administration
FADEC Full Authority Digital Engine Control
FANS Future Air Navigation Systems
FAR Federal Acquisition Regulation
FAST Final Approach Spacing Tool
FBO Fixed Based Operator
FEATS Future European Air Traffic System
FL Flight Level
FMS Flight Management System
FRA Federal Railroad Administration
GA General Aviation
GNSS " Global Navigation Satellite System
GPS Global Positioning System
HAI Helicopter Association International
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HF High Frequency
ICAAS Integrated Control in Avionics for Air Superiority
ICAO International Civil Aviation Organization
IFR Instrument Flight Rules
IMC Instrument Meteorological Conditions
IPT Integrated Product Team
JSRA Joint Sponsored Research Agreement
LAX Los Angeles International Airport
LDGPS Local DGPS
MTT Massachusetts Institute of Technology
MLS Microwave Landing System
MOA . Memorandum of Agreement
MWP Meteorological Weather Processor
NADIN National Airspace Data Interchange Network
NAS National Airspace System
NASA National Aeronautics and Space Administration
NATCA National Air Traffic Controllers Association
NBAA National Business Aircraft Association
NDB Non Directional Beacon
NLR National Research Laboratory (The Netherlands)
NOT AM Notice to Airman
NRP National Route Program
OAG Official Airline Guide
OBTEX Offboard Targeting Experiments
PHARE Program for Harmonized ATC Research in Europe
PIREPS Pilot Reports
PVD Plan View Display
RASCAL Rotorcraft Air Crew Systems Concepts Airborne Laboratory
RDP Radar Data Processing (system)
RNP Required Navigation Performance
RTA Required Time of Arrival
RTCA Radio Technical Committee on Aeronautics
SATCOM Satellite Communications
SBIR Small Business Innovative Research
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SEA/TAC Seattle/Tacoma International Airport
SITA Societe Internationale Telecommunique Aeronautique
STTR Small Business Technology Transfer Resources
SUA Special Use Airspace
TAAATS Australian Advanced Air Traffic Services
TATCA Terminal Air Traffic Control Automation
TCAS Tactical Collision Avoidance System
TMA Traffic Management Advisor
TMU Traffic Management Unit
TRACON Terminal Radar Approach Control
TSRV Transport Systems Research Facility
UCLA University of California at Los Angeles
UPS United Parcel Service
VHP Very High Frequency
VMC Visual Meteorological Conditions
VOR Very High Omni Range
VSCS Voice Switching and Control System
VTOL Vertical Take Off and Landing
WAAS Wide Area Augmentation System
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